

Wittgenstein on Language and Rules

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I

A paradoxical situation exists in the study of Wittgenstein. There is a sharp disagreement in the interpretation of his thinking about the concept of following a rule. According to one group of philosophers Wittgenstein's position is that this concept presupposes a human community in which there is agreement as to whether doing such-and-such is or is not following a particular rule. A second group of philosophers hold that this interpretation of Wittgenstein is not merely wrong, but is even a caricature of Wittgenstein's thought: for when Wittgenstein says that following a rule is 'a practice' he does not mean a social practice, he does not invoke a community of rule-followers, but instead he emphasizes that following a rule presupposes a regularity, a repeated or recurring way of acting, which might be exemplified in the life of a solitary person. On the first interpretation it would have no sense to suppose that a human being who had grown up in complete isolation from the rest of mankind could be following rules. On the second interpretation such isolation would be irrelevant.

This dispute goes back to the first publication of the *Philosophical Investigations*¹ in 1953. Thirty-five years later it has not abated, but has become more intense. The publication or availability of most of the corpus of Wittgenstein's writings has, oddly enough, not made a difference to this disagreement, even though a substantial part of the corpus is devoted to reflections on the concept of following a rule.

The leaders of the second interpretation are G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker. For a number of years they have been devoted to an ambitious study of Wittgenstein's philosophical work. This includes the completion of two volumes of a line-by-line commentary on the *Investigations*, which at present has reached to *PI* 242. Their scholarship is of high quality. They have command of the whole of Wittgenstein's writings, both published and unpublished. They trace remarks in the *Investigations* to their provenance in earlier manuscripts, typescripts, notebooks. In interpreting a particular remark they bring to bear an

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1971). Cited as *PI* with paragraph number or page number.

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impressive knowledge of similar or related remarks that appear elsewhere in the corpus, or in the published notes of those who attended Wittgenstein's lectures in Cambridge.

In addition to their careful scholarship, Baker and Hacker usually interpret Wittgenstein's thinking in a sensitive and sensible way. Only rarely do I find myself in disagreement with their reading of Wittgenstein, or feel that something has gone wrong. In their treatment of Wittgenstein's remarks about following a rule, many of their comments are penetrating.

I am dissatisfied, however, with the lack of importance they assign to the presence of a community of people who act in accordance with rules, as a necessary condition for there being any rule-following at all. In my book *Nothing is Hidden*² there is a chapter entitled 'Following a Rule', in which I say that 'for Wittgenstein the concept of a rule presupposes a community within which a common agreement in actions fixes the meaning of a rule';³ and that 'the idea of a rule is embedded in an environment of teaching, testing, correcting—within a community where there is an agreement in acting in a way that is called following the rule'.⁴ In a critical review⁵ Peter Hacker treated my book with great generosity. But in reference to my suggestion that when Wittgenstein says, in *PI* 202, that one cannot follow a rule 'privately', 'he means that the actions of a single individual, whether these actions are private or public, cannot *fix the meaning of a rule*',⁶ and also in reference to my statement that, according to Wittgenstein, 'the concept of following a rule implies the concept of a *community* of rule-followers',⁷ Hacker said:⁸

I believe this to be a demonstrably mistaken interpretation of Wittgenstein, but having discussed and documented the matter elsewhere I shall pass over it.

Hacker thus gracefully spared me from an onslaught, and instead referred the reader to the 'elsewhere', which is the book by himself and Baker, entitled *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*,⁹ the second volume of their commentary on the *Investigations*.

² Norman Malcolm, *Nothing Is Hidden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

³ Malcolm, 175.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁵ P. M. S. Hacker, 'Critical Notice', *Philosophical Investigations*, **10**, No. 2 (April 1987).

⁶ Malcolm, *op. cit.*, 156.

⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁸ Hacker, *op. cit.*, 149.

⁹ G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). Cited as *B&H*.

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In taking up this issue I will not be able to quote any of Wittgenstein's remarks that Baker & Hacker have overlooked. But I see some of those remarks in a different light, and sometimes I will criticize, as misleading or erroneous, the Baker and Hacker formulations of Wittgenstein's intent.

II

An 'internal' relation. Baker and Hacker give the following succinct statement of their understanding of what is central in Wittgenstein's thought about the concept of following a rule, and also of their disagreement with the 'community' conception:

The pivotal point in Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules is that a rule is *internally* related to acts which accord with it. The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct. This idea is incompatible with defining 'correct' in terms of what is normal or standard practice in a community. To take the behaviour of the majority to be the criterion of correctness in applying rules is to abrogate the internal relation of a rule to acts in accord with it.¹⁰

There is no possibility of building consensus in behaviour (or shared dispositions) into the explanation of what 'correct' means except at the price of abandoning the insight that a rule is internally related to acts in accord with it.¹¹

I will comment on these statements in a series of remarks:

(1) Wittgenstein certainly does hold that the acts that are in accord with a rule are 'internally' related to the rule, *in the sense* that if you do not do *this* you are not following the rule. If you are told to start with 1000 and to follow the rule '+2', you are not following that rule unless you write 1002. Or if you multiply 25 by 25 and do not get 625, you multiplied incorrectly. As Wittgenstein puts it: 'In mathematics the result is itself a criterion of the correct calculation'.¹²

(2) It would be an error, however, to take the remark that acts in accord with a rule are 'internally' related to the rule, *in the sense* that those acts are somehow 'already contained' in the rule. I am not yet attributing this error to Baker and Hacker, but am only clearing the

¹⁰ B&H, 171–172.

¹¹ B&H, 172.

¹² Wittgenstein, *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*, revised and expanded edition, G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees, and G. H. von Wright (eds) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), 393. (Cited as *RFM* with page number. Quotations are my translation.)

ground. Wittgenstein speaks of the mythology of thinking that ‘The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space’,¹³ and of the idea that ‘the steps are *really* already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought’.¹⁴ It is the feeling that when you follow a rule the particular applications of the rule exist in advance of your arriving at them.

