This article draws upon a neo-Gramscian analysis of world order to critically assess the relationship between neo-liberal globalization and socioeconomic rights. It argues that, notwithstanding the well-documented discursive tensions that appear to exist between neo-liberalism and socioeconomic rights, the latter have been reconceptualized in a manner that is congruent with the hegemonic framework of the former in a number of international institutional settings. This has been achieved in part through three discursive framing devices which will be termed ‘socioeconomic rights as aspirations’, ‘socioeconomic rights as compensation’, and ‘socioeconomic rights as market outcomes’. The article will conclude by arguing that, despite such appropriation, there are still fruitful possibilities for counterhegemonic articulations of socioeconomic rights to contest neo-liberal globalization.

In this article, I argue that we need a better understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the current debates in international law surrounding hate speech and inchoate crimes. I construct a theoretical basis for speech acts as incitement to genocide, distinguishing these speech acts from speech as genocide and speech denying genocide by integrating international law with concepts drawn from speech act theory and moral philosophy. I use the case drawn on by many commentators in this area of international criminal law, the trial of media executives for the roles they played in the Rwandan genocide through public speech acts by media entities insulting an ethnic group or advocating violence against an ethnic group. Each of these men were institutional leaders and were charged with using their positions within Rwandan society to distribute what I call genocidal hate speech, genocidal incitement speech, and genocidal participation speech. I argue for a distinction between these three types of speech, and a difference in individual criminal liability for the dissemination of each type of speech. I also argue that there should be a difference in individual criminal liability for speech acts within the context of an ongoing or recent genocide, and speech acts that can be separated from a site of mass violence.

Between 1935 and 1937, the International Missionary Council conducted the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment. The objective was to produce silent educational films and screen them to ‘native’ people via mobile cinemas in the British territories in East and Central Africa. Embracing the principle of ‘indirect rule’, and its role in training colonial subjects in economic self-sufficiency and political self-rule, as then advocated by leading colonial figures and the League of Nations, the films strived to capture ‘the native point of view’ through an ‘ethnographic sensitivity’ towards local cultures, concerns and needs. Hoping to educate the natives from ‘within’, they used local actors, familiar locations and pedagogical instructions that were believed to meet the target audience's cognitive capacity. Though in many respects unsuccessful, the experiment cemented the use of cinema in the late colonial project and, more importantly, embodied the clear move at the time towards a more dynamic and disaggregated, yet perhaps never fully post-imperial, international order. I argue in this article that the Bantu Experiment is thus a telling instance through which to examine both the mobility and multiplicity of late imperial locations and the system of modern international administration that emerged during the interwar period. I suggest that this mobility and multiplicity continue to characterize the workings of today's international order, indicating the key role that ‘indirect rule’, as a silent principle of international law, still plays in its functioning today.

This article argues that in passing Resolution 1540, the UN Security Council has confused the proper scope of its enforcement powers under Chapter VII with the proper scope of its long unused, limited, lawmaking powers under Article 26. It has thereby taken to itself by unilateral exercise of its Chapter VII powers a role which, under the Charter system, it is to share with both the General Assembly, in the exercise of its Article 11(1) powers, and the general membership of the United Nations, to whom it is directed under Article 26 to submit proposals for the creation of new international laws in the area of weapons proliferation.

International criminal law has made impressive strides over the past twenty years. The 1990s and 2000s saw the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the coming into being of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), and the birth of several internationalized ‘hybrid’ jurisdictions, notably the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). However, the dynamic development of international criminal law into a new branch of public international law has also led to some problems and confusion. The rules and principles developed by the newly founded international criminal tribunals have sometimes seemed at odds with accepted views on public international law more generally – raising fears about the ‘fragmentation’ of the law. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the controversy over the ‘overall-control’ test developed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case to determine under which circumstances armed forces may be considered to be acting on behalf of a third state, rendering an internal armed conflict international. The Tadić test differed from the ‘effective-control’ test developed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case and confirmed in the Bosnia Genocide case, where the ICJ specifically rejected the ICTY approach. Also more generally, the discussion on ‘fragmentation’ and international criminal law continues; recently, Elies van Sliedregt set out in these pages her vision of legal pluralism in international criminal law.

