Existing studies of the Thai–Cambodian conflict over the Khmer temple of Preah Vihear tend to focus on the historical and legal dimensions of the contested claims and on Thailand's role. This article examines the conflict from within Cambodia, through the rhetoric of the Cambodian state elites and the views of residents of Preah Vihear province. The state has endeavoured to create and propogate a view that development projects in this province are an expression of Khmer pride as well as important for nation-building and border defence. Residents of the border region, however, view such nationalist discourse through their everyday experiences, giving local meaning to terms such as development, nation and heritage.

The report upon the shortcomings of the Malacca jurisdiction which Extraordinary Councillor Willem de Roo sent to Johan van Hoorn, Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, in November 1705 offered reasons for the initiative which he and his colleagues had taken in relations with the Johor Court: ‘… business in Malacca is wholly fallen into decay, with, it seems to me, little appearance of a big improvement, let alone a full recovery of the formerly flourishing trade, because people have indulgently too long allowed contracts concluded with surrounding rulers and allies to be broken without making much complaint thereupon, or themselves maintaining (the force of the contracts), principally concerning the Johorese …’

During the period between the Great European War (1914–18) and the Pacific War (1941–45) the Japanese expansionist impulse in the South Seas expressed itself through emigration and economic enterprise abroad. There were Japanese settlements in almost every country in the region. The larger ones were in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. On the eve of the Pacific War the estimated number of Japanese residents in the South Seas was 24,000, with investments totalling around ¥250 million. Compared to those of the Western colonial powers and the immigrant Chinese, the size of these investments was insignificant and their numbers meagre. But this only served to spur those interested in Japan's economic expansion in the South Seas to make greater efforts to achieve their aims. External events helped to realize these objectives. For a brief interregnum during the Japanese Occupation (1942–45) the Japanese became the politically dominant community in the region with control over its economic resources.

The shipping conference system in Singapore was under severe and sustained criticism three times in the last 60 odd years. In 1910 the colonial Straits Settlements legislative council in Singapore passed the Freight and Steamship Bill whose lengthy preamble contained the indictment that the conference system was ‘injurious to the trade of the colony and inconsistent with the public welfare’. In 1930, during the annual general meeting of the Singapore Branch of the Straits Settlements Association, a leading lawyer, Roland Braddell, launched a bitter attack on the conference. Subsequently a public meeting was held which called on the colonial government to see ‘if we cannot rid ourselves of this octopus which is strangling this Colony’.

The military side of British-Dutch diplomatic relations in the Far East at the end of the 1930s has received little attention. The issue is examined here on the basis of original source materials, with particular attention to the way the Netherlands abandoned its policy of diplomatic “aloofness”.

The war between Bangkok and the Lao in the years 1827–29 constitutes a watershed in the relations between the Thai and the Lao. Up to now, this conflict has been accounted for largely by only one source: The Royal Chronicles of the Third Reign of the Bangkok Dynasty by Chao Phraya Thiphakarawong. It is time to go beyond this, and to explore the available Lao annals, Vietnamese primary documents, the archives of the Thai National Library and the accounts of western travellers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This paper also introduces Lao historiography and historians who have written about the war.

Western accounts from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries abound with descriptions which portray the king of Siam and the Siamese nobility as the foremost merchants in their land. According to these accounts, rulers monopolized the foreign trade to and from their kingdom, much to the detriment of Western mèrchants attempting to gain an economic foothold. Captain Henry Burney, while negotiating a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Siam in the 1820s, noted that “the Siamese Government have no idea of what is called ‘a free and unrestricted trade’….” British commercial interests sought, moreover, the removal of all these restrictions, but found “the jealousy and mistrust which the Siamese entertain towards Europeans” a major stumbling block.

This paper attempts to analyse Sino-Indonesian relations and the problems as perceived by Indonesian ruling and counter-elites, as well as the place of the Chinese minority in the issue of such a normalization. Pro- and anti-normalization groups are identified and two Presidential Decrees — one granting citizenship certificates and the other granting “mass naturalization” to ethnic Chinese — are analysed in the context of normalization. Possible outcomes will also be discussed.

