

LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

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EUROPE AND THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS. Edited by Ciro Angarita and Peter Coffey. (London: Pinter, 1988. Pp. 193. \$40.00.)

LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM. Second Edition. By G. Pope Atkins. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989. Pp. 421. \$48.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.)

THE CARIBBEAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS: THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING STATES. By Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989. Pp. 244. \$26.95 paper.)

EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Esperanza Durán. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985. Pp. 110.)

THE IBERIAN-LATIN AMERICAN CONNECTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986. Pp. 482. \$48.00 cloth.)

THE USSR AND LATIN AMERICA: A DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP. Edited by Eusebio Mujal-León. (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Pp. 408. \$39.95.)

THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICIES OF U.S. ALLIES: BALANCING GLOBAL INTERESTS AND REGIONAL CONCERNS. Edited by William Perry and Peter Wehner. (New York: Praeger, 1985. Pp. 185. \$35.00.)

Commencing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Latin American countries began using their increased capabilities and resources to try to reduce their dependence on the United States and to break out of the hegemonic system that Washington had imposed on all of Latin America following World War II.¹ Then and now, Latin American countries have

1. See Middlebrook and Rico, "The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Change, Complexity, and Contending Perspectives," in *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis*, edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 7. The hegemonic system's components were military alliance with the United States, ideological commonality, U.S. intervention, and economic dependence on the United States. This concept is discussed in James R.

also shared other complementary goals: autonomy or independence (however elusive it may be in an interdependent world), national security, and national development. The terms *autonomy* and *independence* have fairly clear meanings, as defined in dictionaries. But *national security* and *national development* in the Latin American context require some specification. According to Jennie Lincoln, *national security* refers to defense against external attack (the traditional meaning of the term) but also to internal challenges. *National development* signifies economic development and growth accompanied by various social and humanistic advances.² National development is viewed by most Latin American officials and commentators as the key to attaining other foreign and domestic policy objectives.

In seeking to realize autonomy and national development, Latin American countries of all sizes and stages of development face a difficult, even contradictory situation. It is described perceptively in G. Pope Atkins's *Latin America in the International Political System* (an updated and substantially revised version of the 1977 publication of the same title). This volume treats a range of topics: international relations theory, state and nonstate actors, Latin American cooperative efforts, the inter-American system, global organizations, policy instruments and interactions, violence and accommodation among Latin American states, and Latin American participation in various international regimes or undertakings.³ The book also provides an outstanding bibliography. Although Atkins is addressing the goal of independence or autonomy, his discussion applies equally well to the attainment of national development. In his view, "The pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy is not only difficult for many states but often paradoxical. Latin American states want to achieve or maintain independence in their international actions, but to do so they must be strong in relation to the outside world; to become strong they must obtain some sort of assistance from the outside world toward which they wish to be independent, thus increasing the chances for a dependent relationship" (p. 78).

The approach taken by most Latin American countries in dealing with this dilemma has been diversification of dependence. That is, these countries are endeavoring to reduce, but not wholly eliminate, their de-

Kurth, "The United States, Latin America, and the World: The Changing International Context of U.S.-Latin American Relations," in *ibid.*, 61-86.

2. See Lincoln, "Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions," in *Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions*, edited by Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), 6.

3. John T. Rourke defines an international regime as "a complex of norms, treaties, international organizations, and transnational activity that orders an area of activity such as the environment or oceans." See Rourke, *International Relations on the World Stage*, 2d ed. (Guilford, Conn.: Duskin, 1989), 541.

pendence on a single large country (the United States, for virtually all of them) by significantly expanding the range and depth of their international contacts. Lincoln characterizes diversification of dependence as “a declaration of independence inviting diplomatic and economic exchanges from any part of the international system.”⁴ To achieve this goal, Latin American countries have endeavored to expand their range of diplomatic contacts, export markets, sources of imports, and sources of investment capital and financing.

