In its updated Commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) embraces the ‘external’ interpretation of Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions, according to which States have certain negative (complicity-type) and positive (prevention/response) obligations to ‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions by other actors. This interpretation has been gaining support since the 1960s, though the ICRC's new Commentaries have served as a catalyst for some States recently to express contrary views. This article focuses on two major methodological shortcomings in the existing literature, offering a much firmer foundation for the external obligation under common Article 1. First, it demonstrates the overwhelming support in subsequent practice for external obligations. Previous studies have failed to explain the method by which this practice is taken into account, given the existence of some inconsistent practice. This article addresses this general question of treaty interpretation, critiquing the approach of the International Law Commission that relegates majority practice to supplementary means of interpretation and proposing instead a principled approach that better fits and justifies the judicial practice here. Secondly, the article challenges two common assumptions about the travaux: first, that an original, restrictive meaning was intended, and secondly that the travaux of Additional Protocol I offer no support for external obligations. Given the ubiquity of military assistance and partnering, these findings have far-reaching consequences for the liability of States.

The existing international scope of English freezing injunctions in support of foreign proceedings is excessively claimant-friendly and inconsistent with the need for a level playing field in litigation. The English courts must reconsider the current boundaries of relief by taking into account an international systemic perspective of the purpose of private international law rules. This requires a multilateral and horizontal approach to the existence of jurisdiction rather than the unilateral and vertical approach that exists under the rules of jurisdiction of English national law. The traditional justifications for the availability of collateral freezing injunctions with respect to assets located abroad rest on a series of fundamental theoretical flaws. This article proposes a range of reforms with the aim of strengthening the equality of the parties and eliminating encroachment on the sovereignty of foreign States.

Alfred Drucker,“The Protection of Foreign Investment”, (1967) 16 I.C.L.Q. 217; at page 223, line 3 should read “rather on compensation for the “capitalist at home”.” The full quotation from the book by Professor Joan Robinson is as follows: “If the wealthy countries were genuinely anxious to put the new nations on their feet they would use their funds to compensate the capitalists at home, and present the developing countries with the equity in their own resources”.

Consideration of the Conseil d'Etat and its role in the preparation of legislation helps us in Britain to appreciate how our own legislative process might be improved. The Hansard Society Report1 suggested in 1992 that Britain needed to look beyond just improving the drafting of legislation and needed to reform the legislative process, both before a bill is presented to Parliament and in its passage through Parliament. My reflection on the French process is to suggest that this offers us a further focus of attention—the questions which should be asked during the scrutiny process. There are two areas where we need to ask questions—on fundamental rights and practical effectiveness. I think that the British trust too much to the political process to ensure that questions concerning respect for fundamental values and also administrative workability are addressed before a bill is passed by Parliament. This paper is influenced by observations made in 1986 of the Interior Section of the Conseil d'Etat in its scrutiny of a number of government bills at the beginning of the Chirac premiership.