After Felix Wubbe's study ‘Iavolenus contra Labeonem’, any attempt to draw general conclusions from differences of opinion voiced by two classical Roman jurists concerning specific points of law must appear less than promising. According to Wubbe's finding, not even the critical comments which Iavolenus (head of the Sabinian law school) appended to the posthumous works of Labeo (who supposedly founded the rival Proculian school) seem to yield any tangible evidence of methodological or other principles fundamentally distinguishing the two jurists. How then could one expect controversies within one and the same Proculian school, namely the rejection or modification of individual opinions of the jurist Labeo by his successor Proculus, to offer insights of a jurisprudential nature, particularly with respect to the character of the early classical law schools and the so-called school conflict between Sabinians and Proculians?
Reflections of this kind may, indeed, dampen expectations, yet there is little reason to despair. With some patience it should be possible to conduct an analysis of the content and form of Proculus' criticism aimed at Labeo that will lead to observations supporting or amplifiying other information (e.g. concerning the relationship of Celsus to Proculus) and will eventually enable us to draw a broader picture.