I recently discussed the response of Pham Su Mạnh and other fourteenth century Vietnamese officials to signs of peasant unrest when the Trṇn dynasty (1226–1400) weakened. I suggested that the officials were witnessing social and political conditions that compelled them to abandon their habitual sense of being the emperors' obedient subordinates and, instead, reluctantly to assume the responsibility of defining norms of good government. Their unwonted behaviour led me to believe that important changes were under way in fourteenth century Vietnam. Educated men, under pressure of events, were beginning to become monitors of government even though they served and wanted to protect the Tân autocracy.

Southeast Asia's coinage during the first millenium AD is remarkably conservative and uniform. A single prototype, a silver conch and śrīvatsa coin, is the model for each mainland coinage issued over a period of more than five hundred years, from about AD 450 to 1000. (Plate 1, coin 1) Silver is by far the preferred metal for minting. Gold and copper are rarely used, and then only in late or debased issues. Most of the cointypes are limited in circulation to their place of issue, providing insight into the geographical extent of effective political control in the early states of Candra Arakan, Pyu Śrīkṣetra and Mon Dvāravatī. Weight standards are extremely variable indicating that each state had a localized currency and not one immediately acceptable on an international basis. The main exception is the Rising Sun/Śrīvatsa coinage found in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and southern Viet Nam. Unfortunately this Rising Sun coinage cannot be attributed to any mainland state with certainty.

“A national front without the active participation of the peasants is like a bale of jute without contents, empty and light, and hence easily blown away toy the wind”. These words of Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Central Committee Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI), on the occasion of the party's “National Peasants' Conference” in April, 1959, may serve as an index to the theoretical and tactical importance assigned to the Indonesian peasant's role by the Indonesian Communist movement. Increasingly in the past few years the peasant and the “agrarian question”, i.e. “feudalism”, “landlordism”, debtor bondage and the problem of increasing agricultural productivity, have begun to figure prominently in the PKI program and the “essence of the Indonesian Revolution” is now described by the party as the “agrarian revolution”.

The downfall of the Burmese Kingdom of Ava, late in 1885 (seen in the dramatic deportation of the last Konbaung monarch King Thebaw and the later dissolution of the Hluttaw by the British), was historically significant in several respects. First of all, the end of the Konbaung Dynasty and Burmese independence, which were heralded on 1 January 1886 in a British proclamation incorporating Upper Burma in Queen Victoria's dominions, signalled the start of a period of internal disorder and indigenous resistance to colonial rule. The deposition of the King meant the dissolution of traditional institutions and sanctions, including the demoralization of the Buddhist sangha of which the King had been patron. Thus was begun the Burmese struggle for independence and search for national identity — a struggle which culminated in Burma's attainment of independence outside the British Commonwealth on 4 January 1948, and a search which continued beyond that date.

The Anglo-Burmese administrator, ostensibly another Anglo-Indian administrator and traditionally perceived as such, must be viewed as a special case. He served Company and Crown in a milieu and under circumstances that differed sharply from those known to his counterparts in the subcontinent. Burma was in a unique position in that it was a part of both the Indian and British Empires. The administrator in Burma found himself at the end of a chain of command that extended from London via Calcutta to Rangoon. London tended to view the remote province with an eye to diplomatic and mercantile considerations. Calcutta concentrated on local priorities and imposed a rigid economy that accorded with Indian priorities. Little attempt was made to understand the alien culture with its differing needs. To the Anglo-Burmese administrator fell the difficult task of governing the ancient land under the aegis of Calcutta and the eyes of London.