They have also tried a variety of measures, intangible and tangible, to diversify their dependence or assert their independence. Examples abound of unilateral, intangible measures that provide a psychological sense of lessened dependence and can be undertaken alone (although they may lead to no real lessening of dependence): Brazil’s recognition of the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a faction strongly opposed by the United States; the 1969 Consensus of Viña del Mar in which Latin American countries collectively spelled out a list of economic demands vis-à-vis the United States; substantial Latin American condemnation of the United States for siding with Britain in the Anglo-Argentine war over the Malvinas-Falklands; and the widespread Latin American criticism of the U.S. military invasion of Panama in December 1989 to remove strongman Manuel Noriega (however much they may have welcomed his removal). All these actions cost little or nothing.

In the unilateral, but tangible, category, several actions can be cited: Argentina’s willingness to sell grain to the USSR following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite U.S. refusal to do so and its request that U.S. allies refrain as well; Mexico’s policy since the early 1960s of not implementing OAS sanctions against Castro’s Cuba; support from several Latin American countries for the Sandinista campaign to oust the Somoza regime in Nicaragua; and the efforts of the Contadora countries to promote a Central American peace settlement at odds with Washington’s wishes.

To be sure, Latin American countries vary greatly in their capacity for diversifying their international relations. Although significant constraints affect the bigger, more developed countries, they loom even larger for the smaller countries. That is particularly the case for the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean, as is shown clearly in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner’s *The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States*. This thoroughly researched book describes the foreign policies, limited resources, and foreign-policy process of these states. It is the first comparative study of Commonwealth Caribbean international

4. Lincoln, *Latin American Foreign Policies*, 14.

behavior by a single author. The foreign-affairs establishment composed of the foreign ministry and diplomatic missions abroad (or what Braveboy-Wagner calls the “diplomatic machinery”) is modest to limited in these countries. The staffs of the foreign ministry and missions abroad are small, and some diplomatic personnel are not well trained. For those interested in Latin American and Caribbean foreign-policy behavior, Braveboy-Wagner’s *The Caribbean in World Affairs* is essential reading.

The Commonwealth Caribbean countries are not the only ones with limited capability for diversifying international relationships. The same is true of most Central American countries, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and others.

In general, the impact of unilateral measures seeking to diversify dependence, whether tangible or intangible, is not especially great. To be sure, such actions represent a degree of assertive independence from the United States and may have great symbolic value. Some unilateral measures, however, may be instances of “disguised dependence,” to use a phrase coined by Carlos Astiz.⁵ One example is Mexico’s policy toward Cuba. Although Mexico maintained diplomatic ties and transportation links with Cuba in the 1960s, contrary to U.S. wishes and a ban by the Organization of American States, Mexico still monitored carefully those who flew between Mexico City and Havana and reported that information to Washington. Far more significant in diversifying dependence are bilateral or multilateral measures that entail an exchange between Latin American countries and other actors. They depend as much, if not more, on the interests and responses of actors outside the region as on the interests and initiatives of Latin American countries.

Some tangible bilateral actions are relatively easy to take at little or no cost. One example is diversifying diplomatic ties. Countries in Europe and elsewhere demonstrated during the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s a willingness to establish diplomatic links with Latin American countries.⁶ More substantive interactions between the Latin American countries and those outside the hemisphere, however, depend on the willingness and interests of the non-Latin American countries. Concerning these more substantive interactions, the picture is mixed at best, and in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is far from favorable for Latin America.

Esperanza Durán’s *European Interests in Latin America* accurately describes the situation following World War II: “European economic and political interests in Latin America have been relatively unimportant up to

5. Carlos A. Astiz, “Mexico’s Foreign Policy: Disguised Dependency,” *Current History* 66, no. 393 (May 1974):220–23, 225.

