


One might have hoped Gibson would have used some of these richly detailed episodes to rethink his rather old-fashioned taxonomy of ecclesiastical politics in this period. His insistence on using the term *latitudinarian* as a virtual synonym for Whig churchman is especially problematic, a fact he seems to acknowledge in his conclusion when confronting the theological orthodoxy of reliably whiggish prelates like Bishop Gibson and Archbishop Wake. And his conflation of royalism and high churchmanship completely overlooks the relentless high-church assault on the doctrine of the royal supremacy throughout the 1690s. Moreover, the belief in the invalidity of non-episcopal baptism (which Samuel Wesley evidently espoused) was a fringe doctrine even among high churchman, associated instead overwhelmingly with non-jurors or men like Roger Laurence and Thomas Brett who would become non-jurors after the Hanoverian succession. Both low and high churchmanship each contained often countervailing theological tendencies in the post-revolutionary era. Rather than deploy these terms as monolithic ecclesiologies, or, worse, mere religious analogues of Whig and Tory parties, a more nuanced account of their internal variety and contradictions would have been most welcome here. Samuel Wesley's seemingly contradictory religious and ideological commitments—his reverence for Archbishop Tillotson, on the one hand, and collaboration with Henry Sacheverell, on the other; his involvement in both the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and the lower house of Convocation; his Hanoverianism and his rejection of non-episcopal Protestantism—would seem to provide an ideal set of cases for rethinking the theological politics of the era.

In the end, one is not entirely sure precisely what constituted the titular “crisis of Tory piety” in what Gibson deems the era of the “long Glorious Revolution” (3). Or, indeed, whether that crisis was ever resolved. In Bennett's *Tory Crisis* Atterbury's mounting alienation from both crown and episcopate in the post-revolutionary era eventually impelled him into Jacobite conspiracy and exile. There was an unmistakably tragic dimension to an Anglicanism that could no longer abide either English miter or scepter, and could only proceed in the service of the Roman Catholic pretender. But Samuel Wesley's story ends in stolid Hanoverianism, at home in Epworth. Gibson finds Wesley, at the end of his life, cheerfully recommending works by both the arch-whig Bishop Burnet alongside those of the traitorous Atterbury. All the contradictions remained intact. Perhaps it was Wesley's ability to carry on his pastoral work amidst the mounting tensions besetting Anglicanism at the beginning of the eighteenth century that offer the strongest case for his representativeness.

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JOHN D. GRAINGER. *The British Navy in the Caribbean*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2021. Pp. 279. \$130.00 (cloth).
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Today, most people think of the Caribbean as a vacation destination with sandy beaches bathed in tropical sunlight that occasionally garners further attention as hurricanes or other forms of natural disaster place the region in the headlines. Rarely do we think of the Caribbean as strategically important. In the context of the modern competition continuum, we generally think about the other side of the world in regard to defending maritime security and national interests. However, following the discovery of the New World, many European nations struggled against one another, nature, and disease to control as much of the Caribbean as possible. The primary driver for the region's strategic importance was sugar, which, planted, harvested,

and refined in the Caribbean, brought enormous amounts of money into the coffers of European colonial powers. This economic potential was the foundation for the strategic importance of the Caribbean during the colonial era and led to friction and conflict between competing nations. European wars of the era most often spilled into the area, if they had not been started there to begin with. This is the world that John D. Grainger is concerned with in his new book, *The British Navy in the Caribbean*. Grainger examines naval power in the Caribbean from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, tracing England's passage from a relatively small maritime and naval power to Britain's near absolute command of the ocean following the defeat of France in 1815. The conflict and combat he chronicles take place against a backdrop of sugar, slavery, and disease, driven initially by the desire for state and private financial gain before becoming strategically important with the growth of the British Empire.

The first five chapters of *The British Navy in the Caribbean* provide a survey of the English Navy's exploration and initial ventures into the Caribbean during an era dominated by the Spanish Empire. Accordingly, England relied heavily on mariners such as Sir Francis Drake to act as privateers to disrupt Spanish activity, and often turned a blind eye to piracy and other criminal activity, especially if those actions harmed Spain more than England. In fact, the first English outposts in the West Indies were established to support raids on Spanish shipping in the area. By the end of the seventeenth century, England, soon to be Britain, had developed significant colonies in the Lesser Antilles on the eastern end of the Caribbean Sea. Grainger reminds the reader that the capture of Jamaica in 1655 established Britain as a growing power in the West Indies and demonstrated the beginning of Spain's decline in the region.

