

This is geopolitics without the drama of military strategies but nevertheless with dramatic effects for local and national communities.

Each theme is illustrated by a set of case studies. The geopolitics of globalization is illustrated through an exploration of the 2018 US–Mexico border crisis and the question of China’s place in the global order. The geopolitics of development is revealed by the variable geography of the 2007–8 financial crisis and the US government’s mishandling of the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic, whereas the geopolitics of global regulation is illustrated by the outsized role of global credit-rating agencies and the EU’s mediation of the Eurozone crisis. Few will likely deny Agnew’s contention that “thinking about the world entirely in terms of interstate competition between the Great Powers misses much about how the world actually works” (p. ix). Likewise, the fact that there are winners and losers from globalization has dawned on even the most ardent pro-globalization liberals. What makes *Hidden Geopolitics* an important contribution to current debates, however, is its *critical political geography* perspective, which highlights how spatiality shapes our political world—not via a deterministic relationship between geographic factors and political “necessities” but via geographic representations and imaginaries that influence the understanding and practice of world politics.

This critical perspective comes into clearest view in chapter 3, which focuses on how historical-geographical analogies perpetuate an image of geopolitics originating from the era of inter-imperial rivalry and impose it on the present world to “make the strange familiar.” Agnew offers the examples of “Balkanization” and “Macedonian Syndrome.” Long associated with irrational hatreds among intermixed ethnic groups, both concepts continue to be applied across a range of geographic locations to signal imminent danger from ethnic conflict, thereby effectively reducing geopolitical complexities (not least the detrimental effects of great-power intervention) to local animosities (pp. 58–61). Similar geopolitical tropes inherited from the Cold War presently fuel ideas of a “new Cold War” in which the United States must strive to contain a rising China. This is another form of “hidden” geopolitics: a vernacular geopolitics that offers a convenient but generally misleading way of classifying global problems and solutions.

Hidden Geopolitics has much more to offer than can be explored in this short review. Besides exploring the role of geopolitical tropes in perpetuating a myth of unending interstate territorial conflict, another strength of the book is its attention to historical path-dependence. Chapter 2 centers on the historic role of the United States in opening up the world economy. The public and private agencies of global regulation that shape current patterns of globalization predominantly originate in the United States from where they have been exported to the rest of the world.

The very possibility of cross-border corporate and financial transactions hinges on the spread of legal norms and procedures that arose in the United States in the nineteenth century and continue to be managed by global law firms based mainly in New York and London. Importantly, unlike many that see this as bestowing a unique advantage on the United States in enabling it to control the world economy (e.g., Susan Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” *International Organization* 41 [4], 1987; Farrell and Newman, *Underground Empire*, 2023), Agnew paints a more uncertain picture in which the monster has long since escaped control by its creator.

As should be clear, *Hidden Geopolitics* is not a book organized around competing explanatory frameworks and testable hypotheses. What emerges across 200 pages is less a theory of how globalization and geopolitics fit together than a meditation on the historicity and spatiality of global politics. Concerns about case selection thus seem inapt. Still, there are themes I would have liked to read more about. For example, I would have liked to read more about China’s global role (chapter 5 somewhat skims the surface), Putin’s seeming aspirations to reestablish the Russian empire, and the uneven effects of globalization across Africa.

That said, *Hidden Geopolitics* is a tour de force that delivers a clear message: neither globalization nor geopolitics captures the reality of contemporary world politics. We live in an “in-between world” where great powers continue to vie for domination, but meanwhile all sorts of hidden geopolitics determine how the world really works. This is rarely a good thing, but to remedy the system’s faults we must first clearly see the fault lines.

Rooted Globalism: Arab–Latin American Business

Elites and the Politics of Global Imaginaries. By Kevin Funk. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022. 286p. \$75.00 cloth, \$32.00 paper.

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— Silvia Feraboli , Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, silvia.feraboli@ufrgs.br

In his 1996 *Questions of Cultural Identity*, Stuart Hall proposes the use of the verb “articulate” to discuss identity. For him, this verb conveys two meanings that are essential for our understanding of how identities are forged and mobilized. As a verb, to articulate means “to utter”; as a noun, however, it defines a kind of joint that connects the front cab of a truck to a trailer via a pivoted bar. Hall writes, “An articulation is thus the form of connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made?” (p. 141). This is the question that permeates the

entirety of Kevin Funk's book: Under what circumstances do Latin American elites of Arab descent connect their transnational Arab identity to their national (Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean) identities? The central argument developed by the author is clear: this connection is made when business profits are at stake.

