This paper examines how strengthening patent protection affects welfare in a nonscale quality-ladder model, which was developed by Segerstrom [American Economic Review 88, 1290–1310] and generalized by Li [American Economic Review 93, 1009–1017]. In the Segerstrom–Li model, patent protection creates no distortion in static allocation among the production sectors. In order to examine the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection adequately, we incorporate a competitive outside good into the Segerstrom–Li model. In the general model, we derive the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection analytically by utilizing a linear approximation of the transition path. The result shows that the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is weaker when the market share of the outside good is positive than when it is zero. In other words, disregarding the static distortion that patent protection creates leads to excessive patent protection.

This paper examines the evolution of the distribution of industry-specific business cycle linkages, which are modeled through a multivariate Markov-switching model and estimated by Gibbs sampling. Using nonparametric density estimation approaches, we find that the number and location of modes in the distribution of industrial dissimilarities change over the business cycle. There is a relatively stable trimodal pattern during expansionary and recessionary phases characterized by highly, moderately, and lowly synchronized industries. However, during phase changes, the density mass spreads from moderately synchronized industries to lowly synchronized industries. This agrees with a sequential transmission of the industrial business cycle dynamics.

We study the interaction between endogenous growth and Ricardian trade working solely through comparative advantage. The model is built on several facts about research and development and trade. Trade and growth affect each other in ways previously unexplored. The model can explain and reconcile in a single framework several phenomena usually analyzed separately. Because of a possible dynamic inefficiency, trade may raise or lower the growth rate of each trading partner. Trade leads to “effective technology transfer,” with the growth rate looking as if a country adopts its partner’s technology even though it does not. Economic growth can endogenously change the trading regime from incomplete to complete specialization (the Ricardian corner and interior, respectively), which can explain why trade helps some countries catch up but leaves others behind. Trade may raise or lower social welfare. The model specifies the conditions under which each possible outcome occurs. We examine a few of the model’s many testable implications and find them in agreement with the data.

This paper investigates the nonlinear dynamics of the inflation–output type of Phillips curve based on a multiple-regime smooth transition regression model using data from China. The empirical results indicate significant nonlinearities in China's Phillips curve. The relationship between inflation and output can be modeled by a four-regime smooth transition regression model in which the responses of inflation to output depend on both inflation and economic growth rates. The inflation–output type Phillips curve may be positively sloped, negatively sloped, or even vertical in the short term, depending on different business cycles. Furthermore, we analyze business cycle fluctuations based on the nonlinear Phillips curve, indicating a coexisting zone of stable inflation rate and rapid growth rate.

We evaluate the global macroeconomic effects of cross-country-coordinated fiscal and monetary policies to counterbalance secular stagnation by simulating a five-region New Keynesian model of the world economy, calibrated to the United States (US), the euro area, Japan, China, and the rest of the world. The model includes investment in research and development (R&D) as a key factor affecting global growth. Our main findings are as follows. First, unfavorable technology developments may have played a nontrivial role in the global growth slowdown. Second, secular stagnation can be more effectively counterbalanced by coordinating global fiscal and monetary measures encouraging R&D accumulation. Third, these coordinated measures provide a larger welfare gain relative to a unilateral fiscal expansion.

This paper uses daily observations for the Canadian dollar–U.S. dollar exchange rate over the recent flexible exchange-rate period (from January 2, 1974, to October 28, 2002), and various tests from dynamical systems theory, such as a chaos test, a self-organized criticality test, and a threshold effects test, to support a stochastic nonlinear origin for the series.

Revisions of U.S. macroeconomic data are persistent, correlated with real-time data, and with high variability (around 80% of U.S. real-time data volatility). This paper adapts a DSGE-style model to accommodate both real-time and revised data from the U.S. economy. The results show a lesser role of both habit formation and price indexation than in the standard model. In the simulations, revision shocks to both output and inflation are expansionary because the Fed reacts by cutting interest rates. Consumption revisions, in contrast, are countercyclical, consumption mirrors the observed reduction in real-time consumption. In the variance decomposition, data revisions explain 9.3% of output changes.