This paper analyses the textual-mythographical transformation of Viet origin myths from their transcription in the distant past through their exploitation for political purposes in the 1950s by scholarly elites. It attempts to demonstrate that, as early as the fifteenth century, stories about the Hùng Kings were deliberately collected and codified by members of the Việt elite, who sought to exploit their potential as catalysts of identify-formation and unification under the leadership of the imperial state. However, as a result of the confluence of two currents, that of the monarchical state's mythographical construction and that of popular, village-based, animistic worship, the Hùng Kings came to be venerated as ancestral founders of the Việt quốc in temples throughout the Red River Delta and beyond. During the French colonial and early national periods, the codified myths were the object of severe criticism and strident defence by both French and Viet scholars.

This article explores English–Thai translations of ‘political ideology’. It traces the evolution of the Thai term udomkān and discusses how the complexity of the foreign discourse was reflected in its Thai counterpart. There was a conflation of ‘idea’ and ‘ideal’. Udomkān is a uniquely Thai word, translations of which have never been stable. The contemporary political conflict is analysed through an attempt to catalogue the points on which opposing sides pivot. While this tangled ‘pre–post–ideological’ predicament is not unique to Thailand, it exemplifies the ways in which cross-country comparisons might be wary of coding political factions along universal standards of coherence, contrast or temporal stability.

Between 1945 and 1965, what may be broadly defined as the politics of sugar in Indonesia passed through several critical stages. The industrial manufacture of sugar had begun in the Netherlands Indies in the mid-nineteenth century, but after a slump during the 1930s Depression, the industry virtually went into abeyance during the Japanese Occupation (1942–45). After the war, the years of struggle for Merdeka! (freedom) also saw a partial revival of the industry, which continued through national revolution and independence (1949) through to an incremental nationalisation in the late 1950s. Developments in the sugar industry culminated in massacre, rather than merdeka, however. The campaign against the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) which began in 1965 resulted in the murder of labour unionists and peasant activists associated with the sugar industry. This paper traces the course of events from Merdeka to massacre, focusing on the sugar industry of East Java's Brantas valley. Its themes, however, relate to the industry in Java as a whole, and the question of why the commodity production of sugar came to be so deeply embroiled in the politics of the new republic.

The article deals with the question of whether during the Pacific War there was a community of interest between the Japanese military and Indonesian nationalists. This point is mainly denied. Nationalists did want to use the Japanese to oust Dutch rule, but as soon as this was effected relations soured. The Japanese military wanted to use Indonesia as a source of the raw materials essential for war, and as a reservoir of labour. The Indonesians wished to settle their own affairs without any outside interference. These objectives were incompatible.

World War II may have ended fifty years ago, yet it is clear that numerous evaluations, interpretations, and assessments made by historians and scholars on this period in Southeast Asian history have not sufficiently reflected the intrinsic values of the wartime events, personalities, and developments involved. This is particularly true in the case of two wartime leaders in Thailand — Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and Pridi Phanomyong. The article attempts to re-assess and update both their place in Thai history and their contributions to the socio-political development of the country.

This article looks at two contemporary films by Vietnamese women. In Việt Linh's Travelling Circus (1988) and Phạm Nhuệ Giang's The Deserted Valley (2002), a female gaze is sutured to that of an ethnic minority character's, a form of looking that stresses a shared oppression between women and the ethnic Other. While clearing a space for a desiring female gaze in Vietnamese film, they nonetheless extend an Orientalist view of racialised difference. A feminist film optic, one that does not consider industry history and constructions of race, fails to mark out the layered relations of looking underlying Vietnamese filmmaking. This study attends to the ways women filmmakers investigate gendered forms of looking, sexual desire and otherness within the constraints of a highly male-dominated film industry.

This study will focus its attention on the entrepreneurial role of the overseas Chinese in Thailand and their changing status within the context of the Thai political dynamics. The 1960 census of Thailand reports a population of 26,257,860, of which 409,508 are Chinese citizens either because of birth in China or registration with Chinese diplomatic officials at the age of sixteen. However, observers generally place the number of persons who habitually speak a Chinese dialect and conform to Chinese behaviour patterns in most social situations at about three million to three and a half million. This would make the Chinese community in Thailand, after that in Malaysia, the largest single group of the fifteen odd million Chinese resident abroad.