Using previously untapped Chinese sources, this chapter builds on recent scholarship to provide additional insight into Deng Xiaoping’s handling of relations with the United States in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989. Confronted with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as with Western sanctions, Deng had the tough job of balancing between conservatives and reformers in China’s leadership circle. Unlike the conservatives, who were ascending, and who blamed the United States for all of China’s troubles and would not have hesitated to break relations with Washington, Deng wanted to “keep the US door open.” But at the same time, Deng did not want to show any softness in dealing with Washington. Deng’s foreign policy directive, “avoiding the limelight, and getting some things done,” saved communist rule in China. After three years of dedicated diplomacy, China gradually broke Western sanctions and regained international acceptance, including a White House welcome for the Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen. Had the Bush administration been tougher on China after the Tiananmen crackdown, it might have delayed China’s economic rise, but it wouldn’t have brought down the Chinese communist regime.