philosophy and theology in considering the issue of theodicy. From philosophy all that is required is a formal resolution of an apparent logical incompatibility; nothing more. But from theology much more is necessary; not just possibility, but plausibility—something that will comfort people in their suffering. This has traditionally been supplied by pointing to the Cross as God's direct and personal identification with us in our suffering. But Sutherland rejects any such appeal to Revelation, though the adequacy of his grounds are far from proven. There is a brief mention of Troeltsch, but in the only detailed critique he gives he is surely wrong. He claims that the Virgin Birth is ruled out by obvious parallels elsewhere, such as Virgil's fourth *Ecologue*. But classical scholars would now be in general agreement that the poem refers to the birth of a human child in the ordinary way. Even if the virgin Astraea had been intended as the mother, there is still no hint that she would have conceived the child other than through intercourse with Jupiter.

With his own positive view I find it puzzling why one is supposed to need the figure of Christ to engender optimism. Are there not a hundred minor acts of altruism to encourage us on our way? And, if only heroic self-sacrifice will do, again instances are not wanting in modern times. But even more puzzling is the way in which he sometimes explains the significance of Christ in language which makes sense only in terms of the traditions of Christianity which he has rejected. So, for instance, we are told that 'evasive action' was 'ruled out from the start' in 'the weakness of the cradle' (p. 124). But that surely only makes sense if we think of the birth as a significant event in the life of God incarnate. Again, he attaches moral significance to the way in which the Fourth Gospel describes Jesus' approach to the Cross (p. 191). But what significance can this have, unless with St. John you accept the doctrine of the Incarnation?

However, neither of these two criticisms should be taken as implying that the book is not worth reading by those of a very different suasion. Rather, the better we understand such religious atheism the better equipped will we be to show the richness of the alternative. Indeed, as I read the book I could not help but be struck both by the similarities and the differences from his fellow-Scott in the philosophy of religion, Donald MacKinnon. There is the same care for intricacies of argument, the same admiration for Kant, the same preoccupation with suffering, the same enlightenment sought through literature. But then there is this vast difference. It has led the younger man to the edge of disbelief, the older in worship to the foot of the Cross.

DAVID BROWN

PERSONAL IDENTITY by Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne. ***Basil Blackwell,*** **Oxford, 1984, Pp. 158. £15.00 (paperback £5.50).**

This is one of the first two volumes in Blackwell's new series 'Great Debates in Philosophy'. In it, '(e)ach author contributes a major original essay stating his or her position', and then each comments on the other's view. The aims are 'to provide ... a series of clear accessible and concise introductions' to the issues discussed, and also to bring together 'two outstanding philosophers to throw light on a topic of current controversy'. I doubt whether absolute beginners will find the present volume easy going as an introduction. (For that purpose, John Perry's booklet 'A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality', Indianapolis (1978) is better.) But it is certainly a lively and thought-provoking exchange of views, which will prove very useful indeed in teaching philosophy, particularly as a text for seminar discussion. It is unfortunate for the authors and publisher that the book appeared almost simultaneously with Derek Parfit's *Reasons and Persons* (O.U.P. 1984), a masterpiece which must now be the central text for any treatment of personal identity, and is likely to remain so for a very long time. Although both authors here do discuss Parfit's views as previously published—Shoemaker with a fair measure of agreement, Swinburne with none—the fact that they do not consider the sustained, developed and systematic treatment which

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028428900033151 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Parfit has now given his position makes the book seem somewhat anachronistic. This is particularly true of Swinburne, since his arguments have hardly advanced since his well-known paper in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* in 1976, and Parfit has now given what are (to my mind, at least) convincing answers to them (see op. cit. e.g. Sections 81—2, 102). However that may be, the present volume is a useful contribution. One of its particular strengths lies in the connexions both authors make between personal identity and other problems of philosophy, although, as I will indicate, this is done in a rather complicated and ambiguous manner. (This is one of the reasons I would not recommend the book to beginners.)

Swinburne presents what he calls 'The Dualist Theory', in which personal identity is claimed to be an ultimate, indefinable and unanalysable fact. Psycho-physical facts such as bodily continuity or memory connexions may be *evidence of* personal identity, but they are not what that identity *consists in*. What it does consist in, he argues, is the continuing existence of a soul, made out of 'immaterial stuff' (p. 27), which is both logically and in fact separable from the body. This 'simple view' as Swinburne, following Parfit, calls it, is described as a modified Aristotelianism, which 'amounts to the same as Cartesian dualism' (pp. 20—1). It is called 'classical dualism', and is to be preferred on most grounds to Aquinas' 'greater distortion' of Aristotle (p. 32). Swinburne claims that this same separation of soul from body (its 'vehicle', p. 22) is what would be involved in 'reincarnation, as Eastern religions (sic) have understood that' and in 'resurrection, as on the whole Western religions ... have understood that' (p. 23). 'To say that a person has an immaterial soul is ... just a way of expressing the point within a traditional framework of thought that persons can—it is logically possible—continue, when their bodies do not' (p. 31). In a long section, 'Dualism and Verifiability', he is much vexed by 'empiricist theories' which he claims rest on 'verificationist dogma'. (I would agree with Shoemaker, p. 145, that this is a red herring). Finally, having thus to his satisfaction separated the *meaning* of personal identity from any necessary connexion with *evidence* for it, he discusses the nature of that evidence, insisting that what he calls 'the principle of credulity' justifies 'our reliance on apparent personal memory' (p. 57). Unfortunately, at a crucial point here he misdescribes the notion of 'quasi-memory', introduced by Shoemaker in 1970, which is central to the position he is attacking (p. 56, discussed by Shoemaker on p. 148 n.7).

