This paper studies the growth and welfare effects of macroprudential regulation in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking and agency costs. Indivisible investment projects combine with informational imperfections to create a double moral hazard problem à la Holmström–Tirole and a role for bank monitoring. When the optimal monitoring intensity is endogenously determined, an increase in the required reserve ratio (motivated by systemic risk considerations) has conflicting effects on investment and growth. On one hand, requiring banks to put away a fraction of the deposits that they receive reduces the supply of loanable funds. On the other, a higher required ratio raises incentives to save and mitigates banks' incentives to monitor, thereby lowering monitoring costs and freeing up resources to increase lending. In addition, it may mitigate the systemic risk externality associated with excessive leverage. This trade-off can be internalized by choosing the required reserve ratio that maximizes growth and welfare. However, the risk of disintermediation means that in practice financial supervision may also need to be strengthened, and the perimeter of regulation broadened, if the optimal ratio is relatively high.

We consider a linear growth model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks in which producers cannot commit to repay their loans. Borrowing constraints are determined endogenously by the borrowers' incentives to repay, assuming that defaulters lose a share of output and are excluded from future trade in the credit market. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for the enforceability of a first-best equilibrium growth path. Weak property rights, impatient producers, and small productivity differentials can make the efficient growth path nonenforceable and lead to an inefficient equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints. For some economies, multiple balanced growth paths coexist.

This paper analyzes policies by means of which a whole society in an initial state of illiteracy and low productivity can raise itself into a condition of continuous growth. Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital is formed through child rearing and formal education, we show that an escape from a poverty trap, in which children work full time and no human capital accumulation takes place, is possible through compulsory education or programs of taxes and transfers. If school attendance is unenforceable, temporary inequality is unavoidable if the society is to escape in finite time, but long-run inequalities are avoidable provided sufficiently heavy, but temporary, taxes can be imposed on the better off. Programs that aim simply at high attendance rates in the present can be strongly nonoptimal.

We consider a firm with assets-in-place and a growth option. There is a funding gap for the expansion investment, which is covered by entering into an equity-for-guarantee swap or fee-for-guarantee swap. We explicitly derive all contingent claim prices with the pricing and timing of the growth option taking business cycle and debt maturity into account. For short-term loan, we produce an explanation why Chinese government suggests that guarantee fee rate should be approximately the fraction 50% of the interest rate of bank loans with the same maturity, but for long-term debt, we show this fraction is too small.

We test the expectations theory of the term structure of U.S. interest rates in nonlinear systems. These models allow the response of the change in short rates to past values of the spread to depend upon the level of the spread. The nonlinear system is tested against a linear system, and the results of testing the expectations theory in both models are contrasted. We find that the results of tests of the implications of the expectations theory depend on the size and sign of the spread. The long maturity spread predicts future changes of the short rate only when it is high.

We investigate mean and volatility spillovers between the crude oil market and the debt, stock, and foreign exchange markets. In doing so, we estimate a four-variable VARMA–GARCH model with a BEKK representation and also examine the possible effects of monetary policy at the zero lower bound by including a dummy variable in both the conditional mean and variance equations. We find that the crude oil market and the financial markets are tightly interconnected and that monetary policy at the zero lower bound has strengthened their linkages.

We investigate the quantitative behavior of business-cycle models in which the intermediation process acts either as a source of fluctuations or as a propagator of real shocks. In neither case do we find convincing evidence that the intermediation process is an important element of aggregate fluctuations. For an economy driven by intermediation shocks, consumption is not smoother than output, investment is negatively correlated with output, variations in the capital stock are quite large, and interest rates are procyclical. The model economy thus fails to match unconditional moments for the U.S. economy. We also structurally estimate parameters of a model economy in which intermediation and productivity shocks are present, allowing for the intermediation process to propagate the real shock. The unconditional correlations are closer to those observed only when the intermediation shock is relatively unimportant.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of demographic change on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, financed with a defined contribution scheme. In particular, we examine the relationship between retirement, fertility, and pensions in a three-period overlapping generations model. We focus on both the case of mandatory retirement and the case where the retirement age is freely chosen. In the case of mandatory retirement, increasing longevity has an unambiguously negative impact on fertility and pension payouts and a positive effect on the level of physical capital in the steady state. On the other hand, when agents choose the time of retirement, an increase in life expectancy positively affects physical capital only when the tax rate is sufficiently low and can have a positive impact on pension benefits, because agents may find it optimal to retire later and to decrease fertility less. Finally, the effects of the social security tax on capital per worker are negative with mandatory retirement; however, they could be positive in the optimal retirement case.

