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2 results

  • 6 - 1958 Convertibility and Its Consequences

  • Alain Naef, University of California, Berkeley
  • Book:
    An Exchange Rate History of the United Kingdom
    Published online:
    23 September 2022
    Print publication:
    29 September 2022, pp 92-98
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  • Summary

    1958 marked the introduction of convertibility. While still not completely free, transferring sterling across countries was easier. This led to the end of parallel markets in Zurich. These were now integrated into a global sterling market.

  • Chapter 6 - The Dollar System

  • from II - International Economist, 1948–1976
  • Perry Mehrling
  • Book:
    Money and Empire
    Published online:
    11 June 2022
    Print publication:
    04 August 2022, pp 126-155

  • Summary

    Bretton Woods had envisaged a world without capital flows, neither short-term nor long-term, but market practitioners had other ideas, rebuilding markets first domestically and then internationally in a process Kindleberger understood as a kind of natural Darwinian evolution. Policymakers viewed these developments with increasing alarm, and economists such as Robert Triffin built careers stoking those fears. The result was economic policy first attempting to hold back natural evolution, and then ultimately abdicating responsibility in Nixon’s 1971 devaluation of the dollar, a decision Kindleberger would call the Crime of 1971.