

The Mystery of Death Alterity and Affectivity in Levinas

Michael Purcell

In years gone by, November was the month most closely associated with death. The month, which Ted Hughes appropriately describes as the 'month of the drowned dog', opened, having remembered All Saints, with the Commemoration of All Souls, the black draped catafalque in the aisle, the three Masses, and a hymnody recalling death's pains and anguishes. Think of the words of the popular hymn, O turn to Jesus, Mother, turn, in which it was recalled that those who died,

... have fought a gallant fight;
In death's cold arms they persevered;
and, after life's uncheery night,
The harbour of their rest is neared.

Death was cold; death was pain and loss; sickness unto death was struggle.

Now, it seems, we have possessed death, we have brought it close and made it our own, not to be feared and fled from, but friendly and familiar. The theology of death has come of age and now faces death with that anticipatory resoluteness of which Heidegger speaks. Thanatology speaks the language of ontology. Subjectivity, formerly snuffed out in death, now appropriates, as integral to its own life, death, and reasserts its mastery. Mature in Christian faith, we have authentically managed to appropriate what otherwise we would rather forget. What I would like to suggest in this article is that this repatriation of death into life, rather than yielding death's meaning, actually leads to a situation in which, as Blanchot says, we have lost death,¹ and obscured its significance.

Heideggerian Being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*)

Death marks the end of *Dasein*². In death, *Dasein* becomes 'no-longer *Dasein*'. Heidegger, however, interprets death in two ways, according to the two forms in which *Dasein* realises itself, either as authentic or inauthentic.

Inauthentic death is the death which others undergo, the death other than my own death. Death might certainly come, but it always afflicts others first; *Dasein*'s own death is something so much in the distance that it is an affair with which *Dasein* should not be concerned. But Heidegger notes that this lack of concern with one's own death is an evasion. When he writes of 'Everyday Being-towards-the-end' on the way to articulating the '*Full Existential Conception of Death*,'⁴ he notes that

'In accordance with the tendency to falling, which is essential to everydayness, Being-towards-death has turned out to be an evasion in the face of death — an evasion which conceals.'

'Everyday Being-towards-death' is associated with the idle talk of the They which, though it concedes the certainty of death, conceals this certainty by covering up dying in order to 'alleviate [*Dasein*'s] own thrownness into death.'⁶ They say, "One dies too, sometime, but not right away."⁷ They say, "It is certain that 'Death' is coming."⁸ However, the certainty of death which everyday *Dasein* deals with is the empirical certainty of the deaths of others, and thus death, as *Dasein*'s ownmost possibility, is removed from inauthentic *Dasein*. 'For the most part, everyday *Dasein* covers up the ownmost possibility of its Being — that possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped.'⁹ 'Thus the "they" covers up what is peculiar in death's certainty — that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its when. Everyday Being-towards-death evades this indefiniteness by conferring definiteness upon it.'¹⁰

Such a consideration of inauthentic death enables Heidegger to arrive at the full existential-ontological conception of death: '*death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility — non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.*'¹¹ Richard Cohen notes that, for Heidegger, 'deathboundedness constitutes the existing totality of that being which is *Dasein*, and constitutes *Dasein* as a totality.'¹²

We can, then, following Manning, outline four characteristics of an authentic interpretation of death: firstly, says Manning, death is one of *Dasein*'s own possibilities, it has the character of 'mineness' (*Jemeinigkeit*): 'By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it "is" at all;¹³ secondly, death is a possibility towards which *Dasein* is oriented. *Dasein* is 'being-towards-death, and becomes authentic when it faces up to the possibility of its own demise; when it resolutely accepts its own being as being-towards-death; thirdly, in

accepting death as its own, *Dasein* takes distance from the inauthenticity of the 'they' and is able to stand as a separate and unique individual. 'Death individualises *Dasein* by calling it back from its lostness in the *they* to realise itself as a solitary being,'¹⁴ 'all its relations to any other *Dasein* have been undone;' fourthly, death is appropriated as that about which one can be certain. Death is *Dasein*'s ownmost certainty.

