The period under review (Spring 1998—Autumn 1999) is one in which the prohibition of cartels under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty figured prominently, the Court of Justice clearing up a backlog of unfinished business relating back, in some cases, over a decade. The 1986 Polypropylene cartel decision was finally put to bed with the Court of Justice dismissing a number of appeals raised on the sole ground of the non-existence of the decision. It also dismissed an appeal involving the 1989 Welded Steel Mesh cartel decision except that, in an important development, for the first time the Court expressly applied Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides a right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time before an impartial tribunal, and reduced a Commission fine (marginally, knocking 50,000 ECUs off a 3 million ECU fine) as “reasonable satisfaction” for the excessive duration of proceedings (five-and-a-half years) before the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance itself upheld on review the 1994 Commission decision in the Cartonboard cartel, leaving of major cartel cases only review of the Cement decision still outstanding.

Torture of persons living in poverty has traditionally been at the margins of human rights interventions that have primarily focused on political and conflict related torture. This article examines the extent to which the evolving practice of human rights bodies and organisations evidences an emerging paradigm shift. It finds that a combination of a growing body of empirical research, novel approaches by human rights organisations and the work of bodies such as the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture has increasingly brought into focus the heightened vulnerability to torture resulting from economic marginalisation and discrimination. Drawing on evidence of innovative practices, the article develops the framework for a contextual approach to the interpretation and implementation of States’ obligations under the prohibition of torture that is alive to the realities of systemic violence and the nexus between poverty and torture.

In 2021, unconstitutional transfers of power in Myanmar and Afghanistan highlighted that while States may desire a coherent response to questions about the status of governments, and may look for international guidance in such regard, there is no established process for providing such guidance. Thus, attention focuses on the General Assembly's credentials process, designed to assess the eligibility of delegates to represent their States at the UN. This article proposes that rather than the credentials process being stretched in this way, greater use should be made of the Assembly's competence to pass determinative resolutions on government legitimacy.

Unfortunately an error crept in to our book review of the title Oil Pollution at Sea in the October 1998 issue. The author's name should read Gotthard Gauci. We apologise for the inconvenience to both the author and potential readers.

This article examines the rejection of the International Investor–State dispute (ISDS) system across the African continent and its replacement with a range of domestic and regional alternatives. It assesses the advantages of the two principal options for African countries: retaining the current ISDS system, or using local courts and regional tribunals. To this end, the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed in the Pan-African Investment Code, the 2016 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol, the SADC model BIT, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African States and East African Community investment agreements and domestic approaches are critically examined. The argument is then advanced that African countries should not abandon ISDS because replacing it with isolated domestic or regional mechanisms does not reduce any of the risks. In particular, for foreign investors, the risk associated with the adjudication of investment disputes in potentially biased, politically influenced domestic courts may prove too high. African host nations, in turn, risk sending out the wrong message concerning their commitment to the protection of foreign investments. Instead of veering off course, perhaps the time has come for African States to display the political will to remain within the ISDS system and contribute to its reform from within.

The genius of the century is also changing the conditions of our action overseas, leading us to bring an end to colonization. It is entirely natural that one should feel nostalgia for what was the Empire, just as one may regret the gentle light of oil lamps, the splendour of the navy under sail. But there is no valid politics outside realities.

General Comment 36 of the Human Rights Committee, adopted in 2018, asserts that ‘States parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the Covenant.’ One question about this claim is whether it reduces incentives for compliance with international humanitarian law for States and their agents—incentives provided through the principles of belligerent equality and combatant immunity. It is argued that it does not do so—such a worry about incentives is not a reason to reject the claim in General Comment 36. In the process, it can also be shown that, if accepted, this claim is interesting in another way: it entails, in effect, a duty on States to prosecute acts of aggression insofar as they entail killing, as they often will. This itself is doctrinally innovative. As to who is to be prosecuted, it is the political and military leadership of the State. It is their decision to wage war unlawfully that renders the killings arbitrary.

A key element of the right to self-determination is territorial integrity. This has usually been considered solely in relation to the territorial integrity of an existing State seeking to resist claims by peoples for the right to self-determination. Yet the Chagos Opinion by the International Court of Justice examines a different type of territorial integrity—that of the colonial territory itself. This article explores the consequence of the Court's view that the territorial integrity of the colonial territory is a matter of customary international law, and that any division, integration or other disruption of that colonial territory after December 1960 is unlawful, without the free and genuine consent of the people of the colonial territory. In particular this article seeks to explore what the Chagos Opinion means in terms of the territorial integrity of a colonial territory. It also examines the required conditions for ascertaining a free and genuine consent of the people of that territory, and the legal effects of not complying with them. There is also consideration of the implications for other situations from the clarification of customary international law in the Chagos Opinion, with a special focus on West Papua.