This paper considers an endogenous growth model with public capital and heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity is due to differences in discount factors and inherent abilities. This allows us to closely approximate the 2007 U.S. income and wealth distributions. Government expenditures, including public investment, are financed through a progressive income tax along with a flat tax on consumption. Three revenue-neutral fiscal policy reforms are considered: (i) an increase in the degree of progressivity of the tax schedule that reduces the after-tax income distribution Gini coefficient to its lowest value over the period 1979–2009, (ii) a reduction in the progressivity ratio that causes the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution to come close to 1, and (iii) an increase in the fraction of output allocated to public investment that has the same positive impact on the growth rate as reform (ii). It is shown that increasing investment in public capital is the only type of policy that simultaneously enhances growth and reduces both types of inequality (income and wealth). We also find that the public-investment-to-output ratio that maximizes social welfare crucially depends on the elasticity of the labor supply. With a more elastic labor supply the optimal ratio is 4.40%, whereas with a less elastic labor supply it is 5.53%.

This paper aims to investigate impacts of public provision of universal health insurance (UHI) in an environment with household heterogeneity and financial market incompleteness. Various UHI polices with both distortionary and nondistortionary financing methods are compared to address the trade-off between risk reduction and tax distortion, as well as the corresponding welfare implications. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with endogenous insurance choice and labor supply decisions to perform quantitative analysis. The results suggest that the UHI expenditure coverage rate is too high in most OECD countries when the distortion effect is considered. We find a clear crowding-out effect on asset holdings. Implications for private health insurance (PHI) purchases when UHI is introduced depend on the pricing and the design of coverage. We find that the rich are sensitive to the price of PHI, and would prefer a supplemental plan when UHI is introduced.

In an incomplete markets economy with sunspots, the Pareto-criterion cannot rank sunspot equilibria of different levels of excess price-level volatility. Therefore, I propose a measure of excess volatility cost in terms of a period-0 endowment good. Ex-ante endowment subsidies are provided, in theory, to each consumer, so that the resulting equilibrium allocation of the higher volatility is Pareto-equivalent to the original benchmark equilibrium with a lower volatility level. The aggregate volatility cost is computed as the sum of all consumers' subsidies. Focusing on local analysis that considers small variations around a given volatility level, I show that the aggregate cost strictly increases in volatility even though each individual cost does not necessarily have this property.

In sticky price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices are kept unchanged, recent studies reach the qualitatively equivalent conclusion that higher trend inflation is a more serious source of indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of whether labor is firm-specific or homogeneous. This paper shows that the model with firm-specific labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by high trend inflation than the model with homogeneous labor, because these two different specifications of labor lead to distinct representations of inflation dynamics. In addition, the model with firm-specific labor is more susceptible to expectational instability of the equilibrium caused by high trend inflation.

We study the conditions that ensure rational expectations equilibrium (REE) determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) in a standard sticky-price model augmented with the cost channel. We allow for varying degrees of pass-through of the policy rate to bank-lending rates. Strong cost-side effects limit the size of the policy rate response to inflation that is consistent with determinacy, so that inflation-targeting policies may not be capable of ensuring REE uniqueness. In this case it is advisable to combine policy rate responses to inflation with an appropriate reaction to the output gap and/or firm profitability. The negative reaction of real activity and asset prices to inflationary shocks adds a negative force to inflation responses that counteracts the borrowing cost effect and prevents expectations of higher inflation from becoming self-fulfilling.

The objective of the paper is to develop a model of optimal endogenous technological progress that will exhibit two properties sought in growth models: (1) The bias will depend on the parameters of the model—particularly those affecting the cost of inputs—instead of being constrained to be Harrod neutral; (2) factor shares will be constant in steady state. Using previously derived sufficient conditions, we show the conditions under which such a model can be constructed.

This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, this paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resources and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second-best allocation is one that maximizes welfare when a social planner can use only pay-as-you-go social security in a decentralized economy. This paper finds a range of an old agent's labor productivity such that the first-best allocation is achieved in a decentralized economy. This finding differs from that in Michel and Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013], which notes that the first-best allocation cannot be achieved in a decentralized economy.