What this means is that death confers a future upon authentic *Dasein*, revealing its temporality. 'It is only when authentic *Dasein* receives death as its ownmost, non-relational, not to be outstripped, and most certain possibility that it becomes aware that it has a future of its own to anticipate and to which it may project itself to actualise its own authentic possibilities.'¹⁵ Manning quotes Lingis, 'The sense of my imminent impotence is a Power. It brings me forth into all the potentiality for Being that I am [and] is the very basis of all power in me.'¹⁶ The same is said by Blanchot who recognises that all our relationships *within the world* are relationships of that *pouissance* which possibility contains. Man is possibility, as Heidegger already indicates when he writes that '*Dasein* always understands itself in terms of its existence — in terms of a possibility of itself.'¹⁷ In this perspective, death presents the final impossibility of all my possibility; but 'even death,' says Blanchot,

'is power (*pouvoir*): it is not a simple event which happens to me...; there my power to be comes to an end; there, I will no longer be there; but regarding this non-possibility: insofar as death belongs to me and only to me, since no one else can die my death or in my place, this imminent future of mine, this relationship to myself which is always open to my end, it offers another power (*pouvoir*).'¹⁸

In other words, I am able to die; I can appropriate to myself my death as my power (*pouvoir*), a solitary resolution.¹⁹

Theologically, the Heideggerian perspective is taken up by Ladislaus Boros, in *The Moment of Truth: Mysterium Mortis*²⁰ in which he proposes the thesis that '[d]eath gives man the opportunity of posing his first completely personal act; death is, therefore, by reason of its very being, the moment above all others for the awakening of consciousness, for freedom, for the encounter with God, for the final decision about his eternal destiny'.²¹ Like Heidegger, Boros identifies death as 'a fundamental modality of living, concrete existence',²² the picture of which must be sought 'in the inner structure of living human existence.'²³ The human person is constitutively ordered towards death from the beginning of existence.²⁴ Further, since 'death is the unreflexive, uncoordinated factor in our existence, one of those primitive metaphysical data that precede immediate experience, its

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reality can be disclosed by a transcendental reflection on human existence. Following Heidegger, he writes, 'death is essentially present in the structure of every living existence, and can, therefore, be grasped in the existent being itself at the point of intersection of the various pointers to death.'²⁵

Rahner, too, assumes the same existential thanatology, when he speaks of the knowledge of the inescapability of the experience of death as being the distinguishing factor between a human and being and an animal. '[O]nly man exists always and inescapably confronted with his end, with the totality of his existence, with its temporal end. Only man possesses his existence unto this end.'²⁶ Thus, as previously said, death is drawn into the realm of the ontological and is appropriated by the subject as its final possibility. To quote Heidegger, 'Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as possibility.... Death is *Dasein's* ownmost possibility.'²⁷

Levinas and Death

To recover the meaning of death, Levinas distances himself from Heidegger and the ontological equivalence of Being and death — *Sein zum Tode* — which is operative in *Sein und Zeit*. Two literary accounts of death are cited: firstly the death of Socrates recorded by Plato in the *Phaedo*, and secondly, the death of Macbeth in Shakespeare. Both, says Levinas, provide insights which enable us to approach the meaning of death as an experience of incomprehensible alterity which reveals itself in affectivity.

With regard to the death of Socrates:

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates, authentically and resolutely facing death, is 'a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy [and is] confident in the face of death.'²⁸ His friends, however, find difficulty in understanding his death. Hence, Socrates' admonition to Crito not to confuse Socrates and the body which remains, nor to say at the funeral 'that it is Socrates whom he is laying out or carrying to the grave or burying.'²⁹ Such is the idle talk which surrounds inauthentic dying, and which, says Levinas, associates life and movement. Death, in its 'empirical facticity,' brings this to an end, affecting 'the autonomy or the expressivity of movement.'³⁰ 'Death is the *sans-réponse*.'³¹ From the point of view of language and the observation of the death of the other man, death is an immobilisation, and the beginning of decomposition. It is not a transformation, but an annihilation, 'the passage from being to no-longer-being understood as the result of a logical operation: negation.'³² Hence, the description of the death of Socrates who, after

