The dividend decision is a residual corporate decision and yet it is not a residual corporate decision. This theme runs through Professor Higgins' paper. It is based on the one hand on Higgins' belief that other decisions are more important and should take precedence over the dividend decision, and on the other, that the dividend decision is a function of these more important decisions. If dividends were truly residual, they would be explained by the corporate budget identity. In the empirical analysis, however, dividends are a function of other balance sheet decisions. In this sense the decision is neither active nor residual but passive. The reader wonders why the author insists on this role for dividends when interdependency in decision making is the more appealing (and inevitable) framework.

This paper shows how to decompose the dollar profit earned from an option into two basic components: i) mispricing of the option relative to the asset at the time of purchase; and ii) profit from subsequent fortuitous changes or mispricing of the underlying asset. This separation hinges on measuring the “true relative value” of the option from its realized payoff. The payoff from any one option has a huge standard error about this value that can be reduced by averaging the payoff from several independent option positions. Simulations indicate that 95% reductions in standard errors can be further achieved by using the payoff of a dynamic replicating porfolio as a Monte Carlo control variate. In addition, the paper shows that these low standard errors are robust to discrete rather than continuous dynamic replication and to the likely degree of misspecification of the benchmark formula used to implement the replication.

Option mispricing profit can be futher decomposed into profit due to superior estimation of the volatility (volatility profit) and profit from using a superior option valuation formula (formula profit). To make this decomposition reiably, the benchmark formula used for the attribution needs to be similar to the formula implicitly used by the market to price options. If so, then simulation indicates that this further decomposition can be achieved with low standard errors. Basic component ii) can be further decomposed into profit from a forward contract of the underlying asset (asset profit) and what I term pure option profit. The asset profit indicates whether the investor was skillful by buying or selling options on mispriced underlying assets. However, asset profit could also simply be just compensation for bearing risk—a distinction beyond the scope of this paper. Although simulation indicates that the attrivution procedure gives an unbiased allocation of the option profit to this source, its standard error is large—a feature common with others' attempts to measure performance of asssets.

In the June 1978 issue of this Journal, Herbst [2, p. 363] cautioned the reader to beware of a unique, real internal rate of return (IRR) because such a return is “an incorrect measure of the return on investment” for a mixed project. While it is true, as discussed by Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano (TRM) [4], and now by Herbst, that a mixed project may have a unique IRR, several additional observations developed by TRM should be added to Herbst's discussion. These comments will clarify the implications of Herbst's paper for a decision maker who has a mixed project with a unique real IRR.

There appears to be growing interest in the development and estimation of simultaneous equation models for finance. Simkowitz and Jones [11] stimulated much of this concern in their observations on the need for these structures. Moreover, Simkowitz's application to the modeling of security returns with Logue [12] provides some support for these suggestions. Recently Lloyd [6] has argued that there may be significant problems in using two-stage least squares (hereafter 2SLS) with such models as a result of the potential for contemporaneous correlation in the structural errors across equations. The purpose of this note is to question several of Lloyd's conclusions and to provide some evidence that his findings may not be representative for the broad array of simultaneous models applicable to financial problems.

In this paper the results of some new structural estimates of liquidity preference may be found. The justification for presenting them is that they differ from earlier estimates in certain ways. In some cases, the implications of these estimates differ sharply from the implications drawn by other observers on the basis of their estimates.

This paper investigates the relationship between interest-rate risk and liquidity premiums on U.S. Treasury bills. Interest-rate risk stems from uncertainty about the future general level of market interest rates.

This paper generalizes the past signaling literature from one variable to many. Multivariate models have been studied in the general rational expectations literature (e.g., Allen [1], Kraus and Sick [3]), but this appears to be the first multivariate signaling application. (Here, I distinguish signaling from rational expectations literature by the fact that agents may attempt to promulgate, suppress, or add noise to signals.) Talmor studies signaling models which are fully revealing (i.e., for which, in equilibrium, the values of the signaled parameters are correct).

Using U.S. census survey data on CEOs’ residence in their formative years, I document a negative relation between CEOs’ endowed family wealth and managerial performance. Consistent with the view that CEOs born into low-income families face higher entry barriers but may possess greater levels of ability that enable them to become CEOs, I find that CEOs born into less privileged families outperform those from higher-wealth families. The outperformance of CEOs from less wealthy families is not driven by risk taking or omitted variables. Overall, my results suggest that CEOs’ social endowment provides a useful signal for their managerial ability.

This paper demonstrates that refunding discounted debt represents a form of tax arbitrage that is profitable to taxpaying corporations when the present value of the additional tax shields, created through the refunding, exceeds the sum of the present value of the overall increase in pre-tax debt service requirements, after-tax transaction costs, and any tax incurred on the gain. The paper contrasts the factors that give rise to profitable opportunities to refund high-coupon debt and discounted debt. It also shows that, of the analytical approaches previously suggested for calculating the net advantage of refunding discounted debt, discounting the change in after-tax debt service payments at the after-tax cost of money for the refunding issue is the only one consistent with preserving debt service parity.

