Article 27 ICC Statute has proven to cause compatibility problems with regard to immunity provisions in national constitutions. States have, however, indicated readiness to overcome these problems. On the other hand, Article 98 forms the pivot of the latest attempt of the United States, a non-signatory state, to ensure a de facto immunity from ICC jurisdiction for US nationals. This editorial sets out the contrasting approach of states to the ICC and concludes that the US Proposal for a Rule to 98(2) would have had the effect that the rule encompassed in Article 27 ICC Statute would in practice not apply to nationals of non-state parties.

The long-simmering process of sidelining and side-stepping migrants’ rights protection while attempting to regulate cross-border movement of people was heated up by the 2015 migration crisis and has recently been brought to the boil with the crisis-fuelled adoption of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. The GCM represents an endorsement at the international level of soft-law, goal-setting frameworks for international co-operation on migration as it pertains to migrants’ rights, and a corresponding disavowal of any role for binding legal obligations in this field. Focusing on the EU, I argue in this article that states’ sovereign powers in the realm of control of non-EU migration have been largely undiluted by the development of the international system of human rights protection. I show how the 2015 migration crisis galvanized multilateral international co-operation on the part of the EU and its member states in the field of non-EU migration in a way that entrenched EU states’ sovereign self-interest by institutionalizing a soft-law approach, thereby producing a crisis from the perspective of migrants’ rights protection. I also argue, however, that the migration crisis facilitated a resurgence of state sovereignty in the EU to the detriment not only of migrants’ rights, but also of internal EU co-operation and co-ordination. Finally, I suggest that in times of crisis supranational courts are particularly susceptible to being recruited to EU states’ rights-restrictive approach to international migration.

The Treaty of Asunción in 1991 gave rise to the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) as a promising economic integration process. Over the past 20 years, as the legal personality of MERCOSUR was reinforced, there were also important changes in its legal system. International law and international economic law played a fundamental role in the development of MERCOSUR law. The main aim of this article is to provide some insights into the current stage of MERCOSUR law, taking into account the evolution of the legal system, the dispute settlement mechanism, and the relationship with international law. In order to do so, the author examines various turning points in the case law of the arbitration tribunals constituted so far and the Permanent Review Tribunal established by the Olivos Protocol.

This article uses the first issue of the American Journal of International Law, one hundred years after its creation in 1907, to analyse the state of American international legal thought following the acquisition of Pacific and Caribbean island territories in the Spanish–American War and the creation of a new international identity. Traditionally, the American Society of International Law (of which the journal was the organ) has been placed in the context of the US peace movement. However, both the society and the journal were led by individuals occupying major positions in the administration of Theodore Roosevelt and earlier administrations, including the sitting and a former secretary of war. The society and its journal were vehicles of the US foreign policy establishment. Despite a mixture of imperialists and anti-imperialists, a cultural coherence is discernable in the journal's pages. In essence, the journal can be placed within what the article calls the genteel tradition of US international law, involving an effort at educating the public away from over-excitement, adopting science in the newly professionalized administrative state, and advocating an arbitrational model of legal ordering to promote international peace.

In light of serious problems with the assignment of counsel to defendants before the ICTR, this article examines the freedom of choice of assigned defence counsel before both ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals. International legal instruments guarantee free legal assistance for indigent defendants but do not recognize an unrestricted free choice of such counsel. International case law, however, recognizes that an effective defence can hardly arise from a client-counsel relation that is not based on trust and confidence. Trust and confidence are therefore decisive for a proper understanding of the right to have free legal assistance. Unlike the practice of the ICTY of recognizing the importance of these factors, the Registrar of the ICTR seems to give more weight to geographical distribution of lawyers and other discriminating factors. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR dealt with this policy in the Akayesu case and overturned the decision of the Registry to refuse the counsel of the defendant's own choosing.

This article highlights the challenges to the operation of domestic courts as agents of development of the laws of armed conflict and particularly of the law on the conduct of hostilities. The first part of the article concerns the spillover from various branches of the laws of armed conflict to the law regarding the conduct of hostilities. The second part of the article addresses the structural constraints on domestic courts in deciding issues relating to the laws of armed conflict, focusing on the conflict between their role as guardians of national interests and their judicial commitment to protecting the individual. The cumulative effect of these characteristics of domestic litigation suggests that the laws of armed conflict, and particularly the law on the conduct of hostilities, are not necessarily well served by development through domestic jurisprudence.

