

Young People and Trade Union Membership: An International Comparative Study

Christina Cregan, Chris Rudd and
Stewart Johnston*

Abstract

This paper attempts to test the recent British Industrial Relations model of trade union membership by an examination of a survey of early school-leavers in Dunedin, New Zealand, which was carried out in October 1989. The findings offer strong support for the model because the same distinct strands of core motivation and remainder attitudes were evident. This demonstrates that the model could be successfully applied in a different institutional, cultural and economic context. The major cross-national differences to emerge were that most Dunedin youngsters intended to join a union; for them, collective instrumental reasons were very important and values of little significance. Furthermore, there was little evidence of disinterest or ignorance amongst the minority which was negative towards trade union membership.

A recent article on trade union membership (Cregan and Johnston, 1990) suggested that conventional neoclassical theories are flawed by

* University of Otago. The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Fay Burke, Kirsten Slatter, Lee McLean and Pene Williams in carrying out the interviews and research assistance by Sue Cathro, Glennis Salmon and Valerie Thompson.

the free rider paradox, whereby a rational individual will not bear the costs of joining a union to gain rewards that are available to all the workforce as public goods. It proposed that the dilemma could only be solved by a membership theory which takes into account several different sources of individual motivation drawn from several disciplines. These were identified in a longitudinal survey of London early school-leavers, 1979-1981, in reasons given by young people for their membership decision, positive or negative, from which employees could be categorised in social movement parlance as core and remainder. However, the authors proposed that further direct investigations should be made in different contexts. For example, it may be that some responses were culturally or institutionally specific, or were based on economic context. Accordingly, a similar survey¹ of a single cohort of early school-leavers was carried out ten years later in Dunedin, New Zealand. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to test the validity of the framework of the model within a different national context.

The article will be organised in the following way. First, a brief summary of the Industrial Relations model of trade union membership will be presented and two hypotheses will be drawn from it. Second, the latter will be tested by a discussion of the results of the Dunedin survey and a comparison with those of the London survey. Third, implications of the findings for the consequences of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act will be briefly examined.

1. Theory

The basis of the Industrial Relations trade union model is that some members of a union, the core, join the movement via different sources of motivation than others, or acquire those characteristics once they have joined. The factors motivating the core group include values, a collective instrumental approach, social identification reasons, an appreciation of services available only to members, and frustration-aggression motivation. There may also be a group of core non-members. For example, the values of some may lie in loyalty to the company.

The remainder of the workforce is subject to influences at the workplace which result in decisions to join/not join/stay in/leave the union. The first set of influences are pressures. These are exerted by the union, in particular the core members, and by the employer. The second set are the norms of the culture or the workplace which are likely to be the result of a number of features, in particular the legislative framework set by the state.

Two separate hypotheses can be drawn from this model with reference to the Dunedin study. First, it is hypothesised that core and remainder motivations and attitudes will be present in the school-leavers' responses in Dunedin to the same questions asked in London about trade union membership decisions. However, second, it is also hypothesised that within the framework of this model there will nevertheless be differences apparent in the categories and rankings of the New Zealand responses which are attributable to the different contexts of the Dunedin study.²

2. Empirical work

Data

Our aim was to make a valid comparison with the British survey by capturing a single cohort of early school-leavers without any previous experience or skill label. Thus, the data-set that we investigated consisted of a survey of young people on the point of leaving school. Because Dunedin is a small city³ consisting of only eight state schools, it was feasible to try to capture the whole population of sixth former school-leavers (16-17 year olds). The end of the calendar year also marks the end of the academic year in New Zealand and schools arranged interviews in October 1989 with all those who knew they were definitely leaving in December 1989 and were looking for work. A total of 145 pupils were interviewed of which 93 (64%) were males and 52 females; 130 (90%) classified themselves as European. When questioned, most youngsters regarded the father as head of the household: 127 had fathers living at home: of these, 44 (35%) held professional/managerial occupations, 3 (2%) were farmers, 17 (13%) held sales or clerical jobs and 64 (50%) were manual workers; the remainder were unemployed or in receipt of social security benefits. The sample only excluded absentees for sickness and other reasons. It was not possible to discover whether those absent were intended leavers; as they numbered only 14, our sample comprised at least 91% of the population of Dunedin of those with intentions to leave at the time of the interviews.