drinking the hemlock, experiences a gradual and spreading numbness creeping into his limbs, depriving him of the power to move.³³ But death is not simply an empirical fact. Asking 'Is death separable from the relation with others (*autrui*)?'³⁴ Levinas continues by arguing that the negativity of death is not simply the negation of being but the sense of 'departure towards the unknown,' a departure without return, a departure 'without leaving an address'³⁵ and this gives rise to great emotion. Death is emotion par excellence; it is affectivity. Upon the death of Socrates, 'Apollodorus, who had never stopped crying even before, now broke into such a storm of passionate weeping that he made everyone in the room break down.'³⁶ Levinas notes that, for some, the death of Socrates is a reason for hope as the good life, or theory, triumphs over the negativity of death, but there are also those, like Apollodorus, who 'weep more than necessary, weep without measure: as if humanity were not exhausted by the measure, as if there were an excess in death.'³⁷ And so, Levinas asks, 'What is the sense of this affectivity and of these tears?'³⁸

Secondly, with regard to Shakespeare's Macbeth — ('sometimes all philosophy is only a meditation on Shakespeare')³⁹

Three predictions are given by the witches regarding Macbeth: that he should beware MacDuff;⁴⁰ that 'none of woman born shall harm Macbeth';⁴¹ and that 'Macbeth shall never vanquish'd be until great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill shall come against him.'⁴² At Dunsinane, though, Macbeth admits the messenger who announces that 'the wood began to move.'⁴³ The sign of his own undoing, and with it death, draws close. The alarm is sounded and Macbeth arms and prepares to 'die with harness on our back.' As Levinas notes, 'Before death, there will be combat.'⁴⁴ But, no man born of woman will prevail against Macbeth. The second sign of defeat has yet to be given: MacDuff 'was from his mother's womb untimely ripped,'⁴⁵ and so Macbeth realises that 'Death is for now.'⁴⁶ He cries out 'Accursed be the tongue that tells me so' and recognises that MacDuff has power over him. Levinas notes here the passivity and the loss of hope. Yet, immediately, with Macbeth's last words, the combat takes up again. As Levinas translates, '*Bien que le bois de Birnam soit venu à Dunsinane et que je t'aie en face de moi, toi qui n'es pas né de la femme, j'essayerai cependant ma dernière chance.*'⁴⁷

What significance, then, does Levinas see in the struggle with death and the affectivity that death arouses?

The alterity of death

Whereas for Heidegger, death's significance lies in its certainty and the resolute manner in which *Dasein* comports itself to its own demise and the future opened by its own being-towards-death, for Levinas, the significance of death is otherwise: not so much the fact of its certainty, but rather the fact of its unknowability. But this aspect of death has been overlooked. Levinas asks,

'I even ask myself how the principal trait of our relation with death has been able to escape the attention of philosophers. It is not from the nothingness of death of which we know nothing precisely that the analysis must proceed, but from a situation in which something absolutely unknowable appears; absolutely unknowable, that is to say, foreign to all light, making impossible all assumption of possibility, but in which we are seized.'⁴⁸

Death, for Levinas, is supremely uncertain and mysterious. It evades our attempts to grasp and understand it.

'The fact that we can only conceive of death *via* the deaths of others does not say something about our inauthentic stance towards a death from which we would take flight; rather, it says something about death itself: "The fact that it deserts every present is not due to our evasion of death and to an unpardonable dispersion at the supreme hour, but to the fact that death is ungraspable..."'⁴⁹

It is 'absolutely unknowable', 'foreign to all light.' Against Heidegger who viewed the anguish one experiences in the face of death as ultimately assimilable in the knowledge of one's being as being-towards-death, Levinas stresses that death cannot be possessed. This means that mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) cannot express the reality of death; death is not something that will be mine, but only some day; it is that which can never be mine because it has its own reality. It is other than myself. It comes to me, not as a reality which I encounter in a welcoming embrace or in Stoical acceptance, but as an opposing force in relation to which there is combat and struggle. *Mors et vita duello*. This is why death, for Levinas, is so often presented as violent and murderous. To be conscious of death, then, brings with it not power but vulnerability. 'The will to oppose death is mine, but the power that seizes me in my death is supremely other than mine, is quintessentially a power external to me.'⁵⁰

