This essay traces the relationship between activists and academics involved in the campaign for “women's rights as human rights” as a case study of the relationship between different classes of what I call “knowledge professionals” self-consciously acting in a transnational domain. The puzzle that animates this essay is the following: how was it that at the very moment at which a critique of “rights” and a reimagination of rights as “rights talk” proved to be such fertile ground for academic scholarship did the same “rights” prove to be an equally fertile ground for activist networking and lobbying activities? The paper answers this question with respect to the work of self-reflexivity in creating a “virtual sociality of rights.”

This essay focuses on Alejandro Álvarez's seminal article, ‘Latin America and International Law’, published in 1909 in the American Journal of International Law. Offering and in-depth analysis of the text, it foregrounds the strategic meaning of Álvarez's work in the light of the international politics of his day. It posits that, more than simply a diplomatic history of Latin American particularity, Álvarez presents the case for a different hemispheric international order, based on an ‘American international law’ extending to the United States. He draws primarily an Latin American Precedents – based on historical and stituational commonalities – to argue for a common public law. He then grafts an idiosyncratic interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as the United States' main contribution to this common law, as well as the fact of US sponsorship of various Americas-wide conferences resulting in the ratification of regional treaties. Notably, and this is one of the main points of this is one of the main points of this essay, Álvarez elevates certain Latin American states as leaders in regional international law and capable agents of its enforcement across the hemisphere. In short, this essay advances the claim that Álvarez's project of pan-American law in effect entreats the United States to share its hegemony and wield its power in the region jointly with Latin America's ‘better-constituted’ states.

This note evaluates the application of rules on judicial independence and impartiality in two international decisions issued in 2004 – the ICJ Order on Composition in the Wall Advisory Proceedings and the disqualification decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Sesay – and compares them with a code of judicial conduct recently prepared by an ILA study group (the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary). We assert that the approach taken by the ICJ in Wall is excessively restrictive and is out of step with contemporary tendencies to embrace stricter standards of judicial independence and impartiality.

Human rights law is often regarded as a discipline with aspirations of being an autonomous, self-contained regime within the general corpus of international law. Recent debates concerning reservations in the area of treaty law have reinforced views which claim the governing prinicples of human rights law depart – if not contradict – general rules of international law. By examining a landmark decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which declared the recent purported Peruvian withdrawal from its compulsory jurisdiction invalid, against the background of general international law, the author aims to demonstrate that far from deviating from the general rules of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, this decision supports the view that human rights law is neither insulated from general international law nor divorced from the principle of sovereignty. For the principle of sovereignty has a twofold character: it is the fundament but also the limit of freedom of action by a state.

For over three decades, it has been the International Law Commission's position that the circumstance of consent involves something other than the consent which, through the rule pacta sunt servanda, imparts objective force to international agreements. During the tenure of the second Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, Roberto Ago, the Commission adopted the view that the former suspends the international obligations which are incumbent on states whereas the latter functions to create, modify, or extinguish the rules whence such obligations stem forth. However, as the result of the study carried out by its last Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, the Commission has now come to distinguish between the circumstance of consent defined as a justification for non-performance of subsisting obligations, and consent defined as a requirement for the application of obligations. In this contribution, it is argued that both analyses are problematic. The former gives succour to a mistaken view of the sources of international law. The latter is based on a misunderstanding of the primary-rule–secondary-rule terminology; it justifies itself by referring to an ill-conceived definition of the notion of peremptory norms, and no less importantly undermines the purposefully cumbersome mechanism envisaged in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for suspension of multilateral treaties as between certain of the contracting parties only.

This article uses the contested independence of Kosovo as an opportunity to re-examine the theoretical imagery behind the concept of self-determination, and then confront those findings with the more recent approaches to polity formation from other theoretical genres: normative theories of secession, on the one hand, and the global governance approach to self-determination, on the other. What emerges from the encounter between these bodies of thought is not a new interpretation, or a theory of self-determination and its relationship to uti possidetis, but rather a plea for an approach to polity formation which is simultaneously critical and prudential. That is, an approach which would accept the role of external actors as inevitable, but goes further and unmasks them as complicit in labelling certain projects as ‘civic’ and ‘multicultural’ on the one hand and ‘ethno-nationalist’ on the other. Equally, the proposed approach reveals the ever-present aspiration to unanimity as a concealed ideal of polity formation, shared by both the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ variants of self-determination. Finally, this approach to polity formation sketches the contours of an alternative, thin vision of a political community – one not wearing the badge of peoplehood – one glued together not by normative imperatives of participation and solidarity, but rather by the acknowledgement of geopolitical fiat.

In international criminal tribunal discourse, appeals to history and legitimacy are omnipresent. This article addresses the widespread practice of combining these appeals into one narrative. It analyses how international prosecutors engage with justifying the legitimacy of trials through the invocation of a tribunal's own history. The scrutiny of such ‘auto-histories’ as a specific form of history-telling illuminates an overlooked dimension of trials as fora for writing history. The opening statement is a perfect opportunity for constructing and communicating auto-histories. A comparative study of opening statements at the International Military Tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court reveals a recurrent, self-justifying narrative where both rootedness in history and a break with the past are key to singing the tribunal into existence as a crucial mechanism in the transition from chaos to peace. The connections between auto-histories at different tribunals show how legal practitioners discursively contribute to constructing the international criminal law's identity by relying on both origins and future.