We had intended to interview 5th form leavers to closely correspond with the British survey. However, early school-leaving took place at the end of the sixth year. (In New Zealand those intending to go to university stay on to the seventh form.) This was probably a result of the effects of continuing and deepening recession in the city, particularly apparent since 1987, and of the 1989 legislation which withheld social welfare benefits for six months from school-leavers under the age of 18 without work or training experience. The sixth form year for many seemed to be a time of re-taking

or adding to 5th form formal examinations and/or provided a further period of job search: 71 (49%) were taking School Certificate (ie, fifth form) examinations. The government provided for youngsters of all educational backgrounds to take up Polytechnic and training courses, though entry was competitive. Only 27 (19%) of the young people in our survey had found work, it seemed likely that many school-leavers would want to take up such an opportunity. Thus, our sample is restricted to those who could not gain entry to a preferred course or who did not want to go on to tertiary education. Most were the expected age, 16 or 17, but 22 (15%) were older than this and had already completed one sixth form year while they searched for work. Nevertheless, like the British sample, this group can be regarded as a single cohort with no skill label.

There was a clear difference between the samples: it lay in the socio-economic character. In the British data-set, 84% of the male heads of households were in the manual category. Although 6 of 44 in the professional category in Dunedin claimed to be self-employed, and it may be that the recent government legislation, allowing financial aid for redundant workers to set up on this basis, captured some manual workers, nevertheless the Dunedin sample has a smaller proportion of young people (54%) from manual backgrounds. This will be taken account of in the interpretation of the results.

Method

To make a valid comparison between the data-sets, we repeated the open-ended question asked in the British survey:

Do you intend to join a trade union when you start work? Give (up to three) reasons for your answer.

Hypothesis 1: that core and remainder attitudes will be apparent in the Dunedin responses.

Results

The first hypothesis seemed to be strongly validated by these results.⁴

1. Core attitudes

First, the importance of the perception of the *instrumental effectiveness of collective* strength at the workplace is the most interesting finding evident in the results from those who intended to join a union. This was apparent in the two most frequently chosen categories of response: *job security, protection, safety* and *workers' rights, conditions, procedures*, which

Table 1. Why do you intend to join a trade union?

Variables	Males	(%)	Females	(%)	All	(%)
Have to	9	(10)	7	(18)	16	(13)
Expected to	1	(1)	2	(5)	3	(2)
Support it	1	(1)	2	(5)	3	(2)
Higher/fair wages	17	(20)	3	(8)	20	(16)
Strikes	–	(–)	–	(–)	–	(–)
Family	–	(–)	–	(–)	–	(–)
Job mobility	–	(–)	–	(–)	–	(–)
Job security, protection, safety	27	(31)	13	(33)	40	(32)
Workers' rights, fair treatment, procedures, conditions	30	(35)	7	(18)	37	(30)
DK	1	(1)	5	(13)	6	(5)
Totals	86		39		125	

Table 2. Why do you not intend to join a union or do not know?

Variables	No	Don't Know	All	(%)
Do not help	2	1	3	(6)
Had not thought	1	2	3	(6)
Not asked	1	1	(2)	
Not interested	–	–	–	(–)
Strikes	4	5	9	(18)
Not decided	1	1	2	(4)
Need to know more	10	17	27	(54)
Dislike them	3	1	4	(8)
Union fees	1	–	1	(2)
Totals	22	28	50	(100)

were each significantly greater (at the 1% level and 5% level respectively) than any of the other categories. Moreover, the sample size allowed us to examine specific responses carefully and collective instrumental responses explicitly emerged:

- “*someone to stand up for you*”
- “*help you in some situations better than you could yourself*”
or more generally:
- “*better for workers*”.

The voice mechanism (Hirschman, 1970) was specifically evident:

- “*they will put across your points about dissatisfaction at the workplace*”

Interestingly, one of these categories was the only instance where there were gender differences in the responses. Young males were significantly more likely than young females (at the 5% level) to join for the categories of *workers’ rights, etc* even though similar proportions of both genders were positive about membership: 58 (62%) of the males and 31 (60%) of the females. The likelihood is, therefore, that this sample of young females perceived impending interruptions to their career (eg, see Hakim, 1979), or were more represented than the males in secondary jobs which did not provide a lifetime career ladder.⁵ Consequently, it may be that they did not have the same long-term interest in their work at this particular stage of their labour market participation.

