Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch (eds.), The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 0521835542, 330 pp., £55.00 (hb).

Markus Burgstaller, Theories of Compliance with International Law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, ISBN 9004141936, 244 pp., €98.00 (hb).

Constanze Schulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0199276722, 500 pp., £75.00 (hb).

Science is organized common sense where many a beautiful theory was killed by an ugly fact.

Thomas H. Huxley

This article analyzes the interactions between norms formally stemming from different orders and regimes so as to demonstrate how and to what extent the legal spaces composing the transnational legal sphere are intertwined. Furthermore, it addresses the consequences of the intertwinement and suggests a fresh approach to the traditional concept of legal orders: it stresses a norm-centered rather than system-centered understanding of the transnational legal sphere. It argues for a norm-based strategy in order to understand the phenomenon of intertwinement, analytically deducing the relationship of the legal orders from the relationship of the legal norms.

To many in the West, the League of Nations was to establish political peace between nations. To the Cuban sugar-producing elite of the 1920s and 1930s, however, the League was an important socioeconomic institution used to augment many of Cuba's first modern state institutions. This article explores how and why Cuban delegates were the principals behind the 1937 International Sugar Agreement – one of the League's few operational economic treaties. This treaty sheds light onto how actors from the so-called industrial core and agricultural periphery used international law, institutions, and practice to negotiate and renegotiate their relationship with each other.

The International Criminal Court has a different mandate – exercise of criminal jurisdiction over individuals – from most international organizations. It may help to develop the law of international organizations concerning structure and internal operations, relationships with states, and relationships with other international organizations, as well as concerning relationships with individuals. The ICC assigns its judicial and quasi-political functions appropriately. Notably, the power to make agreements is divided functionally among the judicial and prosecutorial Organs and the Assembly of States Parties. The relationship between the ICC and states that are not parties to its Statute is far more important to the ICC than to most international organizations. Where situations are referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council, such states may be required to cooperate with the Court because of their duties under the UN Charter. Other situations require agreement to cooperate by the non-party state.

After decades of rule-of-law promotion in world affairs, international law and legality have regained scholarly imperative. Yet this has not dissolved disciplinarity between international law (IL) and relations (IR), but furthered a priori theorizing and the unilateral extension of disciplinary research agendas. A prime example is the influential ‘legalization agenda’ of IR scholarship, where an institutionalist doctrine has renarrated the ‘L word’ through a fetishizing of rules and a managerial focus on rule compliance. However, this approach confronts a problem of relevance as international struggles increasingly involve contests over how to legally characterize issues, actions, and events, and this engages juridical and normative dimensions of rule application which are beyond the managerialism of compliance. This article argues for greater sociological and critical engagement with the way in which the concept of law operates through juridico-political practices of legality, and the aim is to provide a theoretical and empirical discussion that revives the significance of the juridico-political world for scholarships which have habitually underplayed the constitutive significance of lawyering for rule application. To do so, this article, first, addresses the profundity of Kant's work and concern over law's application by a rule-applier and, second, claims this has long invited a more critical sociology. To initiate that social exploration, the paper draws on both Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the ‘juridical effect’ and the Foucauldian notion of ‘normative law’ to theorize the significance of juridical and normative practices in the making of international law's rule. In the final section, I introduce the empirical benefit of these critical sociologies by turning to the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and the ways juridical and normative power have enabled sophisticated militaries of the developed world to constrain the application of the LOAC in contemporary wars of asymmetric combat.

The International Court of Justice and other international tribunals have a much more prominent role in settling international disputes than they did 50 years ago. It follows that the measures for the protection of the independence of the institutions and their members are even more important. Those protections include the qualifications judges are to have, the methods of their election and selection, their commitment to their responsibilities, and their methods of work. Also important are the reactions to their decisions by states, particularly the parties, the wider international community and the contribution of the rulings of the institutions to the clarification of the law and its development.

This article, prepared for the symposium on ‘The Future of Restrictivist Scholarship on the Use of Force’, examines the current trajectory of restrictivist scholarship in the United States. In contrast to their counterparts in continental Europe, American restrictivists tend to devote less energy to defending narrow constructions of the UN Charter. Instead, they generally focus on legal constraints outside the Charter's text, including customary norms and general principles of law such as necessity, proportionality, deliberative rationality, and robust evidentiary burdens. The article considers how these features of the American restrictivist tradition reflect distinctive characteristics of American legal culture, and it explores the tradition's influence on debates over anticipatory self-defense and the use of force against non-state actors abroad. The article concludes by examining how the American restrictivist tradition is beginning to shape the United States’ approach to the use of force in response to cyber attacks.