Emotions play an important role in cognition and have a significant and all too often neglected influence on (international) law-making processes. Fear, in particular, can be a driver of reasoning and decision-making. Fear of terrorism / immigrants / health threats / food contamination / environmental hazards – to give a few notable examples – influences the perception of risks associated with these issues and consequently impacts international policy- and law-making. International law rules and doctrines are often adopted – if not overtly justified – on the basis of fear and other emotions. This article aims to explore how fear – as both an individual and collective emotion – may affect decision-making processes, be determinative of normative outcomes, and shape security policies at the domestic and international levels. This approach deviates from traditional rationalist understandings of law and emphasizes the role of emotions in apprehending the nature and functioning of legal processes. Hopefully, this exploration will open up interesting avenues for further research on the role of emotions in international legal processes.

Focusing on some undertheorized aspects of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the present article aims to reassess critically the anti-fragmentation function generally assigned to this provision. The high hopes associated with the harmonizing potential of Article 31(3)(c) are usually based on a reading of this provision as requiring the interpreter to take into account not only rules applicable between all of the parties to the treaty, but also those applicable only between some of the parties. However, this reading does not seem to be confirmed by the interpretive approach suggested in this article. On the other hand, the use of Article 31(3)(c) in judicial settings raises a structural problem inherent in the international judiciary. The analysis undertaken along these lines suggests that the optimism that Article 31(3)(c) has recently provoked should be qualified in some important respects.

The role of domestic courts in the development of the international law of jurisdiction is less direct and less important than might be supposed. As a manifestation of the practice and opinio juris of the forum state, domestic judicial decisions take a back seat to legislation and, like legislation, represent the position of a single state alone. The more influential part that domestic judicial decisions and, indeed, proceedings can play in the evolution of the international rules on jurisdiction is as triggers both for reactive practice on the part of other states and for international litigation. Domestic decisions can also shape international law when looked to by foreign courts as persuasive judicial authority.

Despite its not being an entirely new debate in international law and international relations, the nexus between human rights and non-state actors has become a highly relevant topic of scholarly research, as witnessed by the three works under review, published in 2005 and 2006. When Andrew Clapham published in 1993 Human Rights in the Private Sphere, in which he already questioned the public/private divide of human rights law, the book was then categorized as both ‘adventuresome and timely’. Some fifteen years later, an analysis of this topic can no longer be called ‘adventuresome’, but the timeliness remains beyond doubt.

The approach of Indian courts towards international law has been consistently evolving. Initially, the Indian constitutional framework provided a flexible basis for the application and use of international law, the reasons for which could be seen in the socio-political context of India as a developing country. India, for its part, continued to argue that it remained essentially at the periphery of the mainstream international law, as it had no role in formulating some of the basic principles of international law. For the Indian courts the first substantive encounter with international law emerges in the context of several territorial-related issues. The socio-political context forms the next phase, for the Indian courts to have recourse to diverse international legal norms relating to the environment and human rights and applying them as a persuasive tool. Later, the development context brings a complex array of commercial, environmental, and other related international legal norms into the Indian legal system. For Indian courts, in the present context, the correct sourcing and identification of international legal norms and their application remain a huge challenge. The majority of the legal systems of developing countries for varied historical reasons continue to treat international law as an exotic legal tool to be used sparingly, perhaps only to broaden the interpretation of or sustain a comparable domestic legal norm.

In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice took the position that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rules of international law. This article does not dispute the final finding, but rather critically examines the Court's somewhat controversial reasoning and considers the added value of the opinion for the clarification of legal doctrine in relation to unilateral declarations of independence. An argument is made that the Court's interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the declaration had significant implications for the Court's final finding. Yet, the Court cannot be criticized for not answering the question of whether or not Kosovo is a state, whether Kosovo Albanians are beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, or even whether the ‘right to remedial secession’ is applicable. However, the Court may well have implicitly answered that recognition of Kosovo is not illegal.

This article considers the effectiveness of rights-based approaches to the problem of world hunger. Given that inadequate food supply may be the result of complex, structural problems outside the control of particular staes and authorities, can advocacy based on the right to food significantly improve world food security? To answer this question, this article considers one particular structural factor which contributes to world hunger, namely the operation of the international economic system. It concludes that, at both a theoretical and a practical level, human rights discourse is ill-suited to achieve the fundamental structural change to this system necessary t improve food security. This represents a significant limitation on the effectiveness of the right to food. As a result, an alternative legal approach is suggested, namely using a legal principle of ‘food sovereignty’ to ensure that the international system as a whole operates to support the food needs of its population.