The response *higher wages* also seemed to indicate a collective instrumental approach: several of the respondents in this category used the term *fair(er) wages*, and therefore this seems to imply that individual action leads to less than “just” rewards. If *higher/fairer wages* is included with *job security* and *workers’ rights* then, together, the collective instrumental responses amount to the majority of the total reasons offered (86% for males, 59% for females).

Second, *values* were also apparent in the positive responses in the form of *support* the union. Moreover, reflecting the young character of the sample, the influence of external values in the form of *family* was offered as one reason. Values were expressed coherently as altruism:

- “*to protect own interests and other workers’ interests*”

Third, *social identity* motivation was also clearly evident: For example, the category *expected to* included such responses as:

- “*the done thing*”,
- “*to belong to where you work*”.

Fourth, *selective instrumental* reasons were apparent because the gains of union membership, say with regard to lay-offs, were not necessarily seen as available as workplace public goods:

- “*protection: and it’s not too much to pay for it*”.⁶

We had set up *strikes* and *job mobility* as categories that had been evident in the London survey, but no such responses were made. The likelihood is that the excitement of strike action pales when effects in terms of lay-offs and shut-downs have been perceived over a longer period of time. In the same way, job mobility is likely to be a luxury of a tighter labour market.

Finally, grievance motivation, of course, was not in evidence because none of the cohort had started work.

2. Core non-members (see Table 2)

The negative responses were interesting because a third of those who did not want to join had a firm reason. They were not undecided: *strikes* (18%) *disliked them* (8%), *do not help*, (5%)

3. The remainder

Only a minority could be classified as the remainder. Some were positive respondents whose decision, nevertheless, seemed to be based on an expectation of norms (see Table 1): For example, in the category *expected to*, an explicit reason was offered:

- “*will be with the majority*”

Surprisingly in a nation with a tradition of compulsory unionism, while *have to* was apparent as a category, there were only 10 of these respondents of whom 6 implied that they would join anyway because they gave at least one more reason. Of the remaining 4, we do not know whether they were disinterested or preferred not to join.

For the negative responses (see Table 2) numbers were small and “No’s” and “Don’t knows” can be classified together. Only a minority of reasons were a result of indecision or lack of thought (5%). The response *don’t know* was usually phrased: *need to know more*. This accounted for more than half the negative responses (54%), significantly more than for any other category. That is, there *was* interest and school-leavers seemed to wish to overcome their ignorance: no-one offered lack of interest as a reason

Overall, therefore, the framework of the Industrial Relations model received strong and explicit support.

Hypothesis 2: that there will be differences apparent in the categories and rankings of the New Zealand responses which are directly the result of the economic and national context of the Dunedin study, but that these will further validate the Industrial Relations model suggesting that it applies within different settings.

Results

Table 3. Total responses : those who intended to join a trade union

Variables	NZ 1989 (Oct)		UK 1979 (July)	
	No	(%)	No	(%)
Have to	16	13%	119	(30%)
Expected to	3	2%	45	(11%)
Support it	3	2%	156	(39%)
Higher wages	20	16%	30	(7%)
Strikes	–	–	10	(2%)
Family	–	–	10	(2%)
Job mobility	–	–	8	(2%)
Job security	40	32%	–	(–)
Workers' rights	37	30%	–	(–)
Other			6	(1%)
DK	6	5%	19	(5%)
Totals	125		403	

Table 4. Total responses : those who did not intend to join a union or did not know whether they would join.

Variables	NZ	1989	UK	1979
Do not help	3	6%	19	(2%)
Had not thought	3	6%	92	(11%)
Not asked	1	2%	292	(35%)
Not interested	–	–	128	(15%)
Strikes	9	18%	31	(4%)
Not decided	2	4%	99	(12%)
Other			94	(11%)
DK	27	54%	76	(9%)
Dislike them	4	8%	–	–
Union fees	1	2%	–	–
Total	50		831	

Our second hypothesis also received strong support. There were two major types of difference between the British and the New Zealand results but each lay firmly within the model and offered further support to it. Moreover, each could be explained by the different contexts of the Dunedin study. The first difference concerned the respective proportions in each country who wanted to join, and the second, the respective ranking of reasons given for both positive and negative attitudes.

1. The major contrast between the two surveys concerned the proportions of those who wanted to join. In Dunedin, the majority (61%) intended to join while the reverse was the case in London (21%). This important difference certainly needs comment and we will consider a number of possible arguments.