In opposition to this philosophical picture, Wittgenstein remarks that ‘A rule is not an extension. To follow a rule means to form an extension according to a “general” expression.’¹⁵ Which is to say that the applications of a rule (its ‘extension’), are not given with the rule, but have to be *produced*; the extension has to be *constructed*. This point sets the stage for the hard question—what *decides* whether a particular step taken, a particular application made, is or is not in accordance with the rule? This question is not answered by the declaration that a rule is ‘internally’ related to the acts that accord with it.

(3) ‘The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct.’ This seems to be the response of Baker and Hacker to what I called ‘the hard question’. Wittgenstein puts that question as follows: ‘But what if the actions of different people in accordance with a rule, do not agree? Who is right, who is wrong?’¹⁶ He then imagines cases where the disagreement might be due to a misunderstanding that could easily be cleared up, or where a person who persisted in acting differently might be regarded as mentally deficient. Wittgenstein goes on to say:

But what if the lack of agreement was not the exception but the rule?—How should we think of that?

Well, a rule can lead me to an action only in the same sense as can any direction in words, for example, an order. And if people did not agree in their actions according to rules, and could not come to terms with one another, that would be as if they could not come together about the sense of orders or descriptions. It would be a ‘confusion of tongues’, and one could say that although all of them accompanied their actions with the uttering of sounds, nevertheless there was no language.¹⁷

This is one of the many examples of Wittgenstein’s insistence that there can be rules only within a framework of overwhelming agreement. He says:

¹³ *PI* 219.

¹⁴ *PI* 188.

¹⁵ Wittgenstein, MS 165, c. 1941–1944; unfortunately not published, 78. (Quotations will be by page number and are my translation.)

¹⁶ MS 165, 91.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 93–94.

It is of the greatest importance that hardly ever does a quarrel arise between human beings, over whether the colour of this object is the same as the colour of that one, the length of this stick the same as the length of that one, etc. This quiet agreement is the characteristic surrounding of the use of the word 'same'.

And one must say the analogous thing of proceeding according to a rule.

No row breaks out over whether a rule was complied with or not. People don't come to blows, for example. That belongs to the framework in which our language works (for example, in giving a description).¹⁸

In asserting that 'the rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct', Baker and Hacker do not seem to give sufficient recognition to Wittgenstein's insight that a rule does not determine anything *except* within a setting of quiet agreement. If you imagine *that* no longer existing, you become aware of the *nakedness* of the rule. The words that express the rule would be without weight, without life. A sign-post would not *be* a sign-post. A rule, *by itself*, determines nothing. The assertion that 'nothing but the rule determines what is correct', is a seriously misleading account of Wittgenstein's thinking about rules.

Wittgenstein attempted to clarify for himself the concept of a rule, by approaching it from different directions. He asked himself, for example, *what kind of fact* it is that a rule *requires* a particular step to be taken:

That a rule *requires* this step, can be a psychological fact. Namely, that we proceed in *this* way, without reflection or doubt.

But it can also lie in this, that we can agree with one another, and that all of us proceed in *this same way*.¹⁹

What is here called the 'psychological' fact of the rule's *requiring this* step, namely, the fact that we take this step without looking for a reason, or considering other possibilities, or having any doubt whatever—might be what leads Baker & Hacker to assert that 'the rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct'. The *second* fact that Wittgenstein mentions is, by implication, *not* 'psychological'. It could perhaps be called the 'logical fact' of the rule's *requiring* this step, namely, the fact that *all* of us, in agreement with one another, proceed in *this* way.

Further on in MS 165, Wittgenstein returns to the ambiguity of the notion that a rule *requires* a certain step:

Often one can say: this pattern, *looked at* so, must have this continuation.

¹⁸ *RFM*, 323.

¹⁹ MS 165, 75–76.

I want, however, to stipulate an ‘interpretation’ [*Auffassung*], (something like the old ‘Proposition’), which determines the series like an infallible machine through which a conveyor belt runs. So that only this continuation fits this interpretation.

In reality, however, there are not two things that here fit together.

But one can say: You are, by your training, so adjusted [*eingestellt*], that always, without reflection, you declare some definite thing to be that which fits. Something that agrees with what others declare to be what fits.²⁰

The picture of the interpreted rule as determining a series like an infallible conveyor belt, is replaced by a picture of what is down to earth, and human: i.e., the picture of a person who, having been given a certain training, then goes on to determine, without reflection, that the rule requires *this* step, a step that others (having had the same training) will agree to be what the rule demands.

Wittgenstein insists that it is of ‘the greatest importance’ that there is agreement in the application of words, and about whether doing *that* is in accord with *this* rule. He is saying that this agreement is necessary for the existence of *language*:

The phenomenon of language rests on regularity, on agreement in acting.

Here it is of the greatest importance that all of us, or the overwhelming number, agree on certain things. For example, I can be sure that the colour of this object will be called ‘green’ by most people who see it.²¹

In the passages that I have cited from MS 165 and *RFM*, Wittgenstein is saying, clearly enough, that *without* general agreement as to what is ‘the same’, as to whether going on *thus* fits *this* rule—there would not be rules, descriptions, or language, but at most ‘a confusion of tongues’. Baker and Hacker are fully aware of such passages, but in their zeal to combat the notion of ‘community agreement’, the thrust of Wittgenstein’s remarks seems to slide by without making an impact. I suspect that in part this may be due to their being confused by their formulation, ‘The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct’. This might be understood as merely a repetition, in different words, of their immediately preceding statement that ‘a rule is *internally* related to acts which accord with it’²²—which *can* be read as a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein. But Baker and Hacker also give to their phrase, ‘nothing but the rule determines what is correct’, a

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 86–87.

²¹ *RFM*, 342.