Now, if death approaches with the alterity of an opposing force which marks the end of my power, then there is a source of meaning other than myself. Death's meaning is found in the fact that the subject, 'locked in itself and in its present,' is encountered by what is other than the subject, and what the subject can never be nor understand. 'In death,

the subject meets the other, absolute alterity. By being always already in relation to death, the subject is in relation to something other than itself and its present.³¹ This other contests the power of the subject and marks, not the possibility of impossibility, as in Heidegger's Being-towards-death, but rather the impossibility of possibility. In death, I am brought to an end, and not simply in the empirical facticity of existence, but, radically, in my very subjectivity. 'Death announces an event in which the subject is not the master, an event in relation to which the subject is no longer subject.'³² This means, says Levinas, commenting upon Blanchot, that 'Death... is not the pathos (*le pathétique*) of the ultimate human possibility, possibility of impossibility, but the incessant re-possessing of that which cannot be grasped, before which the "je" loses its ipseity. Impossibility of possibility.'³³

Now, since death does not provide the backdrop against which possibilities temporally unfold, but extinguishes possibility, the future it reveals is a future excessive to my present, a future other than the future filled with expectation and projection which Heidegger proposes for authentic *Dasein*. Since death is absolutely other, I can have no projections or expectations with regard to it, for I can only project from myself and my present. Projected and expected future is not a pure future, but the 'future of the present' or the 'present in the future'. Death, as absolute alterity, refractory to all anticipation and projection, opens on to a 'strange' or 'foreign' future, an 'absolute future' which I cannot overcome or make my own. 'There is an abyss between the present and death, between the ego and the alterity of mystery.'³⁴ Or again, 'The distance between life and death is infinite.'³⁵

Death and Affectivity

What, then, is the significance of Apollodorus' tears? Levinas notes that, although Heidegger presented authentic existence as an existence in which one resolutely embraces one's own death, the reality is that the knowledge one has of death is overwhelmed by the sense of loss and departure, the affection and the weeping, and this raises the question of the nature of our relationship with death. The disquiet which one feels in the proximity of death — 'emotion as deference to death'³⁶ — is the very question which needs to be asked, but emotion is a *question* which does not hold within itself the elements of a response. In other words, affectivity is a response to alterity.

The affectivity which one experiences in the face of death lies beyond intentionality and thematisation, refractory to all phenomenal appearance, 'as if emotion, in the question, without encountering any quiddity, were going towards the acuteness of death and were instituting

the unknown, not as purely negative, but in a proximity without knowledge.’⁵⁷ Heidegger attempted to understand the emotion experienced in the face of death by reducing it to the anguish felt at the prospect of nothingness. The *Phaedo* sought to affirm that theory — the good or authentic death — is stronger than the anguish of death. Nevertheless, Apollodorus still cries more than the others, excessively, and beyond measure. Emotion is excessive, and points to death’s excess. What Levinas wishes to argue is that Heidegger’s cognitive stance with regard to death — the ontological reduction of death — fails to recognise death as an opposing force which is not known but undergone. Death happens to us; hence the truism of the impossibility of experiencing death, of a non-contact between life and death, which signifies the passivity of affectivity. One does not experience death. Death affects us without there being any intentionality on our part; it is neither a seeing nor an intending, but an ‘*affectivity without intentionality*’⁵⁸, an emotion which does not have representation as its basis, a movement of anxiety into the *unknown*.

The death of someone is not empirical facticity, despite it appearing so on first sight. Death does bring an end to expressivity. It is *sans-réponse*, but this marks the loss of responsibility. The negativity of death may always be experienced in relation to others, but its tragedy is that it brings to an end the responsibility that we always and already bear towards others, and since, for Levinas, to be is not to be for-oneself, but to be for-the-other in responsibility, the loss of other in the alterity of death disturbs my own subjectivity at its core. I shudder with emotion in the face of death because I am placed in question. Since the other concerns me as a neighbour, his death accuses me. I bear the responsibility of surviving. ‘I am culpable because I survived!’⁵⁹ It should have been me. The affectivity which death provokes is to be understood in terms of responsibility.