A reasonable explanation seemed to lie in the fact that, compared to young people in the London sample (84%), very few of the New Zealanders (12%) had a job arranged: that is, in the different economic contexts.⁷ The important point about the different rates of unemployment is that the largest group of the negative responses in the London survey was *not asked* (292/38%). These, clearly, were those who held jobs. Had they been asked, their intention may have been to join. Thus, because of the relatively greater number of employed, British figure probably understates positive attitudes to membership. However, of those who claimed not to have been asked, over a quarter (76/26%) provided at least one other reason so would not have joined anyway. Furthermore, although a greater proportion of those in the London survey without jobs, relative to those with jobs, said they would join a union (45%), the effect of (impending) unemployment is an insufficient explanation because the majority of these responses were still negative.

It may well be that institutional differences can add to the explanation. It seems likely that the phenomenon of compulsory unionism (for those over the age of 18) apparent in New Zealand, but not the United Kingdom, has great importance. However, the legislation current at the time of the survey allowed employers to retain workers who did not wish to join,⁸ and respective national density rates were not significantly different: it is difficult to gain accurate trade union membership numbers, but overall figures in the UK for the period of the survey indicated that about 52% of the labour force was unionised (Kelly, 1987); the closest available figure to the date of the Dunedin survey was 62% (New Zealand Official Year Book, 1988, p. 88). Although it is not possible to ascertain union density in the respective cities of London and Dunedin, it seems reasonable to conclude from these figures that it is unlikely that many more young New Zealanders were influenced by their parent members. Moreover, theory suggests that youth unionisation rates are likely to be lower than total rates. Thus, these figures neither

explain the difference between the results, nor the high figure for the Dunedin sample.

2. It might be possible to seek a more satisfactory explanation by an examination of the second major difference between the two surveys. This concerns the *ranking* in importance of both positive and negative categories of response.

First, with regard to the positive responses (see Table 3), in the London, survey values (*support*) were clearly the most important reason (53%) why youngsters wanted to/did join a union. This was not the case in Dunedin, where only a small minority (3%) offered this reason: this was a highly significant difference at the 0.001% level. In the British case, the major importance of values suggests that beliefs predominate where there is a social and political heritage of conflict. It is difficult to find evidence to substantiate such a viewpoint because questions asked in Dunedin had not been included in the London survey. However, for the majority in Dunedin, attitudes to unions were not the result of socialised prejudices. For example, (see Table 5a), youngsters were asked about their attitude to strikers and half thought it depended on the situation, while less than a fifth were against strikes in principle. With regard to national interest (see Table 5b), less than half felt that unions had too much power. Finally, there was ample evidence that young New Zealanders in Dunedin had little idea of the fine nuances of social class in the British sense (see Tables 5c and 5d). Over half said they did not think in terms of social class at all. When we crosstabulated the youngsters' perception of family social class with that of their own social class, there was no significant relationship. Furthermore, when we crosstabulated both of these, separately, with occupation of the head of household, using manual as working class, there was also no significant relationship. Finally, youngsters' attitudes to unions were not significantly correlated to support for a particular political party. In other words, it is not the lower proportion of manual workers' children in the Dunedin study which seems to be important with regard to differences in the respective samples, but rather the lack of strong awareness of social class in the Dunedin sample regardless of its socio-economic character.

Second, the New Zealanders seemed to be overwhelmed by collective instrumental motivations (78%) which were relatively unimportant in the London survey (14%): again, there was a very significant difference, at the 0.001% level, between these two results. It was possible for the Dunedin youngsters to provide up to three reasons for their membership decision, and therefore one would have expected any increasing recessionary influence to have merely *added* collective reasons to existing values, and this was not the case for only 19 offered more than one reason. It is tempting

Table 5. Personal attributes

a) In a strike, are your sympathies generally for or against strikers?

For strikers	42	(29%)
Against strikers	27	(19%)
Depends	72	(50%)
DK	4	(2%)
	141	

b) In general, do you think trade unions have too much power or not enough power in NZ?

Too much	59	(42%)
Not enough	21	(15%)
Correct amount	10	(7%)
DK	51	(36%)
	145	

(c) Do you think of your family as belonging to a particular social class?

No	76	(52%)
Yes, middle class	49	(34%)
Yes, working class	18	(12%)
Upper class	2	(1%)
	145	

(d) If you had to describe *yourself* as belonging to a social class, which would it be?

