In 1995, the German legislature introduced the rule that a woman who terminates her pregnancy in the first trimester, which is illegal, would not be punished if she had previously undergone a legally prescribed counseling session. The counseling session, while oriented toward the protection of unborn life, is also open-ended, respectful of the decision-making right and duty of the pregnant woman. At the request of the pope, the German bishops instructed the existing counseling centers of the Catholic welfare organizations not to issue any written certificates of such counseling, as such certificates could ultimately be used to evade punishment. In order to continue to be able to offer counseling, Catholics, among them Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, founded the association Donum Vitae (Gift of Life), which continues to issue certificates when requested. For the German bishops, the association, founded by Catholics for Catholics and non-Catholics alike, is external to the church. But what precisely is Donum Vitae? What does it stand for? Why are assessments of the association divided until this day? The essay examines these questions theologically and legally.

Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930–2019) was one of Germany’s foremost postwar legal scholars. He coined or popularized key terms and ideas that have left their mark on postwar German political debate to an extent matched by only few, from the chain of legitimation to the concept of the constitution as an ordering frame, the importance of the idea of subsidiarity in the European Union’s political competency, and his insistence that society must continuously work toward agreement on the things that cannot be voted on: the ultimate agreements in society that lie beyond the ballot box. Böckenförde was a lifelong commentator on Catholic affairs in Germany and involved in several important inner-Catholic reform initiatives. At the age of thirty-one, he became known to a wider German public with an article that presented a critical historical appraisal of the role of the Catholic Church under National Socialism. While still a postdoc, he co-authored a widely publicized critique of Jesuit Gustav Gundlach’s justification on theological grounds of a war of nuclear deterrence. In 1968, he was the first to publish a German edition of De Libertate Religiosa, the final declaration of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), and provided an authoritative commentary.

We are only now, after more than half a century, uncovering the real significance of what the Second Vatican Council means for the Church. The time lapse in reception has many factors not least that distinctive shifts in emphasis take far longer be appreciated in a real way that practical changes which, for good or ill, can be accomplished by fiat. So that the reception, fast or slow, of the Council is not a uniform process. One area where very little change has been seen is in relation to ‘adapting the Liturgy to the Temperament and Traditions of Peoples’. There was a call at the Council for a deliberate dialogical relationship between the liturgy and culture, and it is this relationship, rather than any particular modelling of it, that is the focus of this paper.

Fifty years ago, Yves Congar voiced concern over what he considered a serious point of confusion in the post-conciliar Church, namely, the meaning of “the sacred” in Christian faith and mission. This essay details Congar's diagnosis of the problem and explores the continued relevance of his constructive response, or, what he calls “sacred pedagogy.” For Congar, the world is not sacred in itself, because the body of Christ is the only sacred reality. Yet the world can become sacred, if we approach it “pedagogically,” as filled with signs that can lead us to grace. In the end, however, all present experience of the sacred will be transcended in the eschatological kingdom of God.

In Catholic doctrine, church and state are two different and autonomous institutional subjects, but they are mutually linked. Therefore, a believer, as a citizen, is a subject simultaneously of two legal systems; the state is bound to recognize the confessional dimension of its own members, and the church is called to realize its proper ends within a precise political-social context. The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) constitutes for the Catholic Church a point of change and renewal. It did not limit itself to affirming the coexistence of the two systems in their independence, but it declared the necessity of a mutual alliance for the good of citizens and believers.

Therefore, the church offers its own contribution to the state, favoring in this way the right to religious liberty; and the state allows the church to establish itself and carry out its proper mission in an institutional form, guaranteeing the protection of the rights of citizens as believers for the free expression of their faith, whether in a private dimension or in an organized form. Vatican II abandons, therefore, the concept of “state religion” in the classic sense of the term, and thus the privilege reserved to one among numerous religious expressions, and opens an authentic collaboration between parties as a prerequisite for the good not only for individual believers and religious organizations, but also for society itself. In particular, religious liberty finds its foundation no longer in the concept of truth (that legitimized the exclusion of other confessions in that they were “not true”), but in the concept of the dignity of the person, which must be protected as such.

This article posits that the hermeneutical approach of Peter Hünermann toward the “text” of the Second Vatican Council possesses the capacity to dissolve disputes that have arisen from a fissure among Catholics about the meaning of the council. At the heart of Hünermann's approach is a bold attempt to read the council's genre in light of “constitutional texts” that have played an important role in founding and reconciling different types of communities in the modern world.