²² *B&H*, 171–172.

meaning that would isolate rules from their dependence on human agreement. They say:

It would be absurd to hold that a condition of *this* act . . . being in accord with *this* rule . . . is that people in general agree on the application of rules or that people agree that writing *this* accords with *this*. Of course, if there were no agreement, there would be no common concept of addition, of adding 2, of the series of even integers. But it is an error to insert a community agreement between a rule and what accords with it. For if the rule is given, then so is its 'extension'.²³

In this last sentence, Baker and Hacker *seem* to be going against Wittgenstein's comment that 'A rule is not an extension'.²⁴ For how can it be true that 'if a rule is given then so is its extension'—*if* the rule is *not* its extension? Or do Baker and Hacker, after all, think that although a rule is not its extension, the rule *contains* its extension? If a rule neither is, nor contains, its extension, there is no sense left for the assertion that if a rule is given then so is its extension. Furthermore, this assertion may help to explain why Baker and Hacker do not find the nearly universal agreement in applying a rule, as striking and important a phenomenon as did Wittgenstein. For how could people *fail* to agree in applying a rule, *if* when a rule is given so is its extension?

The troubling philosophical problem is precisely that when a rule is given its extension is *not* given. As Wittgenstein says, 'To follow a rule means to *form* [*bilden*] an extension according to a "general" expression'.²⁵ It would seem that different people, with similar training and equal intelligence, *could* form *different* extensions in accordance with the same general expression. They could go on differently. Indeed, that *could* happen—and sometimes does happen. But if such divergence became frequent, then the understanding of what rules are, and what following a rule is, would have disappeared. The fact that almost everyone does go on in the same way, is a great example of a 'form of life', and also an example of something that is normally hidden from us because of its 'simplicity and familiarity'.²⁶

In the passage just quoted from Baker and Hacker, they say that 'it is an error to insert a community agreement between a rule and what accords with it'.²⁷ Certainly one does not take a vote before following a rule—*if* that is what is meant by 'inserting a community agreement'. I will discuss this matter in section III.

²³ *Ibid.*, 243.

²⁴ MS 165, 78.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, my emphasis.

²⁶ *PI*, 129.

²⁷ *B&H*, 243.

In the same passage Baker and Hacker allow a *limited* importance to 'agreement', when they say that 'if there were no agreement, there would be no common concept of addition . . .'.²⁸ An unwary reader might think they were interpreting Wittgenstein as I do. But the emphasis here should be on 'common'. Baker and Hacker think that without agreement there could be concepts but not *common* concepts, rules but not *shared* rules, language but not *shared* language. This is their gloss on Wittgenstein.

But Wittgenstein himself does not employ these qualifications of his theme. He says, for example, that 'If there was no agreement in what we call "red", etc., etc., language would come to an end'²⁹—*language*, not 'shared' language. Quiet agreement 'belongs to the framework in which our language works'³⁰—*our language*, not our 'shared' language. 'The phenomenon of language rests on regularity, on agreement in action'³¹—no 'shared' here. 'The phenomena of agreement and of acting according to a rule, are inter-connected'³²—*rule*, not 'shared' rule.

Wittgenstein likens following a rule to obeying an order; and he asks 'How is what I do, connected with these words?' His answer is, 'only through a general practice'.³³ His point is that following a rule is something that can occur only within the framework of a *general* practice. Here he speaks of 'following a rule', *not* of following a 'shared' rule. Referring to the imagined case in which people no longer agreed in their actions according to a rule, and could not come to terms with one another, he says that the upshot would be that there would be 'no language'³⁴—*not* 'no "shared" language'.

Baker and Hacker have a formidable knowledge of Wittgenstein's writings; yet they put a strained interpretation on what he says about 'general practice' and 'agreement in acting'. Why do they not read him as saying straightforwardly that without the framework of general practices and large agreement there would be neither rules nor language? Why this resistance to Wittgenstein's plain words? I will speculate about this in Section V. At present let us note how Baker and Hacker, in their own thinking, reject the idea that the existence of rules requires general agreement. They say:

Is it then to be argued that a condition for there *being any rules* is that there be general agreement on what acts accord with what rules?

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *RFM*, 196.

³⁰ *RFM*, 323.

³¹ *RFM*, 342.

³² *RFM*, 344.

³³ MS 165, 79.

³⁴ MS 165, 94.

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This is multiply confused. First, . . . there is nothing conceptually awry about solitary rule-followers or unshared rules. Secondly, the very form of the question presupposes that rules and what accords with them, as well as understanding a rule and knowing what accords with it, are externally related.³⁵

According to Baker and Hacker, to hold that 'general agreement on what acts accord with what rules' is 'a condition for there being any rules', implies that there cannot be 'solitary rule-followers or unshared rules'. I will take up this issue in section IV. But their claim that 'the very form of the question presupposes that rules and what accords with them . . . are externally related', I will consider now.

III

A consensus of action. Baker and Hacker say that rules and what accords with them are related 'internally', not 'externally'. This is ambiguous. It could come to the same as their puzzling assertion that 'if a rule is given then its extension is given', which I have already criticized. But it could also be taken to mean that to conceive of general agreement as a condition for rule-following would be, as they put it, 'to insert a community agreement between a rule and what accords with it'.³⁶ Now if 'to insert a community agreement' would mean, for example, that when I am driving on a road and come to a sign-post, I stop other motorists in order to collect their opinions as to which direction is indicated by the sign-post—then it is obvious that agreement does not enter the scene in that way. Normally it does not 'enter the scene' at all, but remains quietly in the background. Wittgenstein makes this distinction clearly, in remarks that are well-known to Baker and Hacker:

Colour-words are taught like *this*: 'That's red', e.g.—Our language-game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails, but the concept of agreement does not enter into the language-game.³⁷

You can picture the chaos that would occur at a busy London intersection if drivers did *not* agree as to which direction to turn in following a sign. If they were *not* in agreement the sign-posts could be removed, since they would have ceased to function as sign-posts. On the other hand, a driver does not usually seek the opinions of others before

³⁵ *B&H*, 243.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds), Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), para. 430. Cited as *Z* followed by paragraph number.