Middle class	91	(65%)
Working class	49	(35%)
	140	

(e) Have you been taught anything about trade unions at school?

Yes	40	(28%)
No	104	(72%)
	144	

to suggest that the gains of unionisation become more apparent during a recession: in fact, we have assumed that they are workplace public goods, but it may be that those benefits associated with a slack labour market are

at least perceived to be selective to union members and less easy to gain via spill-overs (eg, those concerning redundancy, lay-off arrangements). However, empirical findings demonstrate that union density is lowest at such times (Booth, 1983). In the light of this, we must assume that the categories of *job security* and *workers' rights*, which were not even offered in the British responses, were *substitutes*, say, for *higher wages* as a result of the longer experience of recession in NZ, but that the economic context itself does not explain the proportion of collective responses, only their character.

Third, it is also difficult to find a reason for the respective rankings of the negative responses (see Table 4). They demonstrated that most of the British sample indicated they did not (want to) join because they were undecided, ignorant or disinterested. This was not the case in New Zealand: 31% had firm reasons (compared to only 4% in the United Kingdom: a significant difference at the 5% level) Those who *did not know*, in New Zealand - and they were a minority - often wanted to know more. Youngsters in Dunedin were clearly better informed about and more favourable towards unions. A simple answer may lie in information offered via the curriculum of schools in New Zealand. However, the Dunedin findings demonstrate that only a minority (28%) of young people were taught about unions at school (see Table 5e).

The likelihood is that a sufficiently convincing explanation for differences both in proportions and rankings lies not in the more obvious economic and institutional explanations that we have examined and discarded but in the respective social and political contexts which have given rise to very different Industrial Relations systems.

3. Discussion

The major proposal made in this work is that the relative absence of social divisions in New Zealand and the lack of their political manifestations in the form of strong radical political parties, has facilitated the emergence and persistence of a corporatist Industrial Relations system which has evolved alongside the development of modern industrialisation before deeply entrenched values became apparent. In a context which does not encourage the spread of beliefs and ideologies, there is room for the wider dissemination of information, resulting in a rational acknowledgement of the instrumentality of collective action. This links the majority decision of Dunedin youngsters to the relative importance of their reasons for membership decisions.

A crucial explanation for the different results from the Dunedin survey,

it is contended, lies not in the phenomenon of compulsory unionism itself, but in its character relative to that of the system in Britain where the closed shop existed as a result of union pressure, often in the face of popular, employer and government opposition (Dunn and Gennard, 1984). The well-documented, legalistic nature of the Industrial Relations system in New Zealand, with its long-founded 1894 and rarely interrupted system of arbitration, conciliation, and more recently 1970 mediation, seems to have had several effects on popular attitudes to unions.

First, until the recent Employment Contracts Act of May 1991, New Zealand had a legally-imposed collective bargaining system established at the outset of modern industrialisation. This meant that the issue of membership *per se* was not a cause of major controversy. This is most different from the United Kingdom where the striving for union members, resulting in some cases in the closed shop, has always been a constant political and moral issue. It is most interesting that more responses from the London survey concerned compulsion when it affected a lower proportion of the labour force in the United Kingdom (see Table 3: a highly significant result at the 0.001% level). In other words, we are suggesting that the legal character of the industrial relations system meant that there is unlikely to be as much hostility to union membership: indeed, it might facilitate the spread of information.

Second, in New Zealand, people were likely to feel that compulsion was brought about not by the union itself, but by the state; any benefits were likely to be perceived as union-instigated, and any costs, government-imposed. We made a further exploration of the data-set and discovered a highly significant relationship (at the 0.001% level) between union membership of parents and attitude of school-child towards membership: 62 (70%) of the 89 who said they would join had a parent in a union. The likelihood is that the effect can be explained, not by the proportion of those people and therefore parents in unions, but by positive and informed attitudes to unions of parent members.

Third, the arbitration, conciliation and mediation character of the legal apparatus itself meant that conflict was at least carried on within a framework of corporatist negotiation. Moreover, unlike the situation in Britain, unions were explicitly legally-recognised entities in New Zealand. This gave them a corporatist respectability and might have put them apart from political affiliation in the eyes of the employee, as our results seem to demonstrate. Thus, union activity was unlikely to draw a powerful response from the counter-union media influences as is apparent in the United Kingdom. This partly explains the low importance of values in the New Zealand results.