Recent research on blockholders focuses on activist hedge funds and documents positive stock but negative bond returns. This study investigates the role of blockholder heterogeneity on security market effects and target firm follow-on activities across three important dimensions: identity, motive, and purchasing method. We show that target firms’ security returns and post-acquisition activities strongly correlate with blockholder heterogeneity. Further, bond returns are significantly positive for firms with blockholders’ debt-assistance motive while both stock and bond returns are significantly negative in private placements. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of blockholder heterogeneity on the valuation and performance consequences in block acquisitions.

Consistent with the empirical properties of the consumption data, I develop a model in which consumption and dividend growth follow regime-switching dynamics. I show that regime-shift risk is priced in the model. Regime-shift risk exhibits dominant influence on asset prices: It generates a high equity premium and also induces time-varying risk premiums. The model explains major business cycle-dependent asset market phenomena and, in particular, the stronger predictability of stock returns during recessions.

Numerous papers have shown that developing economies are more volatile. We show that, despite greater aggregate and industry stability, performance and size of individual firms in developed countries are more volatile. In developing countries, market imperfections insulate incumbent firms from competition. Consistent with this, firms in developing countries have higher profit, higher market concentration, and less capital raising. Cross-country differences in operating risk and competition intensity are greater in industries that are dependent on external finance, where we expect higher impacts of capital-market imperfections. We show the inverse relation between aggregate and firm-level volatilities has important implications for international studies of cash holding.

We derive the optimal underwriting method and the quantitative initial public offering (IPO) pricing rule that this method implies in a market with informational frictions consisting of fully rational banks, issuers, and investors. In an efficient IPO market, an issuer’s expected initial return will be determined entirely by the combination of this pricing rule and issuer fundamentals. Applying this rule, we find that we can explain the quantitative magnitude of the principal aspects of the time-series and cross-sectional variation in IPO average initial returns. We conclude that the IPO market is efficient.

Ever since Markowitz introduced the concept of portfolio theory in 1952, one of the questions predominant in the minds of financial theorists has been the constituency of the investor's optimal asset portfolio. Research into this area, which became known as capital market theory, attempted to analyze the equilibrium relationships between assets. One of the products of this research was the widely accepted Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe and Lintner.

The federal deposit insurance system of the United States was instituted as a result of severe financial crises in the United States and was intended to prevent the recurrence of some of the evils of such crises, specifically those resulting from bank deposit losses. Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 1934, the United States has not experienced banking panics or harmful effects on the economy due to widespread destruction of bank deposits. As a result, there is a fairly widespread feeling that the present deposit insurance system has been a success. If prevention of panics and large-scale deposit destruction are the only criteria for success, this judgment may be justified, although, if the insurance system uses resources, it must be proved that panics and deposit losses would be unacceptably frequent or large in its absence.

The theory of efficient capital markets indicates that the prices in an efficient market fully reflect all available information. In much of the literature on efficient markets the term fully reflect is made operational with the assumption that the conditions for market equilibrium can be expressed as expected returns. Fama suggests that most expected return theories can be expressed in the following manner:

(1)

where — adopting Fama's notation — E is the expected value operator; Pjt is the price of security j at time t; Pj,t+1 is its price at t+1; is the one-period percentage return (Pj,t+1|Pjt); φt is a general symbol to represent whatever set of information is assumed to be fully reflected in the price at time t; and the tildes indicate that Pj,t+1 and rj,t+1 are random variables at t.

One of the most significant developments in macroeconomic analysis in the post-World War II era has been the dramatic resurgence of interest in the role of monetary factors in economic activity. The demand for money has been a focal point of this monetary renaissance, and in recent years a proliferation of studies has focused on questions such as the motives for holding money balances, the effects of changes in the rate of interest, and the existence of economies of scale for cash balances. The trend toward disaggregation of macro functions has been reflected in demand for money studies of the corporate sector as well as the household sector.

One of the major problems in finance is that of combining the separate costs of debt and equity into an appropriate cutoff rate for new investment; this problem is particularly acute when the firm is changing its capital structure. Solutions to this problem which have been proposed include various types of both marginal costing and average costing.

Traditional planning for working capital needs is typically conducted with a relatively short time horizon. In this process, management attempts to optimize the return on existing fixed assets. The period for capital investment planning is much longer, reflecting the irreversibility of these decisions. Current research in the two areas tends to dichotomize these decision processes. The implications seem to be that working capital policies only have impact in the short run. However, it is clear that cash flows for potential capital expenditures are based on assumptions relative to expected future demand and production to meet this demand—assumptions that are necessarily tied to working capital commitments in the long run. The overall planning for credit, inventory, and liquidity should, therefore, be carried out before, or simultaneously with, the capital investment decision. It is a planning requirement that becomes an integral part of the total asset planning system. The vast majority of existing working capital models or long-term capital planning models do not allow for the explicit existence of and the simultaneous interrelationships between these two important subsystems.

In this issue of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Beranek [2] has presented a clever but cumbersome analysis showing that, for a simple multiperiod situation, computing a project's net present worth by discounting its cash flows at particular “costs of capital” and accepting the project if that net present worth is positive is completely consistent with raising the net present wealth of stockholders, initial investment from whom provides partial funding for the project.