

footnotes. The publishers' irresponsibility in placing them at the end (in a section which, adding insult to injury, they entitle 'Appendix') makes the use of the book very much more difficult than it need be. If many English readers will prefer to use the book in the original French, the blame will not lie with the translator.

R. A. MARKUS

THOUGHT, GOD, AND THE COMMON MAN, by Philip Villiers Pistorius; Bowes and Bowes; 25s.

Professor Pistorius of the University of Pretoria has been led by his interest in the irrational factors which affect behaviour to write a work of epistemology dealing especially with the relations between logic and value. His book contains the following philosophical theses which I have stated as far as possible in his own words and followed by references to the pages on which they appear.

The nature of the human mind is best investigated by introspection (19,66). A human being is a volitional animal with a rational apparatus (26); that is to say, he consists of an inner core or unknown x in whom volition is vested (25,68), plus a logical faculty, which includes sense-organs, which is the absolute servant of the unknown x (40,75). The unknown x selects data and chooses values for the logical faculty, which functions purely mechanically (23,25,35). Free will is exercised by means of a causal chain which runs from the unknown x through the logical faculty to the physical organs of behaviour (115). A man's body is part of his environment, not part of himself (75). The logical faculty is 'a mysterious clearing house, where the incorporeal judgment of the volitional subject is translated into physical action' (77).

Knowledge is a process (17). What a man knows may be false (*passim*). We can know only what we can visualize; concepts are mental images (13,86). Logic is an empirical science, conditioned by experience and corrigible by experience; it differs from person to person (*passim*).

Value is a relation between facts and a volitional subject (44). For those who accept religion the highest good is a categorical imperative based on a relation between man and the divine (64). God is a logic-transcending person, a suppositional knower to whom the essence of reality precedes its existence (65,71,118). Though the unknown x is in mediumless contact with God, divine revelation, because exempt from logic, is unprovable and incommunicable; dogma is a 'pseudo-logical knowledge-content masquerading in the guise of logic-transcending universality' resulting from the attempt to visualize the ontological essence of God (98,113). God's existence cannot be proved, but whether He exists or not does not greatly matter, for there is a widespread belief to that effect, and 'the axiological impact of a knowledge-content is not dependent on the ontological reality of that knowledge-content but on the subjective certainty that it is real' (112). The only essential element in the concept of God is the

notion of all-inclusiveness (124).

The conclusion of the book is that the volitional subject must review his system of values in the light of an absolutely-objective knowledge-content, namely, God or the totality of reality (140).

Anyone acquainted with philosophy will have no difficulty in recognizing this anthology of once-fashionable mistakes, culled in fairly equal proportions from Descartes, Hume, Kant and Hegel. The theology will be equally familiar to any reader of *Pascendi*. The jargon is at first disconcerting (within two pages we get the following hyphenations: 'knowledge-process', 'axiologically-loaded knowledge-contents', 'thought-structure', 'value-free', 'generically-objective', 'generically-human') but one soon learns to translate, e.g., 'axiologically-loaded' into 'biased' and 'knowledge-content' into 'belief'.

Amid this thicket of errors, there are some acute observations and interesting discussions, such as that of the temporal priority of emotive over factual discourse in a child's history (p.11), and that of the three types of values, human, social and individual (pp.88ff).

But to an English reader, the major interest of the book is in the constant references to South Africa (pp.31,36,56,90,94). Not that South Africa is expressly mentioned—we read instead of 'a suppositional individual A who lives in a multi-racial and multi-lingual country'—but it seems clear that what originally interested the author in his subject were the attempts made by practising Christians to rationalize their support for *apartheid*. To write even guardedly on these topics in South Africa at this time may well call for real courage. It is much to be regretted that Professor Pistorius' philosophical qualifications were not adequate to his high intentions.

ANTHONY KENNY

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, by D. W. Hamlyn; Routledge; 25s.

The preface suggests that a historical survey of a particular philosophical problem may provide an illumination not available in general histories. The history of the treatment of sensation and perception, extending from the pre-Socratics to the present day, has as its guiding thread an excellent refinement of Reid's distinction between the two, and the result is certainly better than I would have thought possible before reading this book, although still not entirely free from those pseudomorphisms which are the standard curse of stock-story general history: the field is still too large, in spite of the restriction of topic. Yet the treatment of the modern and contemporary period, and the general discussion contained in its last chapter, are quite irreplaceable, and endow the work with a value which goes well beyond its obvious minimal use as a starting point for discussion.

Throughout, the epistemological, the logical (conceptual) and the psychological (factual) strands of theories are meticulously distinguished, with the