This paper combines horizontal and vertical innovations to generate an endogenous growth model allowing for structural change as an endogenous phenomenon. Older technologies are continuously replaced by newer ones due to creative destruction, and new technologies appear as a result of horizontal innovations and due to the consumers' preference for variety. We assume fixed operational costs for the manufacturing sector and an endogenously defined patent price for every new technology. Every industry is profitable only for a limited period of time, making the effective time of existence of the technology endogenous and finite. We find that in such an economy endogenous structural change is the source of ongoing economic growth. Furthermore, the range of existing sectors as well as growth rates stays constant as long as the technologies are symmetric.

This paper aims at investigating the interplay between inequality, innovation dynamics, and investment behaviors in shaping the long-run patterns of growth of a closed economy. By extending the analysis proposed in Caiani et al. [(2018) Journal of Evolutionary Economics], we explore the effects of alternative wage regimes under different investment and technological change scenarios. Experimental results seem to de-emphasize the role of technological progress as a possible source of greater inequality. Overall, simulation results are consistent with the predominance of a wage-led growth regime in most of the scenarios analyzed: A faster growth of low- and middle-level workers’ wages, relative to managers’, generally exert beneficial effects on the economy and allows to counteract the labor-saving effects of technological progress. Furthermore, a distribution more favorable to workers does not compromise firms’ profitability, but rather strengthen it by creating a more favorable macroeconomic environment, which encourages further innovations, stimulates investment, and sustains economic growth.

This paper examines the relationship between environmental policy and growth when green preferences are endogenously determined by education and pollution. We consider an environmental policy in which the government implements a tax on pollution and recycles the revenue to fund pollution abatement activities and/or an education subsidy (influencing green behaviors). When the sensitivity of agents' environmental preferences to pollution and human capital is high, the economy can converge to a balanced growth path equilibrium with damped oscillations. We show that this environmental policy can both remove the oscillations, associated with intergenerational inequalities, and enhance the long-term growth rate. However, this solution requires that the revenue from the tax rate must be allocated to education and direct environmental protection simultaneously. We demonstrate that this type of mixed-instrument environment policy is an effective way to address environmental and economic issues in both the short and the long run.

This paper presents a computable general equilibrium model of endogenous (stochastic) growth and cycles that can account for two key features of the aggregate data: balanced growth in the long run and business cycles in the short run. The model is built on Schumpeter's idea that economic development is the consequence of the periodic arrival of innovations. There is growth because each subsequent innovation leads to a permanent improvement in the production technology. Cycles arise because innovations trigger a reallocation of resources between production and R&D. The quantitative implications of the calibrated version of our model are very similar to those of Kydland and Prescott's (1982) model. Moreover, under some parameterizations, our model can correct two shortcomings of RBC models: It can account for the persistence in output growth and the asymmetry of growth within the business cycle.

David Cass is undoubtedly one of the central contributors to modern dynamic economics. His fundamental contributions include work on optimal growth problems, overlapping-generations models, sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. His research has shaped in profound ways the manner in which we do both micro- and macroeconomics. From laying the foundations of real business-cycle theory via the Cass-Koopmans model, to providing us with general tools and techniques to analyze dynamic economic models, to furthering our understanding of monetary economics, to making fundamental contributions to the economics of extrinsic uncertainty, Cass's work has played a major part in the development of much of modern macroeconomic theory. In addition to being a first-class scholar, Cass is also truly his own man and a free spirit of the highest order.

In this interview, we tried to gain some insights into the story of David Cass and his approach to economic theory. Also, given the title as well as the intended readership of Macroeconomic Dynamics, we made a real effort to get him to discuss modern macroeconomics and the influence his work has had on its development. We edited out some parts of the discussion in the interests of space, but what remains is essentially unedited. As most readers will know, David Cass has collaborated extensively with Karl Shell over the years. We talked to Shell a few weeks after talking to Cass, and that interview is scheduled to appear in a future issue.

We met with Dave in his office at the University of Pennsylvania's Economics Department just before noon. Amid the boxes and piles of articles, books and CD's, he sat in his standard jeans and T-shirt, looking about as disheveled as he usually does. We chatted there for a while, went out and continued over lunch, and then returned to complete the interview several hours later. It was an unseasonably warm day in February, and Friday the 13th to be exact. That is traditionally an unlucky day, but one that turned out in this case to be a real treat, at least for us! We hope that you get as much out of this conversation with Dave as we did.