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making a turn. Wittgenstein explains what he means by the remark that ‘the concept of agreement does not enter into the language-game:

You say ‘*That* is red’, but how is it decided if you are right? Doesn’t human agreement decide?—But do I appeal to this agreement in my judgments of colour? Then is what goes on like *this*: I get a number of people to look at an object; to each of them there occurs one of a certain group of words (the so-called colour-words); if the word ‘red’ occurred to the majority of the spectators (I myself need not belong to this majority), the predicate ‘red’ rightly belongs to the object.³⁸

Does human agreement *decide* what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the majority? Were we taught to determine colour in *that* way?³⁹

If I am in doubt (as sometimes happens) whether the colour of some object is blue or green, I may ask another person, ‘What would you call this colour?’. But in the vast number of cases I apply colour-predicates without consultation. This is true of nearly everyone. Usually we do not have ‘opinions’ about colours, and we make no appeal to the majority. Nevertheless, we ‘agree in the language’ we use.⁴⁰ For the most part, each one of us does apply colour-words unhesitatingly, *on his own*—yet we *agree*! Nothing could be more astonishing! But if it were not for this astonishing fact, our ‘colour-words’ would *not be* colour words.⁴¹

And of course the same thing holds for arithmetical calculations. In lectures Wittgenstein gave the following illustration:

Suppose that we make enormous multiplications—numerals with a thousand digits. Suppose that after a certain point, the results people get deviate from each other. There is no way of preventing this deviation: even when we check their results, the results still deviate. What would be the right result? Would anyone have found it? Would there be a right result?—I should say, ‘This has ceased to be a calculation’.⁴²

The point is clear. If there were widespread and irremovable differences in the results obtained by different persons, then what they were doing would no longer be called ‘multiplication’. Multiplication requires *consensus*. But what sort of consensus is this? Is it a consensus of *opinions*? Wittgenstein’s response to this question would be the same

³⁸ *Z*, 429.

³⁹ *Z*, 431.

⁴⁰ *PI*, 241.

⁴¹ See *PI*, 226.

⁴² *Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Lecture notes taken by four people, Cora Diamond (ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 101. Cited as *LFM*.

one that he made to the suggestion that perhaps he was saying that ‘the truths of logic are determined by a consensus of opinions’:

Is this what I am saying? No. There is no *opinion* at all; it is not a question of opinion. They are determined by a consensus of *action*: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion.⁴³

Without a consensus of action and reaction, there would not be concepts, language, rules. It is irrelevant whether one calls this consensus a ‘presupposition’, a ‘condition’, or part of the ‘framework’ of language.

As I suggested previously, it may be that the failure of Baker and Hacker to appreciate the full significance of human agreement is due to their idea that ‘the rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct’—and perhaps also due to their declaration that ‘if the rule is given then so is its extension’. These formulations *conceal the possibility* of widespread disagreement in the application of rules, and thereby *diminish* the significance of agreement for the concept of a rule.

When Baker and Hacker ask the question, ‘Is it then to be argued that a condition for there *being any rules* is that there be general agreement on what acts accord with what rules?’, and then go on to declare that ‘the very form of the question presupposes that rules and what accords with them . . . are externally related’⁴⁴—they are misinterpreting Wittgenstein. For he certainly does hold that without general agreement there would be neither rules nor language—as is clear from the remarks I quoted in Section II, i.e. *RFM*, pp. 196, 323, 342, 344; MS 165, pp. 75–76, 79, 86–87, 94; *PI* 240; *Z* 430. This view, as it was meant by Wittgenstein, does *not* presuppose that rules and what accords with them are ‘externally related’. For if ‘externally related’ means that a general agreement is ‘inserted between a rule and what accords with it’, or means that one determines whether *this* action accords with *that* rule, by canvassing the opinions of people—then of course Wittgenstein does not hold that a rule and what accords with it are ‘externally related’. His position is stated concisely in *Z* 430: our language-games of following rules in arithmetic, of colour judgments, of measuring, etc., etc., would not work *except* in the framework of general agreement—but a canvassing and testing of agreement does not enter into the actual *operation* of the language-games.

IV

Solitary rule-followers. As previously noted, Baker and Hacker allow a restricted significance to general agreement. They remark that ‘in a

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 183–184.

⁴⁴ *B&H*, 243.

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certain sense we can say that following a rule is “founded on agreement”.⁴⁵ They say: ‘A framework of agreement *in behaviour* is presupposed by each of our shared language-games . . . agreement in the results of calculating is of the essence of a shared technique of calculating’.⁴⁶ And they say: ‘For there to be an agreed (shared) rule is for there to be agreement in its application . . .’.⁴⁷

The appearance of the word ‘shared’ in these comments is their compromise with Wittgenstein. According to them, not language-games, techniques of calculating, rules, *simpliciter*, are founded on agreement, but only ‘shared’ ones. Commenting on *PI* 199, Baker and Hacker say:

Note that W’s emphasis here is not on the need for *joint* activity, but on recurrent activity. The concept of following a rule is here linked with the concept of regularity, not with the concept of a community of rule-followers.⁴⁸

In reference to Wittgenstein’s remark in *PI* 202, that ‘following a rule is a practice’, they say:

But it is not part of the general concept of a practice (or of Wittgenstein’s concept) that it *must* be shared, but only that it must be *sharable*. It must be possible to teach a technique of applying a rule to others, and for others, by grasping the criteria of correctness, to determine whether a given act is a correct application of the rule. It must be *intelligible* that others can qualify as masters of any genuine technique.⁴⁹

In their book *Scepticism, Rules & Language*, they comment on the appearance of the term ‘*Praxis*’ in *PI* 202, as follows:

It is a misinterpretation to take ‘*Praxis*’ here to signify a social practice . . . The point is *not* to establish that language necessarily involves a community . . . nothing in this discussion involves any commitment to a multiplicity of *agents*. All the emphasis is on the regularity, the multiple *occasions* of action.⁵⁰

And they say:

Whether a person is following a rule, or only thinks incorrectly that he is following a rule, does not depend on what others are or might be doing.⁵¹

⁴⁵ *B&H*, 248.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁵⁰ G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules & Language*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 20. Cited as *SRL*.

⁵¹ *SRL*, 76.

