In its Preamble, the Constitution of India lists dignity as one of several constitutional values. Dignity has no textual mention in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court of India has, however, held dignity to be “the founding faith of the Constitution” and the “core of Fundamental Rights.” How is the special significance of dignity explained? By mapping the application of dignity by the Court, this chapter argues that judicial creativity with dignity has come at the cost of unanchored speculation about the content of dignity and uninhibited reliance on interdisciplinary academic literature. Dignity consequently figures in judicial decisions as a right, a justificatory value, and a reason for limiting individual rights. The content of dignity, however, remains perilously thin, and judicial enthusiasm has not resulted in clarity. Rather, questions arise about how extra-legal materials are employed in judicial decisions. The Indian experience, akin to several others, also raises concerns that arise when legal actors, primarily with legal expertise, employ moral and political values as justifications in constitutional rights adjudication.

This chapter examines the practice of the constitutional courts in India taking up matters suo motu (on their own initiative) without being petitioned by a claimant or party, to address a situation the judges regard as requiring extraordinary intervention on the part of the court. We assemble the available data about the incidence of this practice of suo motu intervention, its frequency, form, and results. We seek to explain why and how the Indian higher courts engage in this practice, and speculate about the effects of this practice on the courts and on Indian social and political life. For illustrative purposes, we describe the case of a recent intervention initiated by the Supreme Court, in response to a newschapter report of a gang-rape in a village a thousand miles away.

By the 1990s, India’s appellate courts had become closely involved in the regulation of street vending in several metropolitan cities. However, despite the frequent use of legal mechanisms by street vendor collectives, there has been little progress towards “formalization” of the street vending economy. To understand the limited impacts of legal intervention, it is necessary to examine the timing and the circumstances under which street vendor collectives first turned to judicial forums for protecting their livelihoods. Based on a historical examination of street vendor politics in Bombay and Madras, I show that legal mobilization in both instances was a response to serious threats faced by the political regimes that had previously shielded street vendors from dispossession and exploitation, rather than being a direct result of new legal opportunities (such as the emergence of public interest litigation). Since organized street vendors had a strong preference for maintaining the status quo, litigation was used as an effective method for buying time in the face of a hostile or uncertain political environment, even when the ultimate verdict was not likely to favor street vendors.

This chapter critically evaluates the impact of the Indian Supreme Court's interim orders in the Right to Food case, a Writ Petition seeking better implementation of the Midday Meal Program (the largest school nutritional program in the world). We cite significant and varied empirical and social science evidence demonstrating that the Program expanded significantly – from a quantitative as well as a qualitative standpoint – in the years immediately following the Court's orders. The harder question is whether the expansion in the Program was "caused" by the Court's intervention, or was largely the consequence of changed political circumstances. We argue that while the supportive political environment was undoubtedly a significant factor, the evidence available seems to indicate that the Court played an important role too. These orders helped in improving the scheme in certain specific respects, in bringing sustained media attention to the issue, in entrenching the Program against subsequent shifts in political priorities, and in providing a platform for the broader social movement to coalesce around. The experience suggests that there is room for "qualified hope" as to the ability of courts to help realize socio-economic rights, albeit in certain limited situations and in partnership with other actors.

The Indian Supreme Court sits in panels and can have up to 31 judges. This chapter explores how the Indian Supreme Court developed its current structure and the impact of this structure on its functioning. It argues that the Supreme Court’s structure has a range of inter-related effects that includes increasing access to the Court, producing a “polyvocal” jurisprudence that destabilizes stare decisis, spurring experimentation among judges, fostering a “Chief Justice dominant” Court, and reducing the perceived partisanship of judges. Mapping the structure of the Court, as well as the Court’s relationship with the rest of the judiciary, helps us appreciate how judges ultimately interpret the law and the Constitution not in isolation, but within a larger judicial architecture.

This chapter critically evaluates the impact of the Indian Supreme Court's interim orders in the Right to Food case, a Writ Petition seeking better implementation of the Midday Meal Program (the largest school nutritional program in the world). We cite significant and varied empirical and social science evidence demonstrating that the Program expanded significantly – from a quantitative as well as a qualitative standpoint – in the years immediately following the Court's orders. The harder question is whether the expansion in the Program was "caused" by the Court's intervention, or was largely the consequence of changed political circumstances. We argue that while the supportive political environment was undoubtedly a significant factor, the evidence available seems to indicate that the Court played an important role too. These orders helped in improving the scheme in certain specific respects, in bringing sustained media attention to the issue, in entrenching the Program against subsequent shifts in political priorities, and in providing a platform for the broader social movement to coalesce around. The experience suggests that there is room for "qualified hope" as to the ability of courts to help realize socio-economic rights, albeit in certain limited situations and in partnership with other actors.

This chapter analyzes the impact of the Indian Supreme Court's watershed case on quotas for "backward classes," the Indra Sawhneycase. It explores the role of the decision in the mobilization of Dalit Muslims, who have been excluded from the constitutionally mandated affirmative action regime for the erstwhile Untouchable or Dalit castes ("Scheduled Castes"). It shows how the incipient mobilization came to creatively interpret the decision, in particular its interpretation of Hindu caste and a partial recognition of Muslim social stratification, as an endorsement of their claims. The appropriation and activation of the judgment allowed the mobilization to generate further political support, convince state commissions and eventually mount a constitutional challenge in the Court. This account aims to highlight the symbolic potential of the Court's decisions, often through unintended mechanisms, to reshape and extend social movement politics. It also highlights the role of political constraints, organizational infrastructure and the Indian institutional context as relevant factors in assessing judicial impact.