Non-international armed conflicts are more numerous, more brutal and entail more blood-shed today than international ones. The Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly upholds the traditional distinction between international and non-international conflicts, and armed conflicts will have to be characterized accordingly. But the tendency to adapt the international humanitarian law (IHL) regime for non-international conflicts to the rules for international ones emerges. Article 7 on Crimes Against Humanity and Article 8(2)(c) and (e) on War Crimes amount to real progress in this respect. Yet, the regulation on war crimes in particular does not provide for comprehensive criminal responsibility of individual perpetrators in non-international conflicts.

The right of self-defence against non-state actors is increasingly invoked and accepted in the practice of states. However, the recognition of this right must overcome a fundamental obstacle: that of explaining why the rights of the host state, in particular its right of territorial sovereignty, is not infringed by the self-defensive force used within its territory. In practice, states invoking self-defence against non-state actors rely on the involvement of the host state with those actors to justify the use of force in that state's territory. It is not clear, from a legal standpoint, how to rationalize the fact of involvement as a form of legal justification. For some, involvement amounts to attribution. For others, involvement is a form of complicity. For others still, involvement may entail a breach of the host state's due diligence obligation to protect the rights of other states in its territory. All of these solutions are deficient in some way, and have failed to receive general endorsement. This article considers whether there may be a different, as yet neglected, solution: self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. The article shows that this is not a perfect solution either, since positive law remains uncertain on this point. Nevertheless, it is a solution that may provide a better normative framework for the development of the law of self-defence against non-state actors.

Three intertwined threads run through many recent editorials of the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL). They tie together many debates within and beyond the board of editors. The threads are those of the Journal's plural identity, the conversation about methods, and the spicy theme of interdisciplinarity. They are related for obvious reasons. Methodology forms one – not the only and perhaps not the foremost – factor in assessing submissions. We need to have an idea of good methodology for such an assessment to be possible. At the same time such an idea must not go against the plurality of perspectives or the Journal's aspiration to provide a forum to new and possibly unsettling voices. Research that cuts across disciplines seems especially valuable in this regard. But it comes with its own methodological challenges and tests the Journal's identity which is – albeit plural– that of a Journal of international law. It is against the background of these intertwined threads that I wish to offer a discussion of a central question that mirrors these recent debates: What makes for a valid legal argument?

This essay is a friendly response to the colloquium on From Apology to Utopia (FATU). It restates the way critical research examines the exercise of power through analysis of (legal) language. Attention is directed especially to the empowering and enchanting effects of the law. The main point has to do with the continuing power of structuralism as a form of legal analysis.

The debate over whether the International Criminal Court should have jurisdiction over corporations has persisted over the years, despite the failure of the legal persons proposals at Rome. For its part, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon determined that it has jurisdiction over corporations for the purpose of crimes against the administration of the Tribunal, albeit not for the substantive crimes over which it adjudicates. Most recently, the African Union has adopted a Protocol that, should it come into operation, would create a new international criminal law section of the African Court of Justice and Human and People's Rights with jurisdiction over corporations committing or complicit in serious crimes impacting Africa. In light of the enduring nature of the proposal that international criminal institutions should directly engage with the problem of commercial corporations implicated in atrocity, this article explores the possible implications for the international criminal justice project were its institutions empowered to address corporate defendants and prosecutors emboldened to pursue cases against them. Drawing on the expressive goals of international criminal justice and concepts of sociological legitimacy, as well as insights from Third World Approaches to International Law, the article suggests that corporate prosecutions, where appropriate, may have a redeeming effect upon the esteem in which some constituent audiences hold international criminal law, as a system of global justice. The article's thesis is then qualified by cautionary thoughts on the redemptive potential of corporate prosecutions.

This article appraises the impact of the Advisory Opinion of 7 July 2004 on the development of self-determination as a legal principle. The plight of the Palestinians being widely understood as a textbook self-determination struggle, the Court had to address the issue in its examination of the case at hand. Self-determination left an indelible mark upon the Opinion, from the decision to allow Palestine to participate, through the use of the principle as applicable law, to the elucidation of the violations and the erga omnes character of the obligations breached. The article examines the Court's positions, which, however sparsely elaborated, may have serious repercussions on the understanding of the principle and on its handling in future judicial proceedings.

This article considers the relationship between the uses and forms of history within international law and questions of method in the development of histories of international law. It focuses on the advantages of genealogy as an approach to the history of international law given its capacity to both explain the way in which the law itself makes use of the past and intervene in this.

Elaborating on the compatibility between genealogy and elements of the contextual approach to history associated with the ‘Cambridge School’, this article challenges recent suggestions that anachronism is irrelevant, unavoidable, or even a ‘method’ that might be fruitfully embraced in studies of international law’s past directed towards explaining and potentially altering its present. It argues that historians of international law should take the dangers of anachronism seriously, particularly if the histories they develop are to operate as a form of critique and basis for change. Genealogy is a form of history that allows a particularly potent critique of international legal thought and practice. It opens up possibilities for more radical change by questioning and moving beyond the normative framework that usually structures (and limits) calls for reform in international law.