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Let us return to their detailed commentary on the *Investigations*. In their comment on *PI* 198, where Wittgenstein says that a person 'directs himself by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom', Baker and Hacker say the following:

By offering this as part of the clarification of the concept of going by a signpost, Wittgenstein *seems* to have built into this concept the existence of a *shared* pattern of behaviour.⁵²

But they claim that to believe this is so, is a serious misinterpretation of Wittgenstein; for he never intended to deny the possibility of there being solitary rule-followers:

He was aware of the danger that his remarks about agreement might be misinterpreted in this way. He quite explicitly took care *not* to exclude the possibility that a solitary individual could follow a rule or speak a language to himself.⁵³

It is far from clear what the issue is here. Can a 'solitary individual' follow a rule? Most of us follow rules when we are alone. I calculate my income tax alone. I write letters, read, think, when I am alone. I was brought up in the English language and carry it with me wherever I go. If I were shipwrecked, like Robinson Crusoe, on an uninhabited island, I would retain (for a time at least) my knowledge of English and of counting and arithmetic. It is normal for people to do calculations, carry out instructions, prepare plans, in private. In this sense, all of us are 'solitary individuals' much of the time.

Of course all of us have spent many years in being taught to speak, write, calculate. We grew up in communities of language-users and rule-followers. The *philosophical* problem about 'solitary rule-followers', should be the question of whether someone who grew up in total isolation from other human beings, could create a language for his own use. Could there be a Crusoe who (unlike Defoe's Crusoe) was never a member of a human society, yet invented a language that he employed in his daily activities? And does Wittgenstein concede such a possibility? Baker and Hacker contend that he does:

Ruminations about desert islanders seem to be attempts to raise the philosophical question of under what conditions we can intelligibly apply the concept of speaking a language. Wittgenstein argued that the solitariness or isolation of an individual is irrelevant to the question of his speaking a language. What is crucial is the *possibility* of another's mastering the 'language' that the solitary person 'speaks'. It is certainly conceivable, Wittgenstein claimed, that each person

⁵² B&H, 170.

⁵³ B&H, 172.

spoke only to himself, that he was acquainted only with language-games he played with himself (giving himself orders or exhortations, asking himself questions, etc.), and even that the language of such speakers had an extensive vocabulary. An explorer who studied these monologuists could grasp the thoughts they expressed and arrive at a probable translation into his own language by observing how their activities were correlated with their articulate speech. By learning their language he would be in a position to predict what they would do in so far as what they say includes predictions or decisions.⁵⁴

It is astonishing to find Baker and Hacker declaring that Wittgenstein *claimed* that it is conceivable that 'each person spoke only to himself'. Would this alleged claim mean that it is conceivable that every person in the world might have spoken only to himself? Where do Baker and Hacker think they find such an extraordinary assertion by Wittgenstein? They make a similar claim in the *Scepticism, Rules & Language*. They say that, according to Wittgenstein, 'There could be men who know only language-games that one plays by oneself, viz. ordering oneself, telling oneself, asking and answering oneself, etc.'⁵⁵ Baker and Hacker refer here to a passage in MS 124, which is an early version of the first paragraph of *PI* 243. This paragraph of 243 reads as follows:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even conceive of human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves.—An explorer who observed them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)

Where in this passage is there any ground for attributing to Wittgenstein the declaration that it is conceivable that 'each person spoke only to himself'? Are Baker and Hacker making an illegitimate use of the proposition 'What *sometimes* happens might *always* happen', which Wittgenstein warns against in *PI* 345?

In *PI* 243 Wittgenstein immediately moves on from the opening paragraph, to introduce an entirely different topic—namely, the notion of a language that is 'private' in the sense that the words of this language 'are to refer to what can be known only to the person speaking'. Wittgenstein does not stop to fill in a possible background for those imagined people who speak only in monologue. He leaves that to the reader. It is easy to supply a background which does not imply that

⁵⁴ *B&H*, 175–176.

⁵⁵ *SRL*, 41.

those people had spoken only in monologue for their entire lives. For example, after a normal upbringing, they might have become members of a monastic order that forbade its members to speak to one another. Or, as H. O. Mounce suggests, 'suppose that some terrible affliction has fallen on a whole population, so that people speak only to themselves, having lost all interest in one another'.⁵⁶

Nothing in *PI* 243 warrants the reading that Wittgenstein was saying that it is conceivable 'that each person spoke only to himself'. Baker and Hacker seem to take this to be a claim by Wittgenstein that there could be people who during their *entire* lives never spoke to anyone, nor were ever spoken to, yet each of whom developed a spoken language, by himself, and that (miraculously) they developed the *same* language!

In the revised and expanded edition of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Part VI is wholly new. It consists of MS 164, probably written in the period 1941–1944. According to the editors, it is 'perhaps the most satisfactory presentation of Wittgenstein's thoughts about the problem of following a rule'.⁵⁷ Let us look at some of the passages in Part VI:

If one of two chimpanzees one time scratches the figure /---/ in the earth, and thereupon the other one scratches the series /---/ /---/, etc., the first one would not have given a rule and the other one be following it, no matter what else went on at that time in the minds of the two of them. But if one observed, e.g., the phenomenon of a kind of instruction, of showing how and imitation, of successful and unsuccessful attempts, of reward and punishment, and the like; if at length the one who had been so trained, put figures which he had never seen before, one after the other as in the first example, then we should indeed say that the one chimpanzee writes down rules and the other follows them.⁵⁸

Baker and Hacker refer to this passage, but seem not to catch its significance. They say, rightly, that it is 'the *circumstances* surrounding the particular act that makes the difference between following a rule and not following the rule'.⁵⁹ Yet in a summary of their interpretation, they say: 'Wittgenstein's verdict is clear: a solitary individual can follow a rule'.⁶⁰ But the striking *difference* in circumstances, in Wittgenstein's example, is that in the second case there is instruction, demonstration,

⁵⁶ H. O. Mounce, 'Following a Rule', *Philosophical Investigations*, 9, No. 3 (July 1986), 198.

⁵⁷ *RFM*, 29.

⁵⁸ *RFM*, 345.

⁵⁹ *B&H*, 177.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

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correction, reward, punishment—and thus the establishing and enforcing of *the right way* of going on. If you conceive of an individual who has been in solitude his whole life long, then you have cut away the background of instruction, correction, acceptance—in short, the circumstances in which a rule is given, enforced, and followed.

