In an examination of the ecological correlates of the Vietnamese insurgency, Edward Mitchell suggests the existence of some disquieting relationships between certain indicators of land tenure arrangements and insurgent activities. Briefly, he finds that the degree of control that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam exercises at the provincial level is positively associated with inequality. Areas that appear to have the most unequal land tenure arrangements are precisely those over which government control is greatest.

With the end of the Fourth French Republic and the apparently effective performance of the Fifth Republic, France no longer provides an obvious touchstone for studies of “unstable” democracies. Perhaps as a result of the search for another such example, there has been an increase in American scholarly interest in Italy. Recent research—when combined with the studies of LaPalombara, Barnes, and Zariski, and with the studies conducted by Italian political scientists—provides a fund of organized and readily available information which may be used to test both general hypotheses and specific ones about Italian politics.

The fact that most Arab countries recently celebrated the centenary of Lenin's birth with varying degree of fanfare only underlines their relative impermeability to his teachings. The fanfare was not in all cases inversely proportional to the country's implementation of practical ideology, but the latter is in scarce evidence. Few of the leadership groups have assimilated the Leninist prescription to unite practice with theory, much less devised or adapted an ideology which is “practical” in the sense of legitimating particular political strategies or tactics in a logical and systematic way. Nor have they, except possibly in Tunisia, developed the necessary concomitant of practical ideology, namely a durable political organization which articulates and implements it.

International conflict has been accounted for in many different ways—in terms of aggressive “instincts,” territoriality, population growth, the search for basic resources or seaports, the protection of trade routes, psychopathological deviations, plunder and profit, a drive for imperialist control, and so forth. Some theorists have considered grievances, competition, anxieties, tension, threat, and provocation to be of special importance. Others have laid heavy emphasis upon national power or capability, military preparedness, strategic considerations, and the competition for dominance.1 No doubt most if not all of these variables are relevant, but this recognition does not help much in the development of a theory of war, its dynamics, and contributing causal networks. In the long run all factors need to be pulled together in some systematic way. A serious difficulty emerges from the fact that the various “causes” that contribute to war tend to be highly interactive, that is, they affect each other in various ways and often in many different directions. The problem is to find out, if possible, which variables are contributing most to international violence and in what proportion. The purpose of this paper is to take an early step in this direction by reporting on some empirical research currently under way and by presenting some tentative findings which suggest partial explanations and some implications and difficulties for national policies.

Although the literature on political development has been remarkably insightful, hopes for a science of “nation-building” have not been realized. While numerous works have described the effects of traditional patterns, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and rapid mobilization, and have investigated factors such as culture, bureaucracy, ideology, and parties, we have learned very little about how to alter favorably the political conditions these have fostered. Political scientists, more often than not, have documented obstacles to, and failures in, political change desired by leaders in new states, rather than explored strategies whereby such change might be realized.

During the past decade policy makers and academic observers have become increasingly aware of the political importance of economic relations, especially among the advanced industrialized states. Some of this awareness came precipitously when monetary crises threatened not only individual currencies such as sterling, the franc, or the dollar, but also the basic structure of the international monetary system. Some of this awareness was more incremental, as with the growing fear that neomercantilist trade policies might result in a reversal of the postwar policies of trade liberalization pursued by the Western industrialized states.

The national malaise over Vietnam has had many spillovers. Among them can be counted a shelf of works on the militaryindustrial complex and the role of the military establishment in American policy-making. Much of this material should never have been written; it is uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical. Several recent contributions to the debate have attempted to raise the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matter of allocative theory and decision. Each of these books will be widely regarded as an authoritative pronouncement on the causes and cures of America's defense dilemmas. They have been written by distinguished scholars or former policy-makers whose reputations in their fields are excellent.

The publications listed above exemplify the debate over national priorities that is gathering mass and momentum in the United States. With respect to each, we shall indicate the perspective of the author(s), scope of the work, and thrust of conclusions. We shall then suggest some broader sources and implications of this debate and its end product, the allocation of resources.

Few scholars have utilized contemporary social science theory in designing research on Communist countries. And fewer still have in systematically incorporated data from Communist countries into the existing body of social science theory. That is, middle-range theories such as organization, development, and socialization theory have not significantly shaped Western research on Communist systems. And surprisingly few one-, two-, and multivariable generalizations from the existing social science literature have been confirmed, rejected, or refined—even tentatively—with data from Communist countries.

The writings of the so-called Cold-War revisionists have had a powerful impact in recent years. In the case of the new generation coming to political awareness, analogies drawn or suggested between Vietnam and the period of the origins of the Cold War carry immediate conviction: many others have had their image of contemporary history challenged or even shattered, and those not persuaded by the revisionist case would acknowledge that important questions have been raised. Undoubtedly circumstances have favored the revisionist critique.

A great deal has been written about the political system of the Republic of South Africa. The ethnic, linguistic and racial differences of its population, the complex and convoluted history of its political antecedents, the strength and productivity of its economy, its strategic location (both in terms of geography and transaction flows), the inequities of its social and political system, and above all, the seeming uncertainty of its future have fascinated observers of its past and present. The volume of material is impressive; however, because many of the works dealing with South Africa are highly personal or partisan in character or essentially descriptive in nature, they are generally of only marginal or transitory importance to any fundamental understanding of its political system. Moreover, there remain substantial blank spots on our cognitive map of South Africa, and many of the more critical aspects of its situation have been ignored or given the most superficial of treatments.

While engineers, economists, and doctors can often prescribe a remedy for an undesirable situation by inference from a general theoretical construct, the architects of foreign policies rarely, if ever, have had such an advantage. Yet, the availability of a general theoretical construct could yield numerous benefits. To the degree that the theory were reliable and general, the foreign-policy maker would be able to deal with a wide range of concerns with confidence, at a minimum cost. For such a theory would allow him to know precisely what information would be needed to analyze the situation and how the information could be used to infer a prescription which would, with a high probability, get the desired results.

Confusion and misconceptions about the state and nature of “theory” have reached monumental proportions in the field of international relations. This situation is debilitating both because it misleads academics and policymakers alike about the contributions that can be made by theorists of international relations and because it operates to set back serious efforts to pursue theory in the field. Accordingly, I write in an effort to cut through some of this confusion and to set the problems of constructing theories about international phenomena in perspective. Specifically, I wish to explicate the following theses in these pages:1