This article argues that the harrowing consequences of official corruption for African societies elevate corruption to the level of a breach of the social and economic rights recognized in international human rights law. Yet, unlike in the case of violation of civil and political rights, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states seems to provide a convenient excuse for the inaction of the international community in the face of egregious violation of social and economic rights. This inaction, the article argues, is part of the reason why corrupt public officials in Africa perpetrate graft and openly accumulate illicit gains at home and abroad without fear of punishment. The article, therefore, suggests two things: elevation of corruption to the status of a crime in positive international law, and expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to include official corruption and looting of public funds.

On 10 May 2001, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey pronouncing on the legal consequences of Turkey's invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. The Court found Turkey responsible for continuing violations of the right to the home and property of Greek-Cypriots. Invoking the Namibia principle, the Court found that remedies in the occupied part of Cyprus may be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey and that the question of their effectiveness was to be considered in the specific circumstances in which it arises. On 1 March 2010, the Court decided that a Commission in the occupied area was a remedy that should be exhausted by the complainants for the above violations. Significant legal questions were determined relating to the effectiveness of this remedy with far-reaching consequences concerning the right to home and property as well as other aspects of human rights and international law.

This article portrays the use of consensus claims, as well as their substantiation, in the debate on cyber-attacks and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Focusing on (re)interpretations of the prohibition on the use of force in the light of cyber-attacks, the article first shows how scholars appeal to the ‘majority opinion’ of scholars or the ‘generally accepted’ interpretation of the norm. It points out the different uses of these ‘consensus claims’, as I refer to them, and what scholars invoke exactly when referring to this elusive majority. Elaborating on this ‘elusive’ nature of consensus, I argue that the appeal of a consensus claim lies precisely in its invocation of a fairly mystical ‘out there’. Consensus, as it turns out, evaporates the moment we attempt to substantiate it, and this might be precisely where its strength lies. The second part of the article thus shifts focus to how these claims are substantiated. An empirical inquiry into the footnotes supporting consensus claims reveals that, most of the time, writers refer to the same scholars to substantiate their claims. Making use of Henry Small's idea of ‘concept symbols’, the article argues that these most-cited scholars turn into the ‘bearers’ of majority opinion. On the level of the individual academic piece, the singular reference might appear to be fairly innocent. Yet, when considered as a more widespread practice of ‘self-referentiality’, it seriously impacts who gets a say – and thus, ultimately, what we know – in international law.

The civilian-combatant frame persists as the main legal lens through which lawyers organize the relationships of conflict zone actors. As a result, little attention has been paid in international legal scholarship to different gradations of ‘civilianness’ and the ways in which some civilians might compete to distinguish themselves from each other. Drawing attention to international humanitarian actors – particularly those working for NGOs – this article explores the micro-strategies these actors engage in to negotiate their relative status in war. Original qualitative empirical findings from South Sudan illuminate the way in which humanitarians struggle over distinction with individuals working for the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS. As is shown, humanitarian actors are doing away with a static civilian-combatant binary in their daily practice. A more fluid logic informs both their self-conceptualization and their interactions with others who share the operational space. Humanitarian actors envision civilianness as a contingent concept, and they operate according to a continuum along which everything is a matter of degree and subtle gradation. As civilianness is detached from the civilian, any given actor might acquire or shed civilian-like, or combatant-like, characteristics at any moment. The distinction practices that humanitarian actors enact can be understood as a bid for legibility, so that they might be rendered intelligible in international law and in the eyes of other actors as a special kind of civilian – the ‘civilian plus’.

This article examines the question of state succession to bilateral treaties. It analyses the work of the International Law Commission undertaken in the 1970s and criticizes the solutions it has adopted in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties for different types of state succession. I will argue that it is incoherent for the ILC to apply, on the one hand, the solution of automatic continuity for bilateral treaties in the context of secession and dissolution of states, while adopting, on the other hand, the solution of tabula rasa for Newly Independent States. In any event, it is plainly unjustifiable to apply the principle of automatic continuity to bilateral treaties. Thus, while the tabula rasa principle was adopted by the ILC for multilateral treaties to protect Newly Independent States’ right to self-determination, the same solution was chosen for bilateral treaties for different reasons. The rule of tabula rasa was adopted because of the particular nature of bilateral treaties and the basic requirement that the other party to an original treaty must consent to the continuation of that treaty with a Newly Independent State. There are simply no logical reasons as to why the tabula rasa principle adopted for Newly Independent States should not also find application for all new states. Bilateral treaties do not automatically continue to be in force as of the date of succession unless both states that are implicated explicitly (or tacitly) agree to such a continuation.