As previously noted, in expounding *PI* 199 (where it is said that ‘to understand a language means to master a technique’, and that ‘to follow a rule, make a report, give an order, play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions)’)—Baker and Hacker say that Wittgenstein’s emphasis there is on *recurrent* activity, not on *joint* activity:

The concept of following a rule is here linked with the concept of regularity, not with the concept of a community of rule-followers.⁶¹

Mastery of a technique is manifest in its exercise on a multiplicity of occasions.⁶²

Baker and Hacker are interpreting Wittgenstein in a way that will *not* have him meaning that following a rule requires a framework of agreement—but only as meaning that it requires ‘regularity’ in the sense of ‘recurrent’ action, repetition, a multiplicity of occasions. They are right to this extent: Wittgenstein did hold that the concept of following a rule has application only when there is a ‘multiplicity of occasions’. In *PI* 199 he says, ‘It is impossible that there should have been only a single time that someone followed a rule’. In *RFM* he says: ‘In order to describe the phenomenon of language one has to describe a practice, not a one-time occurrence, *whatever it might be*’.⁶³ He asks himself, ‘But how often must a rule be actually applied, in order for one to have the right to speak of a rule?’⁶⁴ He doesn’t answer the question—because it cannot be answered. But clearly there must be some *regularity* in acting. This is *one* dimension of the concept of following a rule.

But regularity is not enough. Another dimension of the concept of following a rule is *agreement* between different people, in applying a rule. Here is a longish passage from *RFM*:

The word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are *related* to one another; they are *cousins*. The phenomena of agreement and of acting according to a rule are interdependent. To be sure, there could be a caveman who produced for himself a *regular* sequence of figures. He amuses himself, for example, by drawing on the wall of the cave

⁶¹ *BEH*, 140.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *RFM*, 335.

⁶⁴ *RFM*, 334.

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or ————

But he does not follow the general expression of a rule. And we do not say he is acting according to a rule, just because we can form such an expression.

What if in addition he developed *pi*! (I mean, without a general expression of a rule.)

Only in the practice of a language can a word have meaning. Certainly, I can give myself a rule and then follow it. But isn't it only a rule, because it is analogous to that, which in the dealings of human beings, is called a 'rule'?

If a thrush in its singing constantly repeats for some time the same phrase, do we say perhaps it gives itself each time a rule, which it then follows?⁶⁵

Both caveman and thrush produce regular sequences—but they are not following rules, and their marks and sounds have no meaning in the sense that words have meaning. A rule can exist only in a human practice, or in what is analogous to it. And what a rule requires and what following it is, presupposes the background of a social setting in which there is quiet agreement as to what 'going on in the same way' is. This is an agreement in *acting*, not in opinions:

The agreement of human beings, which is a presupposition of logic, is not an agreement in *opinions*, let alone opinions about questions of logic.⁶⁶

Agreement is a presupposition of *logic*, not just of 'shared' logic. Baker and Hacker want to interpret Wittgenstein as conceding that someone who lived a totally solitary life, from birth to death, might have the mastery of an unshared logic and language, and presumably of an unshared arithmetic. In this connection, Wittgenstein asks some interesting questions:

Could there be an arithmetic without agreement between those who calculate?

Could a solitary person calculate? Could a solitary person follow a rule?

Are these questions perhaps like this one: 'Can a solitary person carry on a trade?'⁶⁷

Baker and Hacker refer to this last question (which Wittgenstein does not answer). They say: 'Clearly the answer is negative'.⁶⁸ This response

⁶⁵ *RFM*, 344–345.

⁶⁶ *RFM*, 353.

⁶⁷ *RFM*, 349.

⁶⁸ *B&H*, 140.

to Wittgenstein's question is surprising. They intend to be expounding Wittgenstein, and here they assume that his answer, not just their own answer, would be in the negative. I think the opposite.

Consider Wittgenstein's frequent remarks of the following sort: 'The phenomenon of language rests on regularity, on agreement in acting'.⁶⁹ 'The agreement of human beings . . . is a presupposition of logic'.⁷⁰ 'Our language-game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails . . .'.⁷¹ 'The phenomena of agreement and of acting according to a rule are interdependent'.⁷² Reflection on such comments convinces me that Wittgenstein's own answer to the question he posed would be affirmative. The supposition that a forever-solitary being could have a language, or an arithmetic, or follow a rule, *would* be like the comical supposition that a being so placed could 'carry on a trade'.

To speak a language is to participate in a way of living in which many people are engaged. The language I speak gets its meaning from the common ways of acting and responding of many people. I *take part* in a language in the sense in which I *take part* in a game—which is surely one reason why Wittgenstein compared languages to games. Another reason for this comparison is that in both languages and games there are *rules*. To follow the rules for the use of an expression is nothing other than to use the expression as it is ordinarily used—which is to say, as it is used by those many people who take part in the activities in which the expression is embedded. Thus the meaning of the expression is *independent* of me, or of any particular person; and this is why I can use the expression correctly or incorrectly. It has a meaning independent of *my* use of it. And this is why there is no sense in the supposition that a forever-solitary person could know a language, any more than he could buy and sell.

This point can be applied to the assertion of Baker and Hacker that 'it is not part of the general concept of a practice (or of Wittgenstein's concept) that it *must* be shared, but only that it must be *sharable*'.⁷³ They are right in half of what they say: a practice must be sharable. But something is sharable only if there is something to be shared. The forever-solitary person could make sounds and marks. This would be only what *he* does. The sounds and marks would not have a meaning *independent* of his production of them—which comes to saying that they would *not have meaning* in the sense that words have meaning.

⁶⁹ *RFM*, 342.

⁷⁰ *RFM*, 353.

⁷¹ *Z*, 430.

⁷² *RFM*, 344.

⁷³ *B&H*, 164.

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Wittgenstein says that 'to imagine a language means, to imagine a form of life'.⁷⁴ The expression 'a form of life' suggests some typical or characteristic behaviour of a species, a tribe, a clan, a society, a people, a culture. Describing the form of life of a species would be describing its natural history. One species of animals dwells in trees, another in caves. One human tribe obtains food by hunting, another by tending crops. These would be differences in forms of life.

