

all this, the France of the period found room for new forms of Christianity, other types of Messianism, and an 'astonishing resurgence of occultism, illuminism, theosophy, freemasonry, and even diabolism' (p. 126).

Either because of the vigorous critical reaction at the end of the last century, or because of their own inherent weakness, none of these movements has survived except as a vestige. The author ends his balanced and well-documented survey of this fascinating period by remarking that most of the criticisms directed against Christianity in the last century, which made people feel the need for a new religious synthesis, no longer apply to contemporary Christianity, at least in most of its Protestant forms. This is not the place to suggest what atheists and Catholics might find to say about that. There is a large and useful bibliography.

HUGO MEYNELL

TWENTIETH-CENTURY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, by John Macquarrie; SCM Press; 40s.

Contemporary religious thought is a jungle, of which this book provides a very useful and detailed map. The quotations from the authors dealt with are invariably apt, and the comments on their works uniformly fair.

The period under consideration is divided by the author into three phases. The first, which derived directly from modes of thought fashionable in the nineteenth century, is that of positivism and naturalism on the one side, and idealism on the other. The section of the book dealing with this phase is the dullest, for all its historical importance; but this dullness is due rather to the subject-matter than to the author. The second phase, whose beginning coincided roughly with the outbreak of the First World War, is characterised by a retreat from the optimism which had previously prevailed; philosophy became more limited in its scope, repudiating metaphysics and other more comprehensive and pretentious aims. The third phase, in which we are living at present, is one of logical empiricism and existentialism in philosophy, and of the 'theology of the Word of God'. More fruitful discussion between these parties is much to be desired.

'I deny the divinity of Christ: I do not deny the divinity of any man.' This remark, attributed to Sir Henry Jones (p. 27), may be treasured as a little classic of conceptual inflation. The two quotations from C. S. Peirce (p. 175f.) on what it is to believe in God, and on the Eucharistic controversy between Catholics and Protestants, suggest that Peirce should be taken as seriously in the philosophy of religion as he is in logic and the philosophy of science. Leuba's recommendation of 'a blending of Comte's religion of humanity with Bergson's philosophy of creative evolution' as the religion of the future (p. 106) seems to anticipate in an interesting way the evolutionary humanism of Sir Julian Huxley and his disciples. In spite of the interesting summary on pp. 159-62, I think it is a pity that the author

gives so little space to the Marxist critique of religion. Whatever may be thought of its validity, its historical importance can hardly be denied.

Yet on the whole the survey is admirably comprehensive and erudite, and though it represents a frankly existentialist's-eye view, there is very little distortion. Inevitably, the author's own conclusions are controversial. At the very end of the book, he quotes with approval Bultmann's dictum that 'the question of God and the question of myself are identical' (p. 376). Now while it would be agreed by all Christians that one cannot know the truth about oneself without taking account of one's relationship to God, to give full assent to Bultmann's proposition is to come perilously near to admitting that discourse about God is *merely* a particularly solemn kind of discourse about oneself. This is a danger to which an existentialist theology is particularly prone; if the followers of Barth and the exponents of linguistic philosophy have anything in common, it is that they provide means by which this tendency may be counteracted. Though these both get fair and extended treatment from the author, it may be doubted whether he has given them due weight in his conclusions.

HUGO MEYNELL

THE GUITTON JOURNALS, 1952-1955, translated by Frances Forrest; Harvill Press; 36s.

English readers who are generally familiar with the French literary or philosophical scene are, I think, possibly less aware of Jean Guilton than of any of his contemporaries; and this is the more surprising since one of his earliest books is a still useful study of Newman's *Essay on Development* which shows a sympathetic knowledge not only of the Victorian background but also of the philosophical tradition in which Newman's ideas are rooted. M. Guilton's mind, in spite of this, is a very 'Frenchy' one, in the sense that it is deeply involved with the seriousness of those things which belong to the French intellectual tradition and only (at any rate in this *Journal*) moderately concerned with what lies outside it. The title itself is a little misleading, even though it is transposed from the French text, which also calls the book, more accurately, *Etudes et Rencontres*. There is no Pepsysian jotting down of the fascinating trivia of everyday life, but a series of long meditations on ideas and people, formally edited by the author himself. We sacrifice some spontaneity, but we gain enormously in the observation of what he regards as the main purpose of his thought. 'The core of this Journal', he writes, 'is a meditation on Being . . . Everyday love, everyday existence, orderly, sombre and splendid; country, land, religion—lived out in time. In fact "Incarnation" in all its varieties and forms.'

Such a formality of approach seems to suit the French academic mind, of which M. Guilton is perhaps one of today's most distinguished examples. And yet as soon as one has said this, one realises that there are in him certain reserva-