Since the expiry of the deadline for the completion of the internal market at the end of 1992, the Commission has shifted its focus away from piloting an intense rule-making burst through the Community legislative system. As part of its quest to establish reliable methods for managing the internal market, the Commission is now overtly concerned to improve the quality of those adopted laws, for example by securing simplification and consolidation, and it is intent on investigating more rigorously how a closer match may be made between the relevant laws on paper and their practical application on the ground.1 In short, the Commission is focusing its energies on ensuring that the legal framework which has been adopted is treated by commercial operators and consumers in the market as a viable and trustworthy basis for an integrated market. Accordingly much of the Commission's work since the last survey of the law relating to the free movement of goods has been at first sight relatively unglamorous. It largely concerns soft law initiatives and attempts to improve administrative co-ordination designed to underpin the practice of market management, both vertically (Commission/Member State) and horizontally (Member State/Member State). This forms the core of the strategy for the internal market covering the next five years, published on 24 November 1999.2 Nonetheless, even though these initiatives might not immediately strike the lawyer accustomed to a fountain of legislative activity as worthy of close inspection, it is clearly the case that the Commission regards its medium-term mission to stabilise the management of the internal market as best pursued by a gradual approach designed to improve practical compliance.

In the conjoined cases C-509/09 e-Date Advertising GmbH v X and C-161/10 Olivier Martinez and others v MGN Ltd,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was required to determine the scope of applicability of both Article 5(3) of Regulation EC 44/2001 (the Brussels I Regulation)2 and Article 3 of Directive EC 2000/31 (the Electronic Commerce Directive). Both cases were concerned with defamation and breach of personality and image rights as a result of the publication of two newspaper articles which were accessible online via each of the defendants' websites. As readers will be fully aware, Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation enables claimants to establish special jurisdiction in the case of a tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts of the Member State where a harmful event has occurred or may occur. The effectiveness of Article 5(3) as a ground of jurisdiction focuses on the locality of the event. The question that arose in both cases was, essentially, where could the claimants bring proceedings for breach of personality and defamation as a result of newspaper articles published online via websites,3 when those websites were accessible in multiple jurisdictions? According to an experienced legal practitioner in the United Kingdom, ‘more than 25 billion individual items of content are shared each month on Facebook alone.’4 There are increasing concerns regarding the dissemination of comments through the medium of ‘ubiquit(ous), converged and displace(d)’5 Web 2.0 communications technologies. Such communications increase the potential for criminal and civil consequences in numerous jurisdictions. The ability of injured parties (famous or not) to seek redress in the most appropriate forum for the purposes of protecting their private lives and reputations is acutely significant.6

In the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Quebec unilateral secession, 1 the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, proposed that the legality of a province's attempting to secede unilaterally be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a judicial opinion, pursuant to that Court's special advisory jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, on 30 September 1996, the Governor General in Council submitted three questions of law, discussed in detail below, concerning the legal authority of Quebec, under both Canadian and international law, to secede from the Canadian federation. In addition to the government of Canada, two provinces, the two territories, and a number of special interest groups and individuals (all given leave to intervene) submitted written arguments and rejoinders over the course of 1997.3 The government of Quebec did not participate in the hearing and submitted no argument. Accordingly, the Court appointed an (from Quebec) to represent the secessionist interest. The Court heard argument from 16 to 19 February 1998. On 20 August 1998 the Court released its unanimous opinion, rather earlier than expected.4 The Court rejected the legal right of Quebec to separate unilaterally under Canadian constitutional law, and the right to do so under international law as recognised in Canada. Given the latter holding, the Court did not consider further the third question relating to reconciling a possible conflict between the two legal orders. The following extended case comment proposes to outline and discuss briefly the reasoning of the Court, in what is a significant exercise of judicial power in the service of constitutional affairs. The structure of this comment will follow that of the Court's resaoning, dealing first with a preliminary objection, then turninh to question 1(introduction and discussion) and then to Question 2 and 3.5

Relying on examples from international, EU and comparative law and drawing on insights from the class action literature, this article argues that important advances in minority rights protection can be achieved without the revision of substantive legal provisions and the full-scale embracing of collective rights. Allowing minority members to present their claims on behalf of a larger group (collective procedure), even when such claims ultimately rest on the rights of individuals as opposed to those of the group, strengthens minority rights and can transform our vision of them. An overview of eight interrelated benefits shows not only how these advantages occur, but also why the procedural approach avoids the issues that motivate negative critiques of group rights.