6. Establishing diplomatic relations with another country entails no cost, beyond a verbal statement recognizing the other country. Establishing diplomatic missions abroad does entail some costs, but they can be limited. An envoy can be accredited to more than one capital and the number of personnel assigned to a mission can be kept small.

now, and this situation seems unlikely to change significantly" (pp. 1–2). Her insightful book examines relations between three Western European countries—Britain, France, and West Germany—and Latin America. Durán observes in her introduction, "Relations between Western Europe and Latin America are hailed for their promise and growing importance. However, hard facts and achievements have not yet kept pace with political pronouncements and expressions of goodwill made by political leaders in both regions over the past decade and a half, or with assessments made by many analysts" (pp. 9–10). She notes that trade between these three European powers and Latin America is not especially significant for the former group, especially when compared to their investments in Latin America and their involvement in the Latin American debt since the 1980s. Of the three, West Germany has the most trade relations with Latin America, and even then only with selected Latin American countries (mainly the larger, more developed ones). In recent years, however, West Germany's trade with Latin America has declined due to Latin American debt and the resulting economic stagnation. Britain and France concentrate their Third World trade with their former colonies, most of which lie outside Latin America.

As Durán notes, the one important exception to West Germany's position as Latin America's leading trade partner (of these three) is in the area of arms sales. As the United States became more restrictive during the late 1960s and the 1970s in transferring arms to Latin American countries, many of them turned to other suppliers, especially European sources.⁷ West Germany responded, along with Britain, France, and many other countries, but on a smaller scale than the others, according to Durán. That outcome is probably attributable to its close relationship with the United States and a tendency to defer to its senior partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on matters having to do with the United States' immediate sphere of influence. Even so, West Germany did not eschew arms sales to Latin America altogether.⁸

All three have been relatively generous donors of development assistance, but little of it has gone to Latin America. Durán offers the following explanation as understandable: "Latin America has not been a leading recipient of European aid, and this has been due to two basic factors: first, because of the relatively high income levels when compared with other areas of the Third World, it does not qualify for aid as such . . . ;

7. Some of the restrictions are detailed by Atkins (pp. 286–88). Others are identified in Luigi Einaudi, Hans Heymann, Jr., David Ronfeldt, and Cesar Sereseres, *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1973), 49–50; also in James D. Cochrane, "Latin America and Arms, 1966–1975: Notes on Acquisitions and Sources of Supply," *Revista/Review Interamericana* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1980):156–72.

8. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 113.

and second, aid funds of countries such as France and the UK have often tended to be channeled to former colonies" (p. 50).⁹

Beyond their limited economic interest in Latin America and the Caribbean, Germany, Britain, and France have few political interests in the region. It is true that some governments or political groups in those countries have taken positions on the Central American crisis, but it remains distant from the real political interests of the European countries. Only Britain and France have objective, but limited, political interests in Latin America and the Caribbean—Britain in the Falklands and Belize, and France in its Caribbean dependencies. Although the thrust of Durán's *European Interests in Latin America* is that Britain, France, and West Germany have limited interest in Latin America, she concludes that Latin America and Western Europe are important to one another and that more extensive and intensive interactions would benefit both regions.

Atkins's *Latin America in the International Political System* also examines the interests of non-hemispheric actors, focusing on a broader range of actors than Durán's study. In addition to the three she discusses, Atkins addresses the interests and concerns of Japan, Israel, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

Atkins observes that the non-hemispheric countries engaged in Latin America prior to World War II virtually disengaged after the war, when Latin America became a peripheral concern to them. By the late 1960s, however, the same countries had recovered economically and politically and had become significant international actors. That change coincided with the Latin American quest for diversification. But as Atkins notes, "Even with the expanded relationship, Latin America generally was not as important to the European states as other areas" (p. 94). Like Durán, Atkins finds that none of the Western European states have a major political interest in Latin America, meaning that none perceive Latin America as an area of primary concern to national security. That view does not imply that Western Europe has no security interest in Latin America. As Atkins points out, "NATO members had a contingency concern that the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea be open for movements of military forces and supplies in the event of European war" (p. 94). But he qualifies his statement, "This concern has been latent, however, and not an essential factor in policy calculations" (p. 94). Evidently, NATO expects the United States to attend to this concern.