When Wittgenstein connects a language with a human form of life, he is seeing a language as embedded in some characteristic way of acting of many people, not in the behaviour of a single individual. He says that he is providing 'remarks on the natural history of human beings'.⁷⁵ His term 'language-game' is meant to emphasize that a use of language reflects a form of life. The daily exchange of greetings is an example of a form of life and of a use of language, that is characteristic of many human societies. The exchange of greetings can be called a *practice*, a *custom*, an *institution*. There is no difficulty about this example.

What is harder to grasp is Wittgenstein's conception that *following a rule*, just as much as the exchange of greetings, is a *practice*,⁷⁶ a *custom*, an *institution*.⁷⁷ It is a *form of life*, a feature of *the natural history* of human beings. Baker and Hacker declare that when Wittgenstein says that following a rule is 'a practice', he cannot mean 'to differentiate something essentially social from something individual which may be done in privacy'.⁷⁸ It seems clear to me, however, that Wittgenstein is saying that the concept of following a rule is 'essentially social'—in the sense that it can have its roots only in a setting where there is a *people*, with common life and a common language. Which is to say that it would make no sense to suppose that an individual who had lived in complete isolation, from start to finish, could have been following rules. Undoubtedly this conception provokes great philosophical resistance—but this should not prevent us from seeing that it truly is Wittgenstein's conception.

Baker and Hacker go so far as to claim that Wittgenstein took *precautions* to ensure that his thinking about the concept of following a rule was not to be understood as eliminating the possibility of a forever-solitary rule-follower;

Wittgenstein's reaction to the suggestion that the practice of following a rule is essentially social is not a mere matter of speculation and conjecture. He was aware of the danger that his remarks about

⁷⁴ *PI*, 19.

⁷⁵ *PI* 415.

⁷⁶ *PI*, 202.

⁷⁷ *PI*, 199.

⁷⁸ *B&H*, 177–178.

agreement might be misinterpreted in this way. He quite explicitly took care *not* to exclude the possibility that a solitary individual could follow a rule or speak a language to himself.⁷⁹

This statement by Baker and Hacker conflates two different things. Whether the concept of following a rule is the concept of something 'essentially social', is an important philosophical issue. Whether 'a solitary individual' can follow a rule or speak to himself, is no issue at all, since most of us are solitary a good part of the time.

Baker and Hacker say: 'It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein explicitly discussed Robinson Crusoe'.⁸⁰ This would be noteworthy only if Wittgenstein had conceived of a 'Robinson Crusoe' who (unlike Defoe's invention) had *never* encountered other people, yet in his life-long isolation had created a language. But of course Wittgenstein did not conceive of *such* a Crusoe. He imagines a Crusoe who talks to himself;⁸¹ but there is no indication that he is conceiving of anyone other than Defoe's Crusoe.

More interesting is a reference he makes to a Crusoe, in connection with the concept of giving an order:

Ordering is a technique of our language.

If someone came into a foreign country, whose language he did not understand, it would not in general be difficult for him to find out when an order was given.

But one can also order oneself to do something. If, however, we observed a Robinson, who gave himself an order in a language unfamiliar to us, this would be much more difficult to recognize.⁸²

Wittgenstein is saying that giving orders and obeying orders is a pattern of action and reaction which could fairly easily be discerned by us, even if the language was foreign—whereas such a pattern would be more difficult to perceive in the case of an isolated individual. But there is no hint that this 'Robinson' had been isolated for his entire life.

Still more interesting is the following:

What if the human being (perhaps a caveman) always spoke only to himself. Think of a case in which we could say: 'Now he is considering whether he should do so-and-so. Now he has made a decision. Now he orders himself to act'. It is possible to imagine something of that sort, if he perhaps makes use of simple drawings, which we can interpret.⁸³

⁷⁹ *B&H*, 172.

⁸⁰ *B&H*, 173.

⁸¹ MS 165, 103.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 108.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 116–117.

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There is no suggestion that this caveman had lived in complete separation from other human beings for his whole life, any more than it is suggested in *PI* 243 that the people who spoke 'only in monologue', had *never* taken part in a common language. Wittgenstein's main point here is that we can often perceive what a person is thinking and deciding, from his circumstances, together with his gestures, movements, facial expressions, even if we do not hear his words, or do not understand them. (In the case of the caveman, his drawings of familiar objects might make this easier for us.) Wittgenstein always puts emphasis on the fact that the words of language have meaning only because they are enmeshed in common patterns of human life. Even familiar words, when separated from these patterns, cease to be language:

If we conceive of a being who, as we would say, performed actions totally without rhyme or reason, and accompanied these actions with sounds, perhaps with sentences of the German language, still this being would have no language.⁸⁴

According to Baker and Hacker, 'Wittgenstein argued that the solitariness or isolation of an individual is irrelevant to the question of his speaking a language'.⁸⁵ This is an extraordinary assertion. Here, as before, the words 'isolation' and 'solitariness', are ambiguous. Wittgenstein did not and had no need to 'argue' that an individual who grew up in a linguistic community, in the normal way, could later live alone and continue to think, write, and talk to himself. This was never an issue. On the other hand, it is not true that Wittgenstein *argued* for the view that a being who had *always* lived in solitude *could* have the mastery of a language. If he argued for anything, it was for just the opposite.

There is a passage in MS 165 that Baker and Hacker cite in support of their interpretation:

One can indeed imagine a human being who lives by himself and draws pictures of the objects around him (perhaps on the walls of his cave), and such a picture-language could be readily understood.⁸⁶

Let us *arbitrarily assume* that Wittgenstein was imagining someone who had *always* lived alone, and who was employing a picture-language (*Bildersprache*). Would Wittgenstein be implying that there could be a forever-solitary person with a language? Baker and Hacker construe the example in that way. Their comment is:

Provided that his symbolism resembles paradigmatic languages closely enough . . . then we can discover that he is master of a

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁸⁵ *B&H*, 175.

