

Banks. *Dominican Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2). Again, the discussion of terms by appeal to ostensive definition or conventional rule has proved valuable, but it can only be philosophic if it does not assume a dogmatic form which rejects as trivial or uninteresting topics which, rightly or wrongly, engage the attention of other thinkers. Mr O'Connor falls very frequently into the trap to which the use of such words as 'trivial' exposes philosophers.

The volume on Berkeley contains a number of selections (with useful notes) from Berkeley's major works. As one would expect, Professor Jessop has selected these passages with discrimination. His Introduction is of great value, especially in its discussion of Berkeley's realism.

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**TIME AND ETERNITY.** An essay in the philosophy of religion. By W. T. Stace (Princeton University Press; Geoffrey Cumberlege; 20s.)

The central point of this essay is that the conflict between science and religion can be resolved if it is denied that religious language has a conceptual content. All statements about God are false when understood in a naturalistic (literal) sense; but they symbolise the intuitions of religious men and enable these to be communicated somewhat as aesthetic experience is communicated. 'The symbol does not mean, but evokes, the experience. For a meaning is, in strictness, a concept; whereas here there is no concept.' Professor Stace reaches this conclusion after examining the elements common to Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam: a process that would drive anyone to symbolism. A study of one of the mystics in our own Western tradition, or even a more careful reading of St Thomas (whose support for the opinion is so oddly claimed in the Preface of the book), would have cleared up this confusion, and perhaps many others, in Professor Stace's thought.

We have to grasp that the mode in which things exist in reality is not that in which we are bound, by our human limitations, to think of them. This is especially necessary, insists St Thomas, when we speak of God: we use many concepts to signify a being whom we know to be utterly simple. (*S.T.* I, 13.) The concepts are drawn from our knowledge of created beings, but there are some which can be freed from reference to creatures and said of God, though this does not bring us a step nearer to having a concept of him, or to comprehending him.

Such analogical thinking is possible because there is a bond between creatures and their creator; this is an 'intuition of religious minds' that Professor Stace is unwilling to accept. Hence his rejection of metaphysics and theology, which lie (in the orders of nature and grace) between naturalism and the direct experience of God—'the literalist error', he says, 'has been an almost universal phenomenon among philosophers in all ages'. It is certain that image and symbol have a large part to play in the communication of revelation, and no doubt some mystical experience is

ineffable, but it seems likely that the two sciences will survive this latest attempt to abolish them.

L.B.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER. *An Anthology*. Edited by Charles R. Joy. (Black; 18s.)

This volume is an attempt to gather into manageable compass a selection of the more inspiring and significant passages from Albert Schweitzer's voluminous works. The story of his life, with its example of utter self-sacrifice for no other purpose than to be a Good Samaritan to the poorest and most suffering race of mankind, has fired the imagination of Western man. Few men of our age had before them so distinguished a career as this critic, theologian, philosopher, musician and teacher. But all had to be sacrificed that he might help the unfortunate. Christianity for him was a being in love; it implied suffering and dying with Christ.

In spite of his eschatological interpretation of the life of Christ, he seems to regard the essence of Christ's teaching as a combination of Ethics, Reason and Mysticism. 'The driving force of it all he calls life-affirmation, world-affirmation or reverence for life. We must love and reverence all life, even in its lowest forms. Life is sacred, whether it be bodily life or spiritual life. Freedom and personality are perfections of life, and the Christian must struggle to save them.

As we read this very excellent collection of passages, it is all impressive. We can sense the sincerity of the soul which inspires it, and begin to feel that we can realise something of the idealism which inspired his life. We must value highly those passages in which he insists on the too common tragedy of losing one's early idealism. 'If all of us could become what we were at fourteen, what a different place the world would be!'

Unfortunately, he is so won over by the principle that everything must give way to the affirmation of life in this world that he rejects the asceticism and self-restraint of the middle ages and early Christianity as life-negation and therefore a degeneration. Christianity seems at times to be for him identical with the advance of civilisation, since civilisation is the highest type of life. He does, however, recognise that there must be internal progress in the external institutions of civilisation. Though he often praises reason and the search for truth, he seems to place higher the mystical instinct which follows felt, but less understood, ethical ideals than cold thought and reason. In this way he interprets the Christian ideal of being *in* the world, but not *of* it.

Few of the passages chosen but will provoke thought. On the other hand, unfortunately there is nothing here of what a Catholic would regard as supernatural; there is an unsympathetic rejection of doctrinal religion; there is no after-life; and the whole gives the impression of pantheism. Which of course makes his life a mystery to us. Can we say that God in