In deciding whether to rule against a state party, international courts regularly confront a compliance dilemma: declare the state in breach of the international regime but with the risk that it will defy the court’s authority; or defer to the state but at the price of acquiescing to an unjust or undesirable outcome. Specifically, international adjudicators must solve this dilemma in a context of uncertainty, that is, without knowing with exactitude whether or not the state will prefer complying with an adverse ruling over overt defiance. I use a simple strategic model to cast light on this aspect of the compliance dilemma. Building off from the model’s insights, I then discuss the practices, doctrinal tactics and institutional mechanisms apt to reduce uncertainty and minimize state defiance. I highlight, in particular, the advantages of defiance avoidance mechanisms that help create informational feedback loops like test-the-water dicta and double-tier review. I illustrate how these mechanisms have been deployed by two of the world’s most powerful international courts, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, I consider the limitations of these mechanisms along with the possibility for other international dispute settlement bodies to replicate them.

In this piece we introduce and contextualize the contributions to the special focus on the international theory of Carl Schmitt, and argue that Carl Schmitt's much neglected international thought can provide scholars of both international relations and international law with a new common multidisciplinary research platform pivotal in thinking about the present international predicaments of crisis in international order and legitimacy, of contested liberal hegemony, and of the issue of unipolarity and the emergence of new forms of warfare, such as terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’.

Engaging with a mundane topic like the softness of international law may certainly look surprising to the readership of a journal known for its avowed and constant quest for an intellectually and conceptually rigorous ‘off-Broadway’ scholarship. Why would a journal that tries to establish itself as a leading alternative voice in the field replay a comedy so often staged in mainstream scholarship? It is with the full awareness of such an anticipated feeling of déjà vu that the editors of the Leiden Journal of International Law have decided to open the ensuing pages to an oft-debated topic with the ambition of evaluating the possibility of transcending the traditional pitched battle between opponents and advocates of soft law. It is well known that, after the juvenile success of the concept1 and its embrace by a great number of international scholars, soft law became the object of severe criticisms, resulting in a chasm in the international legal scholarship. Indeed, the debate about soft law came to literally split authors into two camps, firmly pitted against one another. On the one hand, there are the advocates of the notion for whom the binary nature of law is incapable of explaining the complexity of the international exercise of public authority in a pluralized world2 or who see soft law as an instrument of (programming of the) development of hard law.3 These apostles of the notion of soft law are opposed by those who see the notion as redundant because it turns into either hard law or not law at all,4 it is self-serving for the profession,5 it is dangerously deformalizing our instruments of law ascertainment,6 or it is weakening the general authority of law.7 The fierce character of that confrontation originates in soft law's being intrinsically intertwined with one's core and inner understanding of (international) law, thereby making these discrepancies seem irreconcilable.

Supported by Athens and Ankara, and implemented largely by the League of Nations, the Greek–Turkish population exchange uprooted and resettled hundreds of thousands. The aim here was not to organize plebiscites, channel self-determination claims, or install protective mechanisms for minorities – all familiar features of the Allies’ management of imperial disintegration in Europe after 1919. Nor was it to restructure a given economy and society from top to bottom, generating an entirely new legal order in the process; this had often been the case with colonialism, and would characterize much of the Mandate System in the interbellum. Instead, the goal was to deploy a unique legal mechanism – not in conformity with European practice, but also distinct from most extra-European governance regimes – in order to resolve ethno-national conflict by redividing land, reshaping national identities, and unleashing new processes of capital accumulation.

This article discusses the judicial vision articulated by Judge Christopher Weeramantry in his time as a member of the International Court of Justice. It seeks to trace the development of his vision by examining his earlier writings, and the factors which shaped his approach to international law. It discusses some of the key elements of his vision: his sensitivity to Third World concerns, his attempts to create a universal international law which represents all the world's cultures, and his views of the judicial function and the international rule of law.

Non-permanent members’ strategies to augment their influence in the United Nations Security Council usually seek parity of status with the permanent members. A more radical and transformative strategy would seek to change the Council itself. Working methods reform holds more potential in this respect than composition reform. At present, however, working methods reform is oriented to increasing non-permanent members’ status and focuses on redistributing administrative roles like sub-committee chairing and penholding. The price non-permanent members pay for their offices, however, is bureaucratic drudgery, which both keeps them from pursuing their own political priorities, and socializes them into the permanent members’ rhythms of work. Using Hannah Arendt’s concepts of work, labour, and natality, this contribution analyses strategies for influence in the Security Council, and offers a negative reading of Arendt’s ideas to suggest that non-permanent members should present a more obstructive counterforce in the Council, by cultivating their difference.