Now, to understand the subject as the one-for-another of responsibility is to recognise that, for Levinas, what establishes the self, the very subjectivisation of the subject, is always and already other than the self. Subjectivity happens in ‘an upsurge in me of a responsibility prior to commitment, that is, a responsibility for the other’ ... [in which] ... ‘I am one and irreplaceable, one inasmuch as irreplaceable in responsibility.’⁶⁰ The responsibility I experience in my proximity and vulnerability to the other person establishes my identity, not as a ‘for-itself’ but as *the ‘one-for-the other,’* and insofar as this responsibility is something which I can neither evade or escape, it provides my identity with its own constancy and recurrence. Since my responsibility for others is ongoing, I perdure as a subject. This means, though, that the

achievement of self as an active project of the subject in which the self posits itself *for* itself becomes paralysed by its absolute passivity in respect of the other. The proper sense of the oneself, then, is the birth of the other in the self.

'The one is hypostatized in another one. It is bound in a knot that cannot be undone in a responsibility for others.... In the exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able to resign, and thus incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and to give. It is thus one and unique, in passivity from the start, having nothing at its disposal that would enable it not to yield to provocation.'⁶¹

The corollary of this will be that the sense of grief and anxiety which death brings is the death of the other in the self. As responsible, the self is already to be uttered in the accusative, and as accused. The ego is from the start undeclinable in 'the irremissibility of the accusation.'⁶² I am already declined in such a way that, as accusative, *I* cannot decline the other. 'The word *I* means *here I am*, answering for everything and for everyone.'⁶³ To be one's self is passively to 'undergo from the other,' where this undergoing 'from-the-other' is already the for-the-other of responsibility, or subjectivity. Of course, this means that responsibility for others can never mean a simple altruism, a decision by the self on behalf of the other. 'For under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject is a hostage.'⁶⁴ My life as a subject is the other-in-me, experienced as responsibility. Death undoes this.

To conclude: what death in its absolute alterity reveals is the inherent passivity of subjectivity: we are constituted as subjects in being related to what is utterly excessive to us. But, further, there is a parallel between the alterity of death and the alterity of the other person. Although our relation to others is always, for Levinas, a relation which exceeds comprehension, a paradoxical relationship with another who is proximate yet absolute, what death does is make clear forcefully the absolute nature of the alterity of the other. In death, proximity as the basis of the relationship is destroyed, and the other withdraws absolutely. No longer is there the possibility of being responsible for-the-other. There is simply the responsibility for having survived. It is this loss of responsibility, this loss of the other in me, which gives rise to the affectivity and the tears which surrounds the experience of death. Surely grief is none other than the lament for the loss of responsibility, the loss of the other-in-me, the loss of self constituted as the one-for-the-other of responsibility.

At the start, we noted that perhaps 'we have lost death' in the

assertion of life's victory over it. Perhaps we need to learn to respect death more, to give it the deference which is its due, for the relationship with death, utterly excessive to us, can teach us something about the nature of the relationships we have in life.

- 1 Maurice Blanchot writes in his essay, *The Great Refusal*, (*The Infinite Conversation*, S Hanson (tr.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993; originally published as *L'Entretien Infini*, Gallimard, Paris, 1969) 'We have lost death.' (p.34) Referring to the 'already decomposing remains of Lazarus', Blanchot notes that the confrontation of Lazarus in death by 'he who... is able to name it, "comprehend" it, and by this understanding, pronounce the *Lazare veni foras*' (p.35) is a confrontation in which death is deprived of its true significance. In an implicit criticism of Heidegger, Blanchot writes that the restoration of Lazarus is 'death comprehended, deprived of itself, become pure privative essence, pure negation;' (p.36) it is a 'death that... affirms itself as a power of being, and as that through which everything is determined, everything unfolds as a possibility.' (p.36). But, then, he goes on to ask, 'But how can one not sense that in this veritable death, the death without truth has entirely slipped away: what in death is irreducible to the true, to all disclosure, what never reveals itself, hides, or appears?' (p.36)
- 2 Heidegger writes, 'If "death" is defined as the 'end' of *Dasein* — that is to say, of Being-in-the-world — this does not imply any ontical decision whether 'after death' still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether *Dasein* 'lives on' or even 'outlasts' itself and is 'immortal.' (M Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J McQuarrie & E Robinson (trs.), Harper and Row, New York, p.292; hereafter, BT)
- 3 *ibid.*, p.286.
- 4 *ibid.*, para. 52.
- 5 *ibid.*, p.299.
- 6 *ibid.*, p.300
- 7 *ibid.*, p.299.
- 8 *ibid.*, p.301; '*Man. sagt: es ist gewiss, dass "der" Tod kommt.*'
- 9 *loc. cit.*
- 10 *ibid.*, p.302.
- 11 *ibid.*, p.303.
- 12 R Cohen, *Time in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York, 1979, p. 128.
- 13 M. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p.284.
- 14 R J Sheffler Manning, *Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics as First Philosophy*, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1993, p.69.
- 15 R J S Manning, *op.cit.*, pp.68-69.
- 16 *ibid.*, p.70, quoting A Lingis, *Introduction to Collected Papers*, (M Nijhoff, The Hague, 1987, p.x, n.7.
- 17 See M Heidegger, *op.cit.*, p.33.
- 18 M. Blanchot, *Entretien Infini*, pp.59-60.
- 19 Cf. M Heidegger, *op.cit.*, p311. Heidegger, speaking of the existential constitution of *Dasein* which is yet to be addressed in the face of being-unto-death, asks 'whether the anticipation of [zum] death, which we have hitherto projected only in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-for-Being which has been attested.' (p 311) For Heidegger's understanding and definition of 'resolution' (*Entschluss*), see *SZ*, 270, 296, 298, 301, 305, 329, 382, 391f.
- 20 L Boros, *The Moment of Truth: Mysterium Mortis*, Search Press, London, 1973
- 21 *ibid.*, p, ix; see also, pp.84, 165