In the early 1990s, two former members of the Afghan secret service applied for a residence permit in the Netherlands. Their request was denied on the basis of the exclusion clause of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There were serious reasons for suspecting that the men had committed war crimes during the Afghan civil war of 1979–92. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the files of the two men to the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions in 2003. At the trial, defence counsel raised various preliminary challenges. They argued that the case should be declared inadmissible since relying on the immigration files would violate the nemo tenetur principle and the right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the court had no universal jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since there was no international rule mandating a right to universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The Hague District Court dismissed the defence challenges and eventually convicted the Afghan nationals to 9 and 12 years' imprisonment. The Hague Appeal Court endorsed most of the findings of the District Court and confirmed the convictions and sentences. The reasoning underlying the decisions, both at first instance and at appeal, raise questions particularly with regard to universal jurisdiction. In this article the defence arguments are explored and the reasoning of the courts is analysed.

On 2 April 2015, the full International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered its first advisory opinion in reply to a request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission regarding illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Unlike any other court or tribunal with advisory competence, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber, ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction is not explicitly enshrined in its constituent instrument, but was rather asserted in the Tribunal’s, homemade, rules of procedure. In spite of strong objections from various states, ITLOS affirmed a broad advisory jurisdiction ratione materiae and personae, and found that there were no compelling reasons to exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the request. The request and the Tribunal's handling thereof raise interesting questions regarding the opportunities and risks inherent to, and the outer limits of, the advisory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals. This contribution takes a look at the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal, having regard to the experiences of other international courts and tribunals.

The present article discusses the historical and theoretical parameters of the right of visit on the high seas. This right is considered the most significant exception to the fundamental principle of the freedom of the high seas, which is conceptualized mainly as of a negative nature, namely as ‘the prohibition of interference in peacetime by ships flying one national flag with ships flying the flag of other nationalities’. This prohibition is arguably challenged by the recent extensive practice of interdiction of vessels on the high seas to counter threats such as international terrorism and transnational organized crime at sea. Accordingly, the historical claims to the freedom of the seas and the celebrated controversy between mare liberum and mare clausum are canvassed. Drawing valuable insights from this historical survey, it is possible to revisit this controversy and ascertain the role of interference on the high seas in the legal order of the oceans of the twenty-first century. It is posited that the rationales behind the contemporary right of visit reflect the old-fashioned mare clausum arguments and that they fall under three general categories, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of the bon usage of the oceans, and the maintenance of welfare and ordre public of the states and of international society.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment on 19 June 2001. These Rules seek to address fundamental lacunae as identified by a panel of environmental law experts and the member states of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article discusses some innovative provisions of the Environmental Rules and concludes that arbitration under the Environmental Rules could have some advantages over adjudication, and that the Environmental Rules can increase access to justice functioning as a tool for interpretation of existing agreements; possibly mending some of the fragmentation of international (environmental) law. The article also offers an examination of present systems and scenarios for how the Environmental Rules may lead to direct environmental improvement.

This article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.

Since the start of its operations 10 years ago, the International Criminal Court has dealt with a number of challenges to the admissibility of cases before it. Some of the challenges were mounted by territorial states that had jurisdiction over the cases. Others were mounted by accused persons. The Court, acting on its own initiative, has, on a number of occasions, also considered issues of the admissibility of cases before it. It has done this, in the main, at the pre-trial stages of proceedings. Some of the cases arose out of state or Security Council referrals. Others arose out of the Prosecutor's initiated investigations. In the course of dealing with these matters the Court has endeavoured to strike a balance between the states’ right to exercise their sovereignty through national proceedings, on the one hand, and the interests of the international community to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’, on the other. In the process of doing so the Court has also developed some practices and generated an impressive body of jurisprudence, the subject of this article. The jurisprudence evinces the Court's readiness to assume jurisdiction over a case in situations where there is clear inaction on the part of the national authorities. The article, which is a critical exposé of that jurisprudence, endorses this stance as a veritable antidote to impunity for atrocity crimes.

Global constitutionalism is becoming increasingly prevalent in international legal discourse. While the various contributions give the impression of a seemingly complex and diverse debate, the contributions in fact all share some significant omissions and biases. It is argued here that the limitations, to be found in the disregard for processes such as fragmentation, and the biases, to be found through such realities as hegemony in international law, give rise to the necessity of a reconceptualization of the global constitutional debate. It is suggested that global constitutionalism should be reconfigured in terms of what is called ‘organic global constitutionalism’. Organic global constitutionalism should be understood as being defined by constitutionalism as process, constitutionalism as political, constitutionalism as a ‘negative universal’, and constitutionalism as a promise for the future. These features would offer an alternative way of framing the debate and a means of redeeming the idea of global constitutionalism.