Contemporary philosophical work on freedom standardly refers to the topic as “free will,” even though in present-day philosophy relatively little attention is given to the will. This was not the case in the early modern period in general or in Descartes’ writings in particular. Descartes explains freedom in terms of the will. Yet Descartes never uses the Latin words properly rendered as “free will” and “freedom of the will” and only rarely uses the French words so rendered, instead referring primarily to freedom, as will be done in what follows as well.
1.Divine and Human Freedom
Descartes treats the topics of divine and human freedom both in completed works and in letters, but he devotes considerably more attention to human freedom, which may reflect his desire to avoid theological controversy as much as possible (AT IV 117, CSMK 234). He also maintains in the Sixth Replies that “the way in which [freedom] exists in God is quite different from the way it exists in us.” He believes that God's will is indifferent to all objects – that is, there is no rational basis for God to will one thing rather than another (AT VII 431, CSM II 291). This indifference, Descartes claims, reflects God's power: “The supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme indication of His omnipotence” (AT VII 432, CSM II 292). “But as for man,” Descartes writes,
since he finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already determined by God, and his will cannot tend towards anything else, it is evident that he will embrace what is good and true all the more willingly, and hence more freely, in proportion as he sees it more clearly. He is never indifferent except when he does not know which of the two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least when he does not see this clearly enough to rule out any possible doubt.
(AT VII 432–33, CSM II 292)In this passage, Descartes repeats the account of indifference articulated in his treatment of judgment in the Meditations (AT VII 58–59, CSM II 40–41).