- 22 *ibid.*, p. 8.
- 23 *ibid.*, p.25.
- 24 *ibid.*, p.9.
- 25 *ibid.*, p.23.
- 26 K Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*, W V Dych (tr.), Darton Longman & Todd, London, 1978, p.270.
- 27 M Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 307
- 28 *Phaedo*, 63e, H Tredennick & H Tarrant (trs.), Penguin Classics, London, 1993.
- 29 *Phaedo*, 115e.
- 30 E Levinas, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, Editions Grasset, Paris, 1993, p.17.
- 31 *loc. cit.*
- 32 *ibid.*, p.18.
- 33 *Phaedo*, 117e-118a.
- 34 E Levinas, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, p. 17.
- 35 *loc. cit.*
- 36 *Phaedo*, 117d.
- 37 E Levinas, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, p.18.
- 38 *ibid.*, p.27.
- 39 E Levinas, *Le Temps et L'Autre*, Fata Morgana, Montpellier, 1979, p.60.
- 40 Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act IV, Scene I, 71.
- 41 *Macbeth*, Act IV, Scene I, 80.
- 42 *Macbeth*, Act IV, Scene I, 92.
- 43 *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene III, 34.
- 44 E Levinas, *Le Temps et L'Autre*, p.60.
- 45 *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene VII, 44.
- 46 E Levinas, *Le Temps et L'Autre*, p.60.
- 47 *ibid.*, p.61
 'Though Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane, and thou oppos'd, being of no woman born, yet will I try the last.' (*Macbeth*, V, VII, 59).
- 48 *ibid.*, p.58.
- 49 R J S Manning, *op. cit.*, p70, quoting E Levinas, *Le Temps et l'Autre*, p.59 50. *ibid.*, p.71.
- 51 *loc. cit.*
- 52 E Levinas, *Le Temps et L'Autre*, p.57.
- 53 E Levinas, *Sur Maurice Blanchot*, Fata Morgana, Montpellier, 1975, p.16.
 Cohen argues this point in *Time in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*. When death is the possibility of impossibility, as in Heidegger, then it is 'intrinsic and essential to *Dasein*' since it enables *Dasein* to project itself towards the future and the possibilities for *Dasein* available therein. However, if death is the 'impossibility of possibility', then it is 'extrinsic or external to subjectivity.' (See pp. 138-139).
- 54 E Levinas, *Le Temps et L'Autre*, p.73.
- 55 E Levinas, *Sur Maurice Blanchot*, p.16.
- 56 E Levinas, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, p.26.
- 57 *ibid.*, p.27.
- 58 *ibid.*, p.26.
- 59 *ibid.*, p.21.
- 60 E Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, A Lingis (tr.), M Nijhoff, The Hague, 1981, p. 103.
- 61 *ibid.*, p. 105.
- 62 *ibid.*, p. 112.
- 63 *ibid.*, p. 114
- 64 *ibid.*, p. 112