This study examines the effect of short-sale constraints on a stock market, in particular, on stock prices, trading volume, and the relationship between stock price movements and output cycles. The economic model features incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. The short-sale constraint is endogenously determined in the economy and is a function of agents' risk aversion, time preference, and exogenous driving forces. The dynamic model is solved using a policy function iteration algorithm. We find that, for an array of reasonable time-preference parameters and risk-aversion coefficients, the short sale limits range from 27 to 45% of total outstanding shares. Imposing short-sale constraints causes stock prices to move upward. Trading volume is high when some agents have a large amount of stock holdings but incur a negative shock on their nonfinancial income and is low when some agents have few stock holdings and also incur a negative shock to their nonfinancial income. Stock prices are found to be countercyclical and the expected stock returns are procyclical. These countercyclical stock-price movements are shown to be related to the imposition of a short-sale constraint.

We propose a framework in which expectations have a rational and a learning component. We describe a solution method for these frameworks and provide an application to the Volcker disinflation with the New Keynesian model. Although the model with rational expectations does not seem to account for this episode, results improve when a small and empirically plausible proportion of private agents are learning. The learning component is argued to be more robust and plausible than the rule-of-thumb expectations present in the hybrid Phillips curve.

Two phenomena are widely observed when an economy departs from an underdeveloped state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employment, and consumption from the traditional sector to the modern sector, and the other is a large increase in educational levels of the population. The question is why some economies have succeeded in such structural change, but others do not. To examine the question, an overlapping generations (OLG) model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral shift and human capital accumulation as sources of development is constructed. It is shown that, for a successful structural change, an economy must start with a wealth distribution that gives rise to an adequate size of the “middle class.” Once the economy initiates the “take-off,” the sectoral shift and human capital growth continue until it reaches the steady state with high income and equal distribution. However, when the productivity of the traditional sector is low, irrespective of the initial distribution and the productivity of the modern sector, it fails in the sectoral shift and ends up in one of steady states with low income and high inequality. Thus, sufficient productivity of the traditional sector is a prerequisite for development.

The application of exchange rate target zones modeling to interest rates allows interpreting the puzzles that emerged with the public debt euro area crisis, namely the nonlinear behavior of the interest rates and the fact that some stand-alone countries, not belonging to the euro area, have not been subject to speculative attacks in spite of equally large public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios. As a matter of fact, this model shows that in the case of a noncredible upper threshold for the interest rate (that may be due to both the lack of room for increasing further the required government primary surplus and/or the absence of a monetary authority acting as a lender of last resort), the resulting public debt unsustainability determines an interest rate nonlinearity and makes the crisis possible for public debt levels that would be stable in the presence of a credible interest rate target.

This study investigates the relationship between the sustainability of public debt and inequality in an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents. We show that the threshold for the sustainability of public debt is related to not only the relative size of public debt but also inequality. In addition, this study examines the effects of budget deficit and redistributive policies on the sustainability of public debt and inequality. We show that an increase in the deficit ratio or the redistributive tax makes public debt less sustainable. If the economy falls into the unsustainable region as a result of the policy change, both public debt and inequality continue to increase.

We examine whether annual, quarterly, and monthly U.S. aggregate consumption data could have been generated by a utility-maximizing representative agent with intertemporally separable utility. The model appears inapplicable over the full time periods covered by the NIPA data, which are the sample periods often used in the literature. The model does appear applicable, however, over long subsamples. The data also are inconsistent with separability assumptions routinely made in the literature. In particular, the main categories of consumption (nondurables, services, and durables) are not mutually separable. We consider the implications of our results for inference about consumption based on the representative-agent model.

Replacing the pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG DB) system with an at least partially funded defined contribution (DC) system generates fiscal costs that need financing. The fiscal closures at hand differ by the channel and the extent of distortions. The main contribution of this paper is a thorough comparison of the welfare effects of the various fiscal closures of the pension system reform. In addition, we decompose the welfare effects to the parts attributable to changing the way pensions are financed (PAYG ⇒ prefunding) and to changing the way pensions are computed (DB ⇒ DC). We show that depending on the fiscal closure, the welfare effects differ substantially for the same pension system reform. The financing of the the pension system gap with public debt allows more intergenerational redistribution.