The middle four chapters cover the growth of Britain following the Glorious Revolution and accession of William III to the throne. This event effectively created a new primary adversary in France and growing competition that frequently erupted into war. These European conflicts were increasingly global in dimension, engulfing the Caribbean, where colonial competition witnessed many islands changing hands. Fighting in the Caribbean required greater military infrastructure and defense on the part of all actors, thus creating something of an arms race in the area. The increase of a professional military presence in the Caribbean during peacetime and war helped eliminate much of the piracy issues that had dominated the previous two centuries.

Chapters 10, 11, and 12 detail the British Navy's nadir in first five years of American War of Independence followed by its rise to zenith from 1781 to 1815. Britain, deeply entangled in a war with its North American colonies was caught largely by surprise when France and later the Spanish and Dutch, colonial powers themselves, joined the conflict against Britain. This caused major setbacks for the Royal Navy, which from 1778 to 1781 could not maintain control of the seas. This was overcome in the final three years of the American War, as the British Navy mostly destroyed the French and Spanish fleets in the Caribbean. The lessons learned from the American War ensured Britain gained and maintained command of North Atlantic waters throughout the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the Caribbean, this largely meant filling the vacuum created by the declining presence of French and Spanish naval and maritime power.

The final chapter delivers a brief coverage of Britain as the undisputed naval power of the nineteenth century through colonial decline of the early twentieth century. Grainger flies through more than a century of history in seventeen pages that reads more like an epilogue to the book than a serious chapter preceding the conclusion. The conclusion itself, consequently, is unsatisfying at a page long. One might have expected a more insightful analysis following discussion of centuries of naval operations.

With *The British Navy in the Caribbean*, Grainger provides an interesting survey of the history of the region from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. He chronicles British exploration, war, and colonization in the Caribbean, but does not offer any new insights

and relies almost entirely on secondary source material, some of which is rather dated. Grainger avoids the major historical arguments in favor of writing a narrative history. As a survey it generally works, although it does not contain the cutting edge of historical research and thus is less useful for more serious readers.

The major problem with *The British Navy in the Caribbean* is its price, which at \$130 for the hardback means it is unlikely to find its way on to more than a few library shelves. This is a shame, because the book would otherwise be useful as an entry into the historical naval issues of the area. One suspects that the current Great Power Competition will expand into the Caribbean; how earlier powers operated may be of salience, particularly before the next headline-grabbing event.

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RACHEL B. HERRMANN. *No Useless Mouth: Waging War and Fighting Hunger in the American Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. Pp. 308. \$27.95 (paper).
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In her original and creative study *No Useless Mouth: Waging War and Fighting Hunger in the American Revolution*, Rachel B. Herrmann explores the fundamental human dynamics of food and hunger in the revolutionary Atlantic. She draws her book's title from the words of Frederick Haldimand, the governor of Quebec, who in 1780 stipulated that “no useless mouth” among Britain's Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) allies should remain at British posts like Fort Niagara. Haldimand wished to avoid the expense of feeding refugee Native communities, but he and other British officials found that privation among their Native allies actually strengthened their negotiating power. Herrmann seeks to restore negotiations over food and hunger to a central place in our understanding of eighteenth-century diplomacy: “Hunger prompted violence *and* forged ties; it was a weapon of war and a tool of diplomacy” (3).

Herrmann advances three interrelated concepts—food diplomacy, victual warfare, and victual imperialism—to describe the ways that British, American, Native, and African peoples used food as power, by consuming, destroying, providing, or refusing it. Those concepts also have a chronological quality, in that *food diplomacy* describes the earliest ways in which Natives and newcomers traded, consumed, or abstained from food or alcohol as they created and maintained alliances in North America. *Victual warfare* describes the eighteenth-century North American tactics of warfare practiced by all combatants, focused on the scorched-earth destruction of the means of survival: burning farms, barns, and agricultural fields; killing livestock; and girdling fruit trees.

Perhaps the best-known example of this destruction in the War for American Independence occurred in 1779, when American general John Sullivan led an expedition to Iroquoia (modern upstate New York). Sullivan's men burned and destroyed several Haudenosaunee towns and laid waste their verdant and productive countryside. Herrmann puts Sullivan's claim of having destroyed more than 160,000 bushels of corn into powerful perspective: she calculated that the prerevolutionary Six Nations population of 6,400 (a low estimate) required a minimum of 38,400 bushels of corn per year. Sullivan's army thus destroyed four years of sustenance for their population.

Part of the American strategy in Sullivan's expedition was to curtail British and Indian attacks on the settlement frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania, which provided crucial