Shoemaker's piece is called 'A Materialist's Account' *not* 'A Materialist Theory', since he is a materialist, but the functionalist account he gives of the nature of mind is 'neutral as to how personal identity and mental phenomena are realised' and is compatible with both materialism and dualism (p. 139). He also argues, correctly in my opinion, in his Reply to Swinburne, that the latter's 'simple view' of the unanalysable but necessarily determinate nature of personal identity does not in fact imply dualism (pp. 140—1). The essay is very clearly and comprehensively set out, and might have been better placed before Swinburne's (except that, perhaps, he discusses at some length Swinburne's views as previously published, and so this is easier after Swinburne's re-statement of them). He argues for a development of Locke's view that personal identity consists centrally in connexions of memory and consciousness. He does this by rehearsing and developing a number of arguments which he and others have used, concerning imaginary cases of brain bisection and transplant, fission and fusion of persons, and so on; and also by arguing for a functionalist account of mind (pp. 92—7). Here a mental state is 'definable in terms of its relations (primarily its causal relations) to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and (especially) other functional states' and thus 'is individuated and constituted as being the particular state it is, by its place in a complex causal network of states' (p. 92). This view is compatible with, though it does not entail, materialism (which he accepts for other reasons, 'roughly the explanatory success of the physical sciences', p. 139). The usefulness of this account of mind for the question of personal identity, he says, lies in its potential capacity to explain the 'appropriate causal connexions' which must exist between mental states if

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028428900033151 Published online by Cambridge University Press

they are to be states of the same person, without succumbing to the charge of circularity. This charge—made famously by Bishop Butler against Locke—claims that what Shoemaker calls 'remembering from the inside' must presuppose personal identity, and so cannot constitute it (pp. 81 ff and 98—101). Further brief but informative remarks follow, inter alia, on Unity of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, and on Personal Identity and Animal Identity. There is a particularly fine analysis of what can be meant by 'amnesia', partial or total— this latter called a 'brain zap' (pp. 86—8).

In his reply, Swinburne makes two points. He attacks the functionalist account of mind, and claims that Shoemaker's account of personal identity, particularly in the 'Brain-State Transfer Device', does not do justice to what he (Swinburne) sees as the actual hopes, fears and motivations of persons. Shoemaker's Reply goes more carefully and at greater length through Swinburne's essay, pointing out areas of agreement as well as disagreement. (This last section will be particularly useful pedagogically). Typographical errors, by and large, are rare and undisturbing, but one should be noticed. On pp.17—18 Swinburne is made to write that he is 'adopting' Bernard Williams' famous 'mad surgeon' story. He must have meant to say 'adapting', since his version differs importantly from Williams'. (It involves a brain bisection and separate transfers, which were not in the original). Unwary beginners, or those relying on memory for Williams' views here, might easily be misled about the relation of Williams' arguments to Swinburne's.

STEVEN COLLINS

LUIS DE LÉON : THE NAMES OF CHRIST. Translated and edited by Manuel Durán and William Kluback. *SPCK,* **London, 1984. Pp. 385. £12.50**

The Names of Christ is unquestionably one of the masterpieces of Spanish Golden Age prose, just as its author, the Augustinian Fray Luis de Léon, is a major writer of that period, famous in the Spanish-speaking world above all for his poetry, and almost unknown in this country. He was a gifted Biblical scholar and theologian, who valued and loved the Bible so much that he wrote the *Names* to compensate as far as possible for the fact that the glories of Christ in Scripture were forbidden to literate lay people who could not read Latin. The result is a great work of art, passionately evangelical in the best sense, a serene and burning witness to the universal and the personal Christ.

Fray Luis spent almost five years (1572—76) in the cells of the Inquisition, denounced for his interpretation of the Tridentine decree on the Vulgate's authenticity and for various other reasons, among which envy and malice were conspicuous. The *Names* was born in prison and finished after his vindication, when he became Professor of Bible at Salamanca. This is the first full English translation (Schuster, London, 1955, only translated parts). The fourteen names are those ascribed in the Bible to the humanity of Christ—Bud, Face of God, Way, Shepherd, Mountain, The Everlasting Father, Arm of God, King of God, Prince of Peace, Husband, Son of God, Lamb, Beloved, Jesus. Fray Luis's theory of names at the start outlines his philosophical and theological principles, which, like his allegorical and mystical exegesis, are foreign to us. But in spite of this the *Names* is a classic of devotional christology: Christ unlocks the meaning of the universe and personal experience. The christocentric cosmology is Pauline, a rare voice in post-Tridentine Spain, and the breadth of theological and Biblical exposition gives tremendous strength and integrity to the writing.

In the original, sentences are often long, elaborately constructed, abounding in parallelisms and antitheses and a highly developed imagery, though there are passages of lively and realistic dialogue between the three friends who converse about the names. The translators have opted for ASB and NEB English rather than Book of Common Prayer and KJV, but the Biblical quotations are from the latter (not always matching it, e.g. pp. 211—12), differentiating them from the dialogue therefore, unlike

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028428900033151 Published online by Cambridge University Press