⁸⁶ MS 165, 105.

language. And parallel possibilities hold for determining whether he follows other rules and applies various techniques.⁸⁷

Is there any ground for assuming that the drawings of this solitary being are done in accordance with rules? One of our small children, before it knew any words, might draw something that we could recognize as a picture of a house. But this does not mean that the child is employing a 'symbolism'. A linguistic symbol is a sign or mark, the use of which is governed by rules, and thus can be employed correctly or incorrectly. In this sense, there is no 'mastery of a language' exhibited by the child or the caveman. It is probably natural enough to call the cave drawings a '*Bildersprache*', since they are recognizably pictures of surrounding objects. But they are not language, any more than are the tunes that birds whistle.

In another example (to which I previously referred), a caveman is imagined to be drawing regular patterns on the cave wall. But, says Wittgenstein, he is not following the general expression of a rule—and so he is not acting according to a rule.⁸⁸ For Wittgenstein, following a rule is fundamental to language.⁸⁹ If so, then the cave pictures and patterns are not *close enough* to what Baker and Hacker call 'paradigmatic languages'.

They concede that 'Wittgenstein stressed the importance of regularity and agreement for the application of the concept of following a rule'.⁹⁰ They go on to say the following:

To interpret his observations as parts of a proposal to *define* 'accord with a rule' in terms of agreement is unsupported by sound textual evidence, and it conflicts with his *Grundgedanke* that accord is an internal relation of an act to a rule.⁹¹

Now of course Wittgenstein did not attempt to *define* 'accord with a rule', any more than he tried to define 'language' or 'game'. He did not think that definitions of such concepts were of any value. But he did hold that in the absence of a consensus in action, there would be no *concept* of a *rule*. This interpretation is supported by 'sound textual evidence', as I have tried to show. As to whether Wittgenstein's alleged '*Grundgedanke*' is that 'accord is an internal relation of an act to a rule'—I have said enough about that in section II.

Baker and Hacker declare that they have given the notion of agreement 'a major role' in their exposition of Wittgenstein's ideas.⁹² They

⁸⁷ *B&H*, 175.

⁸⁸ *RFM*, 344.

⁸⁹ *RFM*, 330.

⁹⁰ *B&H*, 179.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 179–180.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 179.

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direct the reader to their essay, 'Agreement', which begins at p. 243 of their commentary. But I have already pointed out, also in section II, that they there interpret agreement to be important only for *shared* language, *shared* rules, *common* concepts. This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for 'shared' language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language *simpliciter*.

V

A conjecture. For a good many years, Baker and Hacker have been pursuing an assiduous study of Wittgenstein's writings. It is clear that they revere Wittgenstein: their admiration of his work is manifest throughout their commentaries. When I ask myself how they could adopt and wholeheartedly expound what seems to be a plainly mistaken interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought, the only answer that seems plausible to me is the following: Baker and Hacker, in their own philosophical thinking, consider it to be *obvious* that an individual human being *could*, logically speaking, have a language, *could* follow a rule, *could* know the meaning of a word, even if he was and forever had been isolated from human company. Is it likely that so great a philosopher as Wittgenstein should have fallen into the misguided confusion of believing that language and rule-following *necessarily* require a community of speakers? No indeed! It is, therefore, a valuable service to Wittgenstein to defend him at every turn from such a discreditable reading.

I have quite a lot of sympathy for this attitude. I know, both from my own inclinations, and from what I have observed of the reactions of many students and colleagues, that it is a thoroughly natural tendency of philosophical thinking to regard it as *self-evident* that a person who had never been a member of a human society could give a name to something and then go on to employ that name in that 'same' meaning, and could make a sign-post for his own use and thereafter take his direction from it.

Colin McGinn, in his book *Wittgenstein On Meaning*, provides a nice expression of this tendency. He defends what he calls 'the natural idea that which concepts a person possesses depends simply on *facts about him*'.⁹³ He goes on to say: 'we can thus form a conception of someone possessing concepts and following rules without introducing *other* persons into our thought . . .'.⁹⁴ McGinn distinguishes between

⁹³ Colin McGinn, *Wittgenstein On Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 191.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

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what he calls 'the individualistic conception' and 'the community conception' of rules and rule-following. He subscribes to the individualistic conception, holding that 'the existence of others is *not* logically necessary for the possession of concepts, language and rules'.⁹⁵ It seems to him to be possible 'that God could have created a single rule-follower alone in the universe for all time'.⁹⁶

This natural bent in philosophy was explored and criticized by Wittgenstein with remarkable energy and tenacity in his post-*Tractatus* writings. A consideration of absolutely fundamental importance, which he brings out in *PI* 202, is the necessary distinction between one's following a rule, and one's *thinking* one is following a rule. If you try to imagine someone who had never participated in human society, inventing a rule for himself and undertaking to follow it, you will realize that there would be no foothold there for that necessary distinction.

A considerable number of philosophers have grasped the significance of this point. Benjamin Armstrong is one of them. Applying the point to signs and words, he says:

Words, if they are to be words, cannot mean whatever an individual happens to 'think they mean'; a correct use cannot be whatever an individual happens to do with a sign. It must be possible for an individual to use a sign incorrectly, if it is to be a word; i.e., if it is to *mean one thing rather than another*.⁹⁷

There must be a use of a sign that is *independent* of what an individual speaker does with it, in order for the latter's use of the sign to be correct or incorrect. As Armstrong says:

The independent 'way of using a sign' that is required for the satisfaction of the conditions on a correct use cannot be provided by a single individual.⁹⁸

This independence-condition can be satisfied only if there is a community of speakers who use the sign in a customary way.

In his 1939 lectures in Cambridge, Wittgenstein expressed this point in a concisely memorable way. He was talking about the notion of 'knowing the meaning' of a word. What he said was: 'To know its meaning is to use it *in the same way* as other people do'.⁹⁹

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⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Benjamin F. Armstrong Jr., 'Wittgenstein on Private Languages', *Philosophical Investigations*, 7, No. 1 (January 1984), 54.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹⁹ *LFM*, 183.