Certain Western European countries have had political interests in Latin America, albeit below the level of national security: West Germany, under the Hallstein Doctrine, sought to secure diplomatic recognition

9. Apart from the French dependencies and the former British colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean, about the only Latin American and Caribbean countries to meet the criteria for development assistance are Haiti and Honduras.

from Latin American countries and to deny such recognition to East Germany; Italy looked for Latin American backing for its position on the South Tyrol question following World War II; and Franco's Spain attempted, with some success, to court Latin American support in the United Nations.

Like Durán, Atkins emphasizes European economic interest in Latin America or, more accurately, in parts of it, which takes priority over political interests. He too notes that among the European countries, West Germany has shown the most economic interest in Latin America.

Japan's growing interest in Latin America is purely economic. Latin America's relationship with Japan is highly complementary, perhaps more so than ties with any other country outside the Western Hemisphere. Japan needs Latin American raw materials and can supply the region with manufactured goods. Japan has also become an investor in Latin America, especially in the more developed countries. The Japanese approach to Latin America is totally apolitical, in deference to the United States. As Atkins observes:

Japan's alliance with the United States remained too important to be eroded by taking contrary positions on relatively peripheral political or security matters like the Central American crisis. Other benefits also derived from this apolitical diplomatic posture. Not only was it considered appropriate to Japan's purposes of economic expansion and protection of overseas Japanese, it allowed Japan to avoid involvement in local Latin American conflicts and to carry on its burgeoning trade with all regimes from right to left. (P. 104)

Undoubtedly, those regimes appreciate Japan's apolitical approach, as does the United States. Washington has never looked favorably on extrahemispheric involvement in Western Hemisphere politics.

Israeli interest in Latin America has been another story, at least at the outset of its contacts with the region. Atkins reports that early Israeli interest in Latin America was almost exclusively political. Future citizens of Israel first sought to marshal support for creating a Jewish state, and in this regard, it was quite successful. Latin American countries provided a significant number of the votes needed to pass the United Nations resolution establishing the state of Israel. The new country then looked to Latin America for support on Arab-Israeli votes in the United Nations. But, according to Atkins, as Israel's fortunes in the organization declined and Latin American voting strength dwindled from substantial to marginal, Israel's interest in the region shifted from political to economic goals. Since that time, Israel has managed to develop a limited trade relationship with a few Latin American countries. In a few areas, trade is more than a limited relationship, as in petroleum imports from Mexico. That source is a vital one for oil-dependent Israel, and the relationship allows Mexico to diversify the targets of its exports. Beyond oil, the most important area of Israel's commerce with Latin America is arms trans-

fers.¹⁰ In this regard, Israel has largely functioned as a loyal ally of the United States and sometimes, it would seem, as a proxy for Washington. When the United States could not supply arms to preferred Latin American clients for one reason or another, Israel did so. A case in point was Israel's transfer of arms to selected Central American countries and groups, such as the Contras, after the U.S. Congress prohibited arms supplies to those elements. But although Israel may have behaved as a loyal ally, it has not done so in an entirely unselfish fashion. Israeli arms sales to Latin America (and elsewhere) have served fundamental domestic interests. As Atkins observes,

Arms transfers to Latin America are of commercial value to Israel, but they are also a function of the necessity to keep Israeli arms factories going during periods of relative peace. Military transfers are a post-1967 phenomenon; they began after the Six-Day War, when Israel decided to build its own heavy arms industry. When the domestic demand is low, exports keep the arms industry at a high level of readiness. In addition, with weaponry quickly becoming obsolete, the export sale of "older generation" products helps cover the high costs of defense. (P. 105)

Israel's arms trade with Latin America is also examined by Edy Kaufman in his contribution to the volume edited by William Perry and Peter Wehner, *The Latin American Policies of U.S. Allies: Balancing Global Interests and Regional Concerns*.