Carl Schmitt is still astonishingly present in the legal discourse. Yet instead of indulging in the study of his explicit ‘lesson’ and its possible impact on contemporary legal problems, it might be worthwhile to survey the primary cause of his greatest fear. Following this perspective, the article analyses Schmitt's concept of the nomos, distinguishing it from the traditional normativist approach on the one hand and confronting it with a more recent understanding of law in terms of the network conception on the other. Thus Schmitt's view of the developing legal system in the twentieth century proves to be relevant to our current efforts to grasp newly emerging legal phenomena in the twenty-first century.

This editorial takes a practical approach. It aims to stimulate reflections on the way we teach international law today, on how new technologies could enhance the pedagogical experience, on the upgrading of the role and participation of students, and on a better connection with the ‘real world’. It focuses on ‘how’ rather than on ‘what’ or ‘for what purpose’ we teach international law. With this aim in mind, it serves a few ideas seasoned with suggestions and examples.

This article discusses some of the legal issues that arise in the context of the possible establishment of an individual complaints procedure for violations of international humanitarian law, a proposal launched at the Hague Appeal for Peace in 1999. It examines such a proposal in the light of recent practice of human rights bodies, which suggests that the latter are not the most adequate means to improve supervision of compliance with international humanitarian law. The article argues that a separate body should be established and concentrates on the competence ratione materiae of such a body, the conceptualisation of the legal basis for individual complaints, non-state actors as respondents of complaints and applicable reparations for violations of international humanitarian law.

The dynamic of the secondary market for sovereign debt has been affected by the presence of a peculiar category of holders: vulture funds. These funds, specializing in purchasing the debt of sovereign states in distress at a discounted market price, stay aloof from restructuring processes and then enforce their claims in courts to secure the face value. For low revenue debtor countries, paying the claims may involve reducing the resources available for basic services to the population. For very poor countries this also involves a significant regression in terms of development. Against this background, the purpose of this work is to inquire whether and to what extent there exists a rule permitting the suspending and rescheduling of payments so as to pay dues without impairing services. In order to find such a rule, inquiry is to be made into general norms: necessity and public policy. It is under the umbrella of the truly international public policy that the duty of a state to provide certain basic services to its population can be subsumed and the corollary of the suspension and rescheduling of these payments consistently with this duty can be applied.

The purpose of the present study is to briefly introduce the final (1994) Draft Articles of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) on The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter Draft Articles or 1994 Draft) and to analyse some of the more important and interesting provisions. It is not the intention to discuss basic theories relating to the management of international watercourses, on which numerous studies are already available. Nevertheless, the Draft Articles incorporate two fundamental principles of the law relating to watercourses, viz. the principle of equitable utilization and the no-harm rule, which will be treated at rather greater length because of their importance as well as certain ambiguities in the Draft Articles relating to them.

In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) seminally found self-amnesty laws on serious human rights violations to be null and void. However, later national reactions showed that this supranational control has faced challenges. Such supranational judicial authority has been exercised where amnesty laws and other exemption measures blocked judicial cases, democratic referendums upheld legislation, and peace-making processes existed.

This article seeks to determine whether the traditionally interventionist jurisprudence of the IACtHR on amnesty laws/exemption measures has been legitimate under global constitutionalism standards. The standards considered are: human rights, namely, rights of victims of mass atrocities; consistency or coherence of this jurisprudence with international, regional and national practices; and democratic legitimacy and/or accountability considerations.

Victim rights have underlain the IACtHR’s jurisprudence on amnesty laws and similar measures. Importantly, developments on victim rights are not exclusive to the IACtHR as case law of other supranational human rights bodies evidences. Among human rights courts and bodies, the IACtHR has exercised the highest level of control over amnesty laws/exemption measures, even nullifying national legislation. However, the IACtHR’s case law shares common principles with UN/regional jurisprudential developments and domestic practices in terms of inadmissibility of amnesties and other exemption measures in cases of serious abuses. Unlike the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the IACtHR has not deferred to sovereign state appreciation (conventionality control doctrine). Nevertheless, the IACtHR has arguably begun to move towards more ‘moderated’ approaches. This is advisable under democratic legitimacy considerations.

The article explores the demise of the ‘colonial war’ category through the employment of French colonial troops, under the 1918 armistice, to occupy the German Rhineland.

It traces the prevalence of – and the anxieties underpinning – antebellum doctrine on using ‘Barbarous Forces’ in ‘European’ war. It then records the silence of postbellum scholars on the ‘horror on the Rhine’ – orchestrated allegations of rape framed in racialized terms of humanity and the requirements of the law of civilized warfare. Among possible explanations for this silence, the article follows recent literature that considers this scandal as the embodiment of crises in masculinity, white domination, and European civilization.

