

are good, and I noticed only a single misprint.

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**CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSALITY** by D.M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm. Oxford: *Blackwell*, 1984. pp. 222. Price £17.50 (Hardcover).

This is one of the first two volumes of a new series of 'Great Debates in Philosophy'. So the first and grateful task for any reviewer is to welcome this project. The second duty is less grateful, yet absolutely necessary if the debt of the philosophical public to Blackwell is to become as great as it should. For the promise of this project will not be fulfilled if future executants handle their assignment as Armstrong and Malcolm have done. What we have here is two very able philosophers for the most part talking past one another. What we might have had, and need, is a sustained dialogue in which by getting at least some things firmly agreed at least some progress is made.

The book begins with a ninety-nine page essay by Malcolm. This is, of course, excellent stuff. But we thus have to wait for too long before we hear Armstrong speaking in his own person. Malcolm's essay ends with what should have been seen by Armstrong as a salutary challenge: "... philosophers ... have lost sight of the bearer of mental predicates ... These destinies and vicissitudes are undergone and suffered by *people* ... *not* by immaterial minds or brains or machines" (pp. 100—1). Armstrong then has first say, eighty-seven pages of it. This is only fair, indeed twelve pages less than fair. But, because Malcolm is by the rules bound to keep silent until the time comes for his twelve-page Reply, Armstrong is able to start off by accepting "the traditional picture ... of the relation of a person's body to that person's mind" as "by and large a correct one". So all his answers are given in terms of that picture. This is bound to make all who favour Malcolm's starting point want to imitate the disapproving looker over the garden fence in the Pont cartoon: "I suppose you realize that you are doing that all **WRONG**".

Naturally with two participants of the calibre of Malcolm and Armstrong it works both ways. It would, for instance, have been so much better if Armstrong could have come in at once to dispose of the suggestion that two things cannot be identical just because under one description they possess of necessity characteristics which under another they possess only contingently. This is, surely, one point on which agreement might have been reached. In reaching that agreement they might perhaps also have agreed not to agree but to disagree with Elizabeth Anscombe's contention that a brain state could not be a sufficient condition for a belief. For this is true only where 'sufficient condition' is construed in a non-contingent sense. It was exactly thirty years ago that failure to distinguish local and causal from material implication interpretations of 'necessary condition' and 'sufficient condition' misled Michael Dummett to offer an affirmative answer to the Joint Session symposium question 'Can an Effect precede its Cause?'

Finally, I wish that someone had been heard saying that the Cartesian problem is a problem (only) of the relationship between consciousness and stuff. So there is no call for anyone who wants to say that enjoying such and such a sort of consciousness just is being in this or that physiological state to feel bound to maintain that beliefs, intentions, hopes, fears, purposes and you name it are all brain states.

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