Atkins states that the People's Republic of China has become only minimally involved in Latin America. Although China established diplomatic ties with several Latin American states in the 1970s, its economic relations with Latin America remain limited. The bottom line is that China and Latin America are distant geographically and have little to offer one another at this point.

Perry and Wehner's *The Latin American Policies of U.S. Allies* examines in some detail the policies of Britain, Canada, France, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and West Germany. Its findings accord with the works already reviewed here. Perry and Wehner note in their final chapter that U.S. allies have increased their involvement with Latin America during the last twenty to twenty-five years, although the degree of involvement varies. According to these authors, most of the allies stress economic matters over political issues in their contacts with Latin America. U.S. allies also differ in their inclination to defer to Washington. Britain, Israel, and Japan tend to hew to U.S. policy, but France and Spain take more independent stances. Even countries that tend to defer to U.S. policy toward Latin America may diverge sharply—and vocally—from it on occasion. A case in point was Britain's reaction to U.S. military intervention in Grenada. Durán reports, "There was resentment not only

10. See Bishare Bahbah, *Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986).

about the lack of consultation (especially in Britain, because of Grenada's status as a Commonwealth country and Britain's 'special relationship' with the U.S.), but also about the violation of the principle of sovereignty" (p. 76). Britain was joined in protesting the U.S. action by Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and even deferential West Germany. The European Community (EC), as distinct from the individual member-countries of that organization, has diverged much more openly from U.S. policies toward Latin America. Durán comments that the EC's approach to Latin America as a whole "has tended to tilt more openly against U.S. policy than has been possible for its individual members, which are anxious not to damage their bilateral relations with the U.S. This is one of the advantages that could be gained from a collective approach to the region" (p. 78).

Whether or not they tend to defer, states beyond the Western Hemisphere view Latin America differently than Washington does, and their approach—whether one of some engagement or scant interest—reflects that fact. Non-hemispheric actors emphasize neither Latin American political stability nor security, as does the United States. Such divergences lead to very different approaches.

In the introduction to *The Iberian-Latin American Connection: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*, Howard Wiarda comments, "The subject of Spain's (and, to a lesser extent, Portugal's) reentry into Latin America is interesting, significant, and worthy of serious reflection for a number of reasons" (p. 4). He cites several factors: the two countries are the former metropolises of most Latin American countries; Spain has emerged as an economically advanced country, according to World Bank standards; in recent years, Spain has increased its ties with Latin America (especially Spanish America) economically, diplomatically, and culturally; Spain has dropped its former paternalistic notion of *hispanismo* that was offensive to Spanish America; Spain is actively emphasizing the commonality of the Iberian-Latin American countries; and Spain is promoting its ability to be an interlocutor between Latin America and the United States and an intermediary between North and South and between Latin America and the European Community. Wiarda's emphasis on Spain reflects the focus evident throughout this collection.

The contributors to *The Iberian-Latin American Connection* differ in their assessments of the present and future significance of Spain's involvement with Latin America. Some offer a positive, perhaps even optimistic, assessment suggesting that the former mother country may be able to advance some Latin American interests. Other contributors to the volume are less optimistic. Larman Wilson and Janine Perfit observe in "Spain and Latin America: Diplomatic and Military Ties" that "Latin America has gained greater importance in the rank order of Spain's international relations. Still Latin America is not as crucial to Spain as Western Europe, the United States, or even Japan" (p. 203).

Although Spain projected itself as a viable participant when it entered the European Community, the Wiarda volume presents no convincing evidence or even argument that it will be able to induce that organization to adopt a more favorable approach to Latin America. Several contributors stress the limits of Spain's ability, regardless of its willingness and desire, to significantly change EC policy. The community's deeply vested interests propel it away from any preferential treatment of Latin America.