These crises, like the scandal itself, expressed antebellum jurisprudential anxieties about the capacity – and implications – of black soldiers being ‘drilled white’. They also deprived postbellum lawyers of the vocabulary necessary to address what they signified: breakdown of the laws of war; evident, self-inflicted European barbarity; and the collapse of international law itself, embodied by the Versailles Diktat treating Germany – as Smuts warned, ‘as we would not treat a kaffir nation’ – as a colonial ‘object’, as Schmitt lamented.

Last, the article traces the resurgence of ‘colonial war’. It reveals how, at the moment of collapse, in the very instrument embodying it, the category found a new life. Article 22(5) of the League of Nations Covenant (the Covenant) reasserted control over the colonial object, furnishing international lawyers with a new vocabulary to address the employment of colonial troops – yet, now, as part of the ‘law of peace’. Reclassified, both rule and category re-emerged, were codified, and institutionalized imperial governance.

In March 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1101 (1997) which authorised a multinational protection force – known as Operation Alba – to enter Albania “to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.” Created with the consent of the government of Albania, the intervention occurred as a direct but also as a near-immediate response to the political, financial and humanitarian crisis that had been precipitated by the collapse of so-called pyramid schemes in Albania. The purpose of this article is to examine the background of the adoption of Resolution 1101 (1997) and then to investigate the impact and importance of the consent for the operation given by the beleaguered government of President Sali Berisha. The article will then analyse the legal significance, meaning and interpretation of Security Council in Resolution 1101 (1997), as amended in Resolution 1114 of June 1997, in its endeavour to provide an account of the organisation, achievements, shortcomings and lessons of Operation Alba.

At the time the United States withdrew from participation in the Nicaragua case at the International Court of Justice, the US government expressed concern that ‘the course on which the Court may now be embarked could do enormous harm to it as an institution and to the cause of international law’. This essay examines whether or to what extent the anticipated negative effects came to pass. It concludes that dire predictions of harm to the Court were overstated. Twenty-five years later, the rate at which states accept the Court's jurisdiction has held steady. Only a few states have added jurisdictional reservations concerning military activities. The mix of cases being brought to the Court has shifted towards a more representative distribution. States are generally complying with the Court's decisions, though some compliance problems remain. The most serious negative impact has been on the willingness of the United States (still the Court's most active litigant) to participate fully in international dispute settlement.

The article tackles the question of how far should investment tribunals go in reviewing the reasonableness of host state conduct. Based on an evolutionary interpretation of the preamble of international investment treaties and focusing on the principle of integration as the key element of the concept of sustainable development, the article's main argument is that investment tribunals should avoid a review based on proportionality stricto sensu or cost-benefit balancing.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United Nations Human Rights Council is an innovative monitoring mechanism in the international human rights law system. As the UPR matures, scholars have increasingly sought to stand back and understand it as a process. In this article, I take work in this vein further by considering more closely the actors involved in the UPR – humans and objects – and highlighting the time creating effects that emerge from the relationships between them. Across the various stages of the UPR, a range of temporalities – from cyclicality and linearity to retrogression and suspension of time – are produced and sustained by people, reports, data, lists, microphones, screens, computers, action plans, and desks, just to name a few. I argue from this that time is materially made in the review process, often in micro and taken for granted ways. In its operation, the UPR appears as a collection of temporal assemblages. Or, in language drawn from actor-network theory (ANT), an assortment of fluid and interweaving sets of actants networked together who generate ideas of time across its practice. Apprehending time creation in this material, the ANT-inflected way is highly significant for scholars and practitioners interested in the UPR. It holds potential to influence how this process can be understood, approached, and located within international human rights law as itself a larger, time creating actor-network.

In this article the author elaborates upon the close relationship between the concepts of human rights and development, examined in relation to African legal practice. Development is considered as a comprehensive legal, economic, social, and cultural concept. According to the author the right to development may be claimed by individuals and peoples of developing nations. In this respect the African situation is carefully analyzed by the author. The African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights, which came into force in October, 1986, may be considered a first regional effort to promote human rights and development. So far, the Charter has already been ratified by 30 African States.

A locus classicus of international law, the study of the regulation of the legality of the use of force has an unavoidable ring of tragic fanciness about it. War, as acknowledged by David Kennedy in the very first sentence of his book, is indeed ‘a profound topic – like truth, love, death or the divine’. A Pandora's box of multiple distilled intellectual emotions behind which lurk the horrid memories of its survivors, war only truly breathes in the mirrors of the mutilated, in the eyes of the tortured, in the memories of the displaced, in withering flowers over graves crowned, most of the time, by religious symbols. A vague intellectual scent of it, a sort of aseptic intellectual variant, still remains, nonetheless, a field of professional interest for international lawyers.