There is widespread anxiety about human rights ‘inflation’: positing too many human rights, it is said, will lead to their devaluation. This article seeks to disentangle the inflation objection from other concerns about rights expansionism and to critically assess it. It considers the scope and implications of the inflation objection by reference to several issues – e.g., which modes of human rights proliferation it covers and which restrictions follow from it – and argues that it is characterized by a formal emptiness since it lacks any specific criteria to indicate which human rights lead to inflation and which do not. The formal emptiness of the inflation objection does not, however, mean that it is politically neutral, for despite its inability to generate closure it does generate a sense of closure by drawing strict boundaries around the corpus of ‘proper’ human rights. This sense of closure, the article argues, entrenches currently dominant (neo)liberal understandings of human rights while generating suspicion of claims to far-reaching social transformation. In light of this, an alternative to the anti-inflation mindset is suggested: a mindset of wonder, which understands human rights claims outside of dominant understandings not as a threat, but as an opportunity to question the status quo.

This article critically examines the dynamics between public health, intellectual property, and international trade in the context of the TRIPS Amendment and its theoretical implications in international law. The article suggests that international efforts in the TRIPS 2003 Waiver and 2005 Amendment addressing public health concerns have not been very successful due to the birth defect of TRIPS, i.e., hoping a private-rights-in-nature regime could accommodate public interests in health concerns. TRIPS’ birth defect further reveals itself in post-TRIPS development and contributed to the failure of the TRIPS Waiver and Amendment due to the resulting practice fragmentation and procedural hurdles in domestic compulsory licensing administration. Moreover, the TRIPS Amendment raised a fundamental theoretical issue, i.e., how the WTO as an international organization in public international law can regulate compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights as private rights – in particular the proprietary right to remuneration – while recognizing that TRIPS grants no positive rights. The paper suggests that the key to the issue is the treatment of private rights in public international law. It is submitted that the TRIPS Amendment has no legal basis in international law due to its unwarranted intrusion into members’ domestic affairs and individuals’ private proprietary rights. The article thus calls for alternative thinking about the TRIPS Amendment, in particular to leave administration of compulsory licensing fully with domestic authorities as it is in the Paris Convention.

The potential for conflicts of norms is particularly great in modern international law. Yet until now, the International Court of Justice has said very little as to what it considers a conflict of norms. The opportunity to do so arose in the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening). There, it was argued that granting Germany sovereign immunity in proceedings before Italian courts involving civil claims for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945 would come in conflict with prevailing peremptory (jus cogens) norms of international law. In its 3 February 2012 Judgment, the ICJ rejected this argument. In the present article, the author argues that the conceptions of conflict of norms underlying the Court's judgment and the dissent of Judge Cançado Trindade both have weaknesses. The author suggests an alternative framework to ascertain conflicts of norms. He then applies this framework to the rules of state immunity and the IHL rules breached by Germany, agreeing in the end with the conclusion reached by the majority of the ICJ that these rules did not conflict.

Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds.), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 226 pp. (hb).

Sinkwan Cheng (ed.), Law, Justice, and Power: Between Reason and Will, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 278 pp. (pb).

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) follows its own rules regarding the responsibility of states, although the international law of state responsibility enshrined in the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) remains, as general international law, relevant to its decisions. However, case law of the ECtHR shows that the Court is departing from certain ARSIWA principles as it adopts a broad interpretation of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) giving rise to positive obligations.1

Exploring those trends in the state responsibility regime of the ECHR, this article argues that, by clarifying certain ARSIWA provisions, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can play an important role by contributing to a higher degree of judicial integration on the law of state responsibility. It is desirable that the ICJ takes any upcoming opportunity to provide greater clarity on the challenges and nuances of the applicability of the law of state responsibility, in particular as it relates to positive obligations. That would contribute to a more systematic use of those rules by regional courts such as the ECtHR, and ultimately to guaranteeing a greater protection of human rights.

The recent investor–state arbitration claim of Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa considers the extent to which international human rights obligations might be compromised by investor protections. In this regard, the paper examines the investor protection known as fair and equitable treatment (FET). It addresses this treatment obligation in the context of the South Africa–Italy bilateral investment treaty, and its invocation by investors who feel wronged by South Africa's black economic empowerment policies. It analyses the main interpretative theories of the FET clause, and concludes that it is to be interpreted as a self-contained treaty standard. This sui generis approach to interpreting FET clauses more accurately reflects the intentions of the state parties. Such a view supports the conclusion that international human rights should be considered in the interpretation of the FET clause.

It is always a pleasure and privilege to address a body of students as they commence their graduate studies. You have climbed the foothills successfully and have reached the first plateau. But there are many peaks ahead, and as you commence your ascent of one of them today, I wish you the very best of luck in reaching the sunlit plateau that lies ahead. When you arrive there, you will no doubt see other peaks which you may wish to climb, because any branch of study reveals ever higher and higher peaks. The higher you go, the more you see. These summits are sometimes even hidden in the clouds. You keep discovering them, and even if their existence is known, they are often unexplored territory. Pathways have to be found through them. That is part of the intellectual excitement you will commence today as you leave the well-trodden paths and begin to carve out pathways for yourselves. I congratulate you and wish you God speed on your journey.