In his conclusion, Wiarda discusses limitations on the Iberian role in Latin America. Portugal's limits are the higher priority of its European and NATO relations as well as those with its former colonies in Africa. As Wiarda observes, "Latin America does not figure prominently in Portuguese foreign policy" (p. 439). He identifies a broader range of limitations for Spain, some of them substantial: the priority that Spain places on its ties with the United States and Western Europe; limited resources to devote to international affairs beyond areas of primary importance; fairly limited trade relations with most Latin American countries (only about 10 percent of total Spanish trade and no prospect for significant increase in the near term); geographical distance from Latin America; and a significant, if unacknowledged, lack of real interest in Latin America on the part of the general Spanish populace. To quote Wiarda, "Spanish attitudes toward Latin America tend to be patronizing and condescending and are often resented by Latin America" (p. 441).

The last point is a potent limitation. Latin Americans have had long and painful experience with a patronizing and condescending United States. Few are likely to seek any close association with another such country, even if it is the former mother country in most cases.

Despite statements to the contrary, EC attitudes and policy toward Latin America have been ambivalent. This point is discussed in Atkins's and Durán's analyses and also in *Europe and the Andean Countries: A Comparison of Economic Policies and Institutions*, edited by Ciro Angarita and Peter Coffey. On the one hand, the EC has repeatedly expressed interest in Latin America and its economic problems and has entered into some agreements with Latin American countries or groups of countries. On the other hand, the European Community has pursued policies that are decidedly more favorable to other Third World countries, namely the ACP countries (recently independent nations that were former African, Caribbean, and Pacific colonies of some EC members). That orientation is not likely to change much.

Among the non-hemispheric actors, the Soviet Union is a special case because of its status as a superpower and rival of the United States. It has been the giant's rival, as characterized in Cole Blasier's study of Soviet-Latin American relations of that title.¹¹ Of the works under review

11. Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America*, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

here, Eusebio Mujal-León's *The USSR and Latin America* focuses exclusively on those relations, but they are also discussed by Pope Atkins.

In *Latin America in the International System*, Atkins notes that the USSR looked on Latin America for half a century with an attitude of "geographical fatalism," believing the area to be so geographically remote and so firmly within the U.S. sphere of influence that few, if any, opportunities existed for the Soviets. Consequently, while not totally ignoring Latin America, Moscow devoted few resources to it and advised Communist parties in the region to take no risks and to engage in no reckless or violent action in quest of power.¹²

The Soviet view of Latin American opportunities was altered considerably by the Cuban Revolution, the survival of the new regime (which the Soviets did not anticipate and would not have tolerated in their own sphere of influence), and Castro's alignment with Moscow. The USSR moved to sustain Castro, and Moscow may have hoped in the early 1960s to influence at least some political events in Latin America beyond Cuba. It was during this period that the USSR made the bold and highly risky move of installing missiles in Cuba.

Following resolution of that crisis, the USSR revised its policy and approach to Latin America. Atkins believes that Soviet policy vis-à-vis Latin America since the missile crisis has been restrained by three factors:

Ironically, because of its "success" in Cuba, the Soviet Union became more aware of the financial costs and risks of policy and of its military limitations. The Cuban experience suggested three basic lessons for the Soviet Union. First, the financial costs of a Soviet commitment to an economically underdeveloped ally were high and tended to escalate. Second, a close relationship with a Latin American state did not guarantee that the Soviet Union would have its way politically, nor that political gains would be worth the economic costs. Finally, political, economic, and military support to a movement like that in Cuba could not easily be reduced or terminated. (P. 101)

As Blasier has pointed out, the USSR has established diplomatic relations with most of the larger Latin American countries and many of the smaller ones over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It has accomplished less in the commercial arena, however. Although the Soviets purchase some much-needed items from Latin America, especially agricultural products, they continue to run a substantial trade deficit with Latin America. The Soviets are unlikely to increase their imports unless Latin America imports more from the Soviet Union, which it has shown little disposition to do.

12. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Castroism and Marxist-Leninist Orthodoxy in Latin America," in *Cuban Communism*, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, 7th ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1989), 756–79.

Editor Mujal-León presents an excellent collection of essays in *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship*. It includes an array of diverse topics: Soviet–Third World political and economic strategies, U.S. perceptions of Soviet strategy, Soviet-Cuban relations, Soviet economic relations, trade, relations between Eastern Europe and Latin America, and the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Central America. The volume also contains articles on Soviet relations with the Andean countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Germane but discouraging to Latin American efforts to diversify dependence by expanding the range of international contacts is David Albright's contribution to this collection. In his view, Soviet interest in Latin America since World War II and Cuba's alignment with Moscow has ebbed and flowed, depending on perceived or actual U.S. weakness in Latin America and perceived Soviet opportunity in the region. Beyond Cuba, the Soviets have manifested a reluctance to invest many tangible resources in Latin America. Albright would undoubtedly agree with Cole Blasier's assessment that the United States has vastly greater interests in Latin America than the USSR and that Washington is consequently prepared to devote far more resources to the region.¹³

While it is relatively easy to identify past Soviet policy toward Latin America, despite differing interpretations of Soviet motivations and objectives, meaningful predictions—or even educated “guestimations”—about such policies in the near or long-term future are difficult to make.¹⁴ The momentous and ongoing changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe of the late 1980s and early 1990s make that task all but impossible. Mujal-León nevertheless suggests in his conclusion, “The redirection of Soviet foreign and domestic policies currently being engineered by Mikhail Gorbachev should also encourage Moscow to deepen its engagement with Latin America” (p. 376). Perhaps, but there is no readily apparent or compelling reason to think so. More likely, the Soviets will engage less, not more, in Latin America, perhaps even less in Cuba, which is now out of step with Moscow and an economic burden. To the extent that such matters can be predicted, it seems likely that other issues—the Soviet economy, the state of the Soviet polity, and political change—and geographically closer Third World regions are likely to command greater Soviet attention than distant, problematic Latin America.

The foregoing conclusions do not auger well for Latin American efforts to reduce dependence by diversifying international relationships. The sad reality is that Latin American countries have greater interest in and need for non-hemispheric actors than those actors have in and for

13. Blasier, *The Giant's Rival*, 175.

14. See James D. Cochrane, “Contending Perspectives on the Soviet Union in Latin America,” *LARR* 24, no. 3 (1989):211–23.

Latin America. To the extent that non-hemispheric interest exists (and it is not constant over time), it focuses on selected Latin American countries, generally the larger ones that are more developed and more economically dynamic. The situation may actually be even bleaker for Latin America. As Laurence Whitehead has argued, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and beyond has severely constrained efforts to diversify.¹⁵

Wiarda is equally pessimistic and says what few Latin American countries want to hear: "After showing some interest in the early 1980s, Europe is not very much involved in Latin America. . . ." ¹⁶ John McQuaid's assessment of the options of Central American countries is even more pessimistic: "During the 1980s, they might have been able to turn to the Soviet Union and scare the United States into coughing up more. But now the Soviets have pulled back, the Europeans and the Japanese have only a passing interest and the United States is the only game in town."¹⁷ The current situation is not likely to change until vitality returns to the Latin American economies, and even that development might not suffice to command greater non-hemispheric interest.

In sum, Latin America's quest for greater independence has been forestalled by events, some of its own making. The salience of the United States remains high—the very situation that Latin America has been endeavoring to escape. At this juncture, at least, real change is not foreseeable.

15. Laurence Whitehead, "Debt, Diversification, and Dependency: Latin America's International Political Relations," in Middlebrook and Rico, *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s*, 102.

16. Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Policy in Latin America," *Current History* 89, no. 543 (Jan. 1990):31.

17. John McQuaid, "Latins Leaning Hard on U.S. for Aid," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans, La.), 11 Mar. 1990, p. A-2.