We discuss the existence of universal spaces (either in the sense of embeddings or continuous images) for some classes of scattered Eberlein compacta. Given a cardinal κ, we consider the class δκof all scattered Eberlein compact spaces K of weight ≤ κ and such that the second Cantor-Bendixson derivative of K is a singleton. We prove that if κ is an uncountable cardinal such that κ = 2≤κ, then there exists a space X in δκ such that every member of δκ is homeomorphic to a retract of X. We show that it is consistent that there does not exist a universal space (either by embeddings or by mappings onto) in . Assuming that = ω1, we prove that there exists a space X ∈ which is universal in the sense of embeddings. We also show that it is consistent that there exists a space X bΕ, universal in the sense of embeddings, but δω1 does not contain an universal element in the sense of mappings onto.

We prove that for every Σ20 enumeration degree b there exists a noncuppable Σ20 degree a > 0e such that and . This allows us to deduce, from results on the high/low jump hierarchy in the local Turing degrees and the jump preserving properties of the standard embedding , that there exist Σ20 noncuppable enumeration degrees at every possible—i.e., above low1—level of the high/low jump hierarchy in the context of .

Let o(k) denote the Mitchell order of k. We show how to reduce long games which run to the first ordinal admissible in the play, to iteration games on models with a cardinal k so that (1) k is a limit of Woodin cardinals: and (2) o(k) = k++. We use the reduction to derive several optimal determinacy results on games which run to the first admissible in the play.

It is shown that for each computably enumerable set of n-element subsets of ω there is an infinite set A ⊆ ω such that either all n-element subsets of A are in or no n-element subsets of A are in . An analogous result is obtained with the requirement that A be replaced by the requirement that the jump of A be computable from 0(n). These results are best possible in various senses.

1.1. In two previous papers a consistent theory of real numbers has been outlined by the author, using a system K′. This latter system is an extension of a system K, which is “basic” in the sense that every finitary (recursively enumerable) subclass of its well-formed expressions is in a certain sense represented in it. The system L described below is a further extension of K. The system K′ lacks two important features possessed by L: a symbol for a special kind of implication (or “conditionality”) and a symbol for the modal concept “necessity.” The presence of the implication symbol, and the additional assumptions that go with it, make available in L various kinds of restricted universal quantification not available in K′, for example, universal quantification restricted to the real numbers of the author's theory of real numbers.

1.2. If ‘~[a & ~a]’ is a theorem of L, then the proposition expressed by ‘a’ may be said to L-satisfy the principle of excluded middle. I t is always the case that ‘a’ L-satisfies the principle of excluded middle (or rather that the proposition expressed by ‘a’ does so) if and only if ‘a’ or ‘~a’ is a theorem of L. An example of a proposition that does not L-satisfy the principle of excluded middle is that expressed by ‘’, namely the proposition that asserts that the class of classes that are not members of themselves is a member of itself.

We suggest the name “approximation theorems” for a new kind of theorems which are strong versions of preservation theorems. A typical preservation theorem has the form:

A sentence φ is preserved by the relation R (i.e. and imply ) iff there exists φ* ϵ Φ such that ⊧φ↔ φ*

where R is a relation between structures and Φ is a class of sentences (depending, of course, on R). Usually, Φ is described in syntactical terms and it is easy to see that every element of it is, indeed, preserved by R. A typical approximation theorem has the form:

For every sentence Φ there is a sentence Φ* ϵ Φ (the “approximation” of Φ) such that, for all sentences δ which are preserved under R,

(a) if ⊧δ → φ then ⊧δ → φ* and

(b) if ⊧φ → δ then ⊧φ* → δ.

An approximation theorem obviously implies the corresponding preservation theorem.

The first approximation theorem was proved by Vaught in [14] (see Corollary 2.3 below). That paper inspired the present one. Vaught's result is stated in topological terms. It says that for each Borel set B there is an invariant Borel set B* explicitly defined by an L ω1ω sentence, such that B − ⊆ B* ⊆ B + where B − (B +) is the largest (smallest) invariant set included in (containing) B.

The well-known incompleteness results of Gödel assert that there is no recursively enumerable set of sentences of formalized first order arithmetic which entails all true statements of that theory. It is equally well known that by introducing sufficiently nonconstructive rules, such as the ω-rule of induction, completeness can be re-established.

Starting from the work of Turing [4] Feferman in [1] developed another method, viz. the study of transfinite recursive progressions of theories, for closing the gap between Gödel (recursively enumerable sets of axioms yield incompleteness) and Tarski (number-theoretic truth is not arithmetically definable).

Using formally intuitionistic logic coupled with infinitary logic and the completeness theorem for coherent logic, we establish the validity, in Grothendieck toposes, of a number of well-known, classically valid theorems about fields and ordered fields. Classically, these theorems have proofs by contradiction and most involve higher order notions. Here, the theorems are each given a first-order formulation, and this form of the theorem is then deduced using coherent or formally intuitionistic logic. This immediately implies their validity in arbitrary Grothendieck toposes. The main idea throughout is to use coherent theories and, whenever possible, find coherent formulations of formulas which then allow us to call upon the completeness theorem of coherent logic. In one place, the positive model-completeness of the relevant theory is used to find the necessary coherent formulas.

The theorems here deal with polynomials or rational functions (in s indeterminates) over fields. A polynomial over a field can, of course, be represented by a finite string of field elements, and a rational function can be represented by a pair of strings of field elements. We chose the approach whereby results on polynomial rings are reduced to results about the base field, because the theory of polynomial rings in s indeterminates over fields, although coherent, is less desirable from a model-theoretic point of view. Ultimately we are interested in the models.

This research was originally motivated by the works of Saracino and Weispfenning [SW], van den Dries [Dr], and Bunge [Bu], each of whom generalized some theorems from algebraic geometry or ordered fields to (commutative, von Neumann) regular rings (with unity).

In the middle of my Mathematical logic I defined a certain class of formulae as “stratified,” and conjectured that exclusion from this class is a feature “shared, presumably, by all the untenable statements (p. 157). This ushered in a set of axioms of class-membership which Rosser has since shown to be inconsistent. Accordingly, in Element and number I dropped the principle *200, in which had been assembled axioms to the effect, roughly, that “stratified functions of elements are elements.” In lieu of *200 I set forth alternatives in which no appeal is made to stratification. The system of Mathematical logic exclusive of *200 carries over as an unchanging framework; and this framework admits, we know, of a simple consistency proof. My concern in the present paper is to draw attention to certain relationships between this framework and earlier theories.

We give a characterisation of forking in the context of simple theories in terms of the fundamental order.