Authors with a Marxist orientation—and Funk clearly is one of them—mostly tend to portray elites in the Global South as either victims or proxies of their Global North counterparts. Funk does not follow that trend, however. For him, Arab economic elites in Latin America have their own agenda, one that is strongly connected to their country of residence and citizenship. After more than a century of presence in Latin America, Arab immigrants have not only been fully integrated into Latin societies but have also assumed as theirs the identity of their countries of residence, strategically mobilizing some nuances of Arabness when seeking business with Arab countries. If the mobilization of this perceived cultural capital by Arab Latin elites for business profit is the thread that intertwines Funk's work, the construction of global imaginaries at the business elites' level and how identities are marshaled on the ground for the purpose of capitalist accumulation are the main material making up *Rooted Globalism*.

Funk's main argument in the book is that global elites are not firmly marching toward a rootless globality but are grounded in their national spaces that they, in turn, use as platforms to launch their business enterprises around the world. The socioeconomic relations that Arab Latin business elites have been forging with the Arab world are, therefore, a broad case study about how elites from the Global South see themselves as globalizing agents and how globalization is enacted through their actions—separately from the Global North. From the perspective of the construction of global imaginaries at the business elites' level in the Global South, which is *Rooted Globalism*'s main concern, the colonial experience is not to be neglected. Both Arabs and Latin Americans endured centuries of direct or indirect forms of European imperial control and currently face renewed forms of US neocolonialism hardly seen in other parts of the world. This has historically shaped the way Arabs and Latin Americans related to, a lens that is clearly central to the discourse of Funk's interviewees.

It is fascinating to see how much of an Orientalist discourse is manifested in some of the comments of Latin American businessmen about Arabs and how much those Arab elites *concurrently* feel offended by what they perceive as prejudice against them for being Arab. The situation of Arabs in Latin America evokes Albert Memmi, Thomas Cassirer, and G. Michael Twomey's now classic discussion of the "impossible life" of Frantz Fanon "existing" between France and Algeria: too Afro-Caribbean to be French, too culturally French Christian and Black to be Algerian ("The Impossible Life of Frantz Fanon,"

Massachusetts Review 14 [1], 1973). In the rich ethnographic interviews at the core of *Rooted Globalism*, we can see members of the Arab-descent Latin American elite class trying to affirm their Argentineness, Brazilianness, or Chileanness by downplaying their Arab past and at the same time proudly affirming their Arabness as absolutely compatible with their respective Latin American citizenship and identities.

It is noteworthy that these perceived congruous identities have deep historical roots. For roughly seven centuries, between 711 and 1492, both Spain and Portugal (the core of the Iberian Peninsula) were governed by Arab Muslim rulers. During that time, Arabic was the lingua franca of the peninsula and the Mediterranean. A civilization and history were erected around the possibility of communication and expression in Arabic. This means that, at some point, those we perceive today as Portuguese and Spanish people were, in fact, Arabs. As Emilio González Ferrín explains in *Cuando Fuimos Arabes* (2018), at that time to be Arab was to be part of the Arabic-speaking civilization and everything that was erected around it and because of it. It is also well known that the Arab Muslim presence in contemporary Latin America dates to the time of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the region. Moors—Muslims of Arab or Berber descent living in Spain or North Africa—explored the Americas with Spanish conquistadors in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Many ended up settling in areas of Latin America after fleeing from persecution, such as the Spanish Inquisition.

These historical-geographical insights, often invoked by Funk's research, make *Rooted Globalism* a work that transcends the (arbitrary) lines of political science and puts it in direct dialogue with the disciplines of anthropology, history, and geography, as well as the new fields of critical diaspora studies, South–South relations, transnational identity politics, and scholarship related to the role of the Global South in the future of capitalism. Another major contribution of Funk's work is the awareness he brings to the reproduction of the Orientalist discourse in Latin America and the implications it has not only for the elites under scrutiny in the book but also for the millions of citizens of Arab origin living in Latin America. Evoking Darcy Ribeiro's famous quote that the Arabs achieved success in the New World due to their greedy devotion to nothing else but money and profit (*The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil*, 2000)—something that, said in a heavily Catholic environment, equates to saying that these people are evil—Funk demonstrates how these kinds of statements of truth about the Arab diaspora in Latin America have been resignified in unofficial but highly effective ways.