This article analyzes the consequences of environmental tax policy under public debt stabilization constraint. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax on pollutant emissions and/or by public debt. At the same time, households can also invest in private pollution abatement activities. We show that the economy may be characterized by an environmental-poverty trap if debt is too large or public abatement is not sufficiently efficient with respect to the private one. However, there exists a level of public abatement and debt at which a stable steady state is optimal.

The present paper uses an analytical approach to derive approximate closed-form solutions for the asset moments of a real-business-cycle model with idiosyncratic risk. To preserve analytical tractability, risk sharing is completely shut down. Further, the firm is assumed to maximize a variant of value maximization, given that its usual objective is no longer well defined under market incompleteness. When idiosyncratic risk is incorporated into the model, the asset moments can be decomposed into their value under identical households plus a new idiosyncratic term. Under full constrained persistence, in which case the same household determines the asset moments every period, the model is able to generate the risk premium in the data with reasonable parameter values, but it cannot generate the risk return trade-off. While the quantitative impact of idiosyncratic risk is smaller when there is only some persistence in who is constrained, the qualitative predictions are unaltered.

Most of empirical studies find evidence of the J-Curve, but recent results cast doubt over its standard explanation. By addressing the countercyclicality of the current account and its dynamic link with the terms of trade, this paper revisits the J-Curve phenomenon using a two-good dynamic optimizing small open economy model allowing for a habit-forming behavior and capital adjustment costs. While the nonmonotonic adjustment of the current account relies on the degree of habit persistence in consumption and the magnitude of capital installation costs after an unanticipated terms of trade worsening, we show that the sizes of the long-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution under time nonseparable preferences and the import content of real consumption and investment matter as well after a temporary perturbation. As a consequence of an intertemporal speculation effect and an inertia effect, the small country reaches the long-term equilibrium with higher foreign assets after a short-lived terms of trade worsening.

This paper develops a model of the optimal timing of interest rate changes. With fixed adjustment costs and ongoing uncertainty, changing the interest rate involves the exercise of an option. Optimal policy therefore has a “wait-and-see” component, which can be quantified using option pricing techniques. We show that increased uncertainty makes the central bank more reluctant to change its target interest rate, and argue that this helps explain recent observed deviations from the Taylor Rule. An optimal wait-and-see policy fits the target interest rates of the Fed and Bank of Canada better than the Taylor Rule.

The limited asset-market participation hypothesis has triggered a debate on DSGE models' determinacy when the central bank implements a standard Taylor rule. We reconsider the issue here in the context of an exogenous money supply rule, documenting the role of nominal and real frictions in determining these results. A general conclusion is that frictions matter for stability insofar as they redistribute income between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households when shocks hit the economy. Finally, we extend the model to allow for the possibility that consumers who do not participate in the market for interest-bearing securities hold money. In this case, endogenous monetary transfers between the two groups make it possible to smooth consumption differences, and the model is determinate, provided that the non-negativity constraint on individual money holdings is satisfied.

Are firms and households constrained in the use of a productive input? Theoretical approaches to this question range from exogenously imposed credit allocation rules to endogenous market failures stemming from some sort of limited-commitment or moral-hazard problem. However, when testing for constraints, researchers often simply ask firms or households if they would wish to borrow more at the current interest rate and/or test for suboptimal use of inputs in production functions relative to a full-information, full-commitment benchmark. We demonstrate that if credit is part of a much larger information-constrained (or limited-commitment) incentive scheme, then input use may very well be distorted away from the first-best. Further, households and firms, in certain well-defined circumstances, may, at the true interest rate or opportunity cost of credit, desire to borrow more (or less) than the assigned level of credit. In other, more constrained, contractual regimes, firms and households would say that they do not want to borrow more (or less), but these regimes are decidedly suboptimal, although the magnitude of the loss does depend on parameter values. We conclude with empirical methods that, in principle, could allow researchers armed with enough data to estimate parameters and distinguish regimes. Researchers then could see if firms and households are truly constrained and, if so, what the welfare loss might be.