4. Conclusions and Implications

In summary, the findings provide strong support for the Cregan and Johnston multi-disciplinary union membership model in a different context to that of the London survey. The same distinct strands of core motivation were apparent: collective instrumental, values, selective instrumental and social identification. Remainder attitudes were evident both in members and non-members; interestingly an *expectation* of future workplace norms was apparent. Moreover, the differences that were apparent between the Dunedin and London surveys strongly suggested the veracity of the model within a different institutional, cultural and economic context. First, a majority of youngsters in the New Zealand sample intended to join a union compared to a small minority in the United Kingdom sample. Second, collective instrumental attitudes were important for positive respondents in Dunedin, while values predominated in London. Third, in New Zealand those who were negative about membership tended to display firm views. There was little of the disinterest and ignorance which was characteristic of the British findings.

The likelihood is that these differences can be accounted for first, by the character of the sample: most of the New Zealanders had not joined work; those in the British sample in this position were more likely to want to join. Second, the Dunedin school-leavers seemed to be open to information rather than beliefs. This is interesting and points to a different social and political climate: a growth of a state-sponsored Industrial Relations Systems in a nation where social class is not a centuries old heritage.

Implications of the Employment Contracts Act of May 15 1991 which abandoned the century-old corporatist tradition and essentially established a voluntarist system of industrial relations, can be analysed in the light of these findings for it may be that the Act has unforeseen consequences. Those employees who join or remain in unions are likely to have core attributes particularly of the values and collective types. The institution of unionism is likely to be seen increasingly as the champion of "class interests", particularly where these are threatened in a time of deepening depression by a government which has cut welfare and unemployment benefits and encourages wage reductions. Should there be a return to a buoyant economy, the characters of unions in New Zealand may well have changed irrevocably and may more closely match their British counterparts. Union recruitment is likely to be fierce in view of the changed nature of the core and governments may well be faced with a tougher opponent no longer constrained by a corporatist stance and a benevolent view of the national interest.

Notes

1. For a description of the London data-set, see Cregan and Johnston (1990).
2. There is no attempt to suggest that Dunedin is representative of New Zealand. Indeed, the suggestion is that the model can be adapted to local situations.
3. Population 114,349. (New Zealand Census of Population, Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1986.) The city of Dunedin is used in NZ census figures; the Department of Labour uses Dunedin area unemployment and vacancy figures.
4. The results represent number of responses rather than respondents. Of the positive respondents, only 19 offered a second reason, and 11 a third; of the negative, 5 offered a second reason. We carried out exploratory significance testing on the first response only and the results were not affected.
5. In the British sample, most of the females gained jobs as clerks, typists and shop assistants.
6. One "don't know" respondent, though only one, said *union fees*: this accords with orthodox economic theory which suggests that youngsters are likely to perceive that expected selective costs, in terms of subscription fee relative to wage, will exceed expected selective benefits.
7. The Dunedin survey took place ten years after the London study. At the time of the New Zealand investigation, registered unemployment in N.Z. was 11.3% (EMIS, 1989) and had been increasing steadily for a number of years. In the Dunedin area, registered unemployment at 13.3% was higher than the national rate (Department of Statistics, 1989) and the population of the city was declining with an estimated net outward migration of 5% in the three years from 31 March, 1986 (EMIS, 1989). Youth unemployment (15-19 year olds) was 20.5% of total unemployment in the country. In Dunedin, in October 1989 there was an existing pool of 400 school-leavers who had never held a job: 224 (56%) were male and 176 (44%) were female. The London survey started in 1979; using January figures, the male unemployment rate was 7.1%; for females the figure was 4.2%. The rapid increase in unemployment already experienced in Dunedin took place over the *subsequent* three years in London (Department of Employment Gazette, January 1983, s59), and less jobs were available to Dunedin school-leavers in 1989 than to their London counterparts in 1979.
8. The 1987 Labour Relations Act allowed for compulsory membership: if employer and union agreed to "unqualified preference" or compulsory unionism then such a clause could be inserted into an award or agreement. If there were no agreement, the workers could have a secret ballot, making membership compulsory by a majority vote. Adult workers so covered in either of these cases had to join within 14 days of being requested to do so by the union. However, employers were permitted but not required to dismiss them if they declined.

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