The centrality of this process is clearly illustrated by the discussion of Paulo Maluf's election campaign catchphrase. While running for mayor of São Paulo (the richest city in Brazil), Maluf's slogan was "rouba, mas faz" (he steals, but he

gets things done). During his successful career as a Brazilian politician, the Lebanese-descended Maluf embodied the tenets of tropical Orientalism: being a smart, charming, corrupt, and greedy Other who is here to accumulate fortune at the expense of the impoverished, hardworking local population. After Maluf's arrest in 2018 for corruption, money laundering, and currency evasion, Brazilian politicians with Arabic connections started to downplay their Arab origins as much as possible—unless trade, business, and capital were at stake. Brazil's current vice president, Geraldo Alckmin, is not an Arab; that is, until he is speaking to an Arab audience of investors and entrepreneurs and then a couple of badly pronounced words in Arabic are spoken and his Lebanese origins are used as credentials for the construction of business partnerships based on a common past that can lead to a common (profitable) future.

It would have been interesting to see a discussion about how global imaginaries are constructed at the non-elite level in *Rooted Globalism*. I can think of two questions that could have added even more nuance to this book's insights: Are there strategic mobilizations of Arab identities in Latin America deployed by non-elites to develop stronger connections to social movements or political parties in the Arab Latin world? And, if so, how are these identities mobilized on the ground for the purpose of human emancipation?

Delivering on Promises: The Domestic Politics of Compliance in International Courts. By Lauren J. Peritz.

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— Oumar Ba, *Cornell University*
oumar.ba@cornell.edu

When are international organizations (IOs) effective in promoting interstate cooperation? What conditions and factors hinder their effectiveness? What make states break their commitments or skirt their obligations following adjudication by international courts (ICs)? These are the questions that Lauren J. Peritz seeks to answer in this book. Its focus is on a specific kind of IO, international economic courts, and the case studies are the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO DSM) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).

Domestic political constraints, Peritz finds, are the major drivers of the variations seen in state compliance with international courts' (ICs) rulings. A high number of domestic veto players make states less responsive to adverse international rulings, thereby hindering ICs' effectiveness. When institutional legislative constraints and domestic interest groups converge, they pressure governments to resist unfavorable WTO rulings, for instance (pp. 114–32). In fact, states face domestic incentives to “cheat” in

response to pressures from domestic interest groups. States evade enforcement by the courts, and domestic constraints lock in the violations of international trade policies and commitments. Going even further with veto players theory, the book argues that “the effectiveness of international courts is a function of the domestic politics of litigant governments” (p. 8). A cross-national variation of the outcomes is determined by various forms of gridlock and opportunism.

Despite these domestic hindrances, however, Peritz finds that ultimately international economic courts are indeed effective in restoring international cooperation under certain conditions. For instance, the WTO DSM and the ECJ have advanced international cooperation in concrete ways, making states adjust their policies and abide by their rulings. In that sense then, international adjudication furthers international economic cooperation.

Delivering on Promises makes two major contributions to the study of international cooperation. First, it advances the literature on the effects of domestic politics on international cooperation, articulating the mechanisms through which veto players undercut their governments' willingness or ability to abide by adverse international rulings. As such, these veto players do indeed curtail the ability of IOs to effectively facilitate cooperation. Second, these findings open avenues to improve the effectiveness of international organizations through institutional design. IOs can better mitigate the constraints to compliance by introducing more flexibility mechanisms—allowing, for instance, states to temporarily defect from or delay compliance.

A rational choice approach guides *Delivering on Promises'* theoretical framework, taking states as strategically motivated actors that try to maximize short- and long-term gains. Empirically, the author uses large-N data for statistical analyses, complemented by the two case studies. In chapter 2, the author presents the theory and shows how veto players—division of authority within the state—can hinder compliance with ICs. The four hypotheses to be tested empirically are also presented. Chapter 3 introduces the WTO and EU courts and how governments use them to advance their interests. The author then tests the hypotheses, showing that states are less likely to comply with WTO rulings when domestic politics and veto players' interests interject (chap. 4). One of the strengths of the analysis is the construction of a novel dataset on (non)compliance with adverse WTO rulings and drawing out the link between such (non) compliance with the extent of domestic constraints, whether bicameralism, federalism, or partisan divisions (pp. 120–32). The author finds that veto players do undermine the ability of the WTO to enhance economic cooperation and trade between disputing governments (chap. 5). Chapter 6 focuses on the ECJ and shows that defendant states with more internal divisions,