The distinction between substance1 and procedure2 is central to conflict of laws methodology. It cannot be determined what law governs a particular issue until, crucially, that issue has been characterized as substantive, on the one hand, or procedural,3 on the other. The distinction is the fulcrum, or axis, of the choice of law process.

This article compares the approach of the Court of Justice in the area of taxation with its general case law on restrictions on free movement. It is argued that the Court, while sometimes referring to the same concepts as in the field of regulatory barriers, is in practice employing a narrower test. The possible reasons for the comparatively cautious approach are analysed and the issue of double taxation is examined, with reference also to the US case law. Finally, the connections to larger questions concerning the nature of the single market and the roles of the Community institutions are noted.

It is rather distressing, if not tragic, that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, with a relatively large legal population and a somewhat litigious reputation, has earned itself the dubious distinction of having the most archaic, if not the most inequitable, succession laws in the English-speaking Caribbean, second only to the Bahamas.

The process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom instituted by the present Labour government has been considerable but it has proceeded on a piecemeal basis. Its aim is to reinforce accountability for the exercise of public power but, in the absence of a comprehensive scheme of reform, the achievement of this ambition has the same lack of coherence as the reform programme itself. Some matters remain untouched by the process, centrally and crucially the domination of the House of Commons and therefore effectively the legislature, by the Executive, a condition exaggerated by the massive majority enjoyed by the government.1 The justification for this arrangement, which so infringes the separation of powers, lies in the claim that it produces effective, stable and accountable government. This is not the place to assess the accuracy of these claims but to note the importance of recognising the particular relationship between executive and legislature which characterises the British Constitution when considering the likely impact of proposals for its reform.

In the wake of recent catastrophic natural disasters, the United Nations (UN) has developed an increasingly sophisticated network of collaborative partnerships to assist with humanitarian relief operations. The growing use of open-source technology such as crowd mapping and resource tracking—being universally accessible, collaboratively designed, subject to ongoing improvement, and responsive to on-the-ground needs—reflects in many respects the emerging UN governance mechanisms developed to support the creation of such technology. The 2008 meeting of the World Economic Forum called for increased documentation and ‘dissemination of the work of humanitarian relief’ and ‘mapping of assets, non-food items’ and resources to prevent duplication.1 However, as yet, little attention has been given to the role of open-source governance mechanisms in the context of disaster response. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the emerging mechanisms by which private sector collaboration is coordinated by international institutions such as the UN. It finds that the emergence of post-disaster open-source humanitarian relief reflects the observations of new governance legal scholars that coordination is increasingly the result of expanded participation and partnership on the part of governments and non-State actors, a learning-focused orientation, with the State increasingly acting as a convener, catalyst and coordinator.

Following extensive debate by the great theoreticians of public international law earlier in this century,1 it might seem that the completeness of the international legal order is now a banal issue, which should be remembered only as an academic dispute.2

It might have been so had the International Court of Justice not intervened, perhaps unintentionally, in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons3 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins argues that “the Court effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of law, and of facts”.4 In her view, the Court thus interrupted a line of case law which, in theory, had endorsed the idea of the completeness of international law and which, in practice, made it unthinkable that an international judge or arbitrator should actually pronounce a non liquet.5

History suggests that a military alliance will rarely survive major political change that results in the disappearance of the original danger that the alliance was first set up to combat. Since 1989 the reshaping of the political and strategic map of Europe has proceeded on a scale and at a pace such as to give rise to an expectation that the North Atlantic Alliance would become a victim of historical inevitability and thus be either formally dissolved or left to atrophy. Instead, the North Atlantic Alliance has embarked on a root and branch transformation of its structures, procedures and strategies for the twenty-first century. What is equally remarkable is that these changes have been accommodated within the framework of the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty drawn up in 1949,1 thus obviating the need for large-scale formal amendment.

In its work to maintain and develop the free mobility of judgments within the European Union, the EU approved on 22 December 2000 a new regulation1 (hereafter the Jurisdiction Regulation) that replaced the Brussels Convention with effect from 1 March 2002.2 Possibly the most discussed and disputed new development in the Jurisdiction Regulation is Section 4, which concerns jurisdiction over consumer contracts. Before the approval of the Regulation, the provisions of Section 4 were heavily debated. The unreserved right of the consumer, under certain circumstances, to sue the other party in the courts of the State where the consumer is domiciled met strong resistance. This was particularly the case in relation to e-commerce, where there was an expressed fear that the provisions would lead to a scenario where anyone doing business through the Internet or by other electronic means could face the risk of being hauled into court in every state in Europe. It was asserted that this would significantly increase the costs of establishing new businesses online, and that, as a result, small and medium size enterprises would be deterred from offering their products online throughout the EU, and restrain the development of e-commerce in Europe.

International sanctions, understood as coercive means imposed by the United Nations, or by States, individually or collectively, against a country responsible for violating fundamental rules of international law, have been extensively analysed in the legal literature.1 A survey of such literature shows that particular emphasis has been put on the nature of sanctions, their status in international law and the very controversial issue of the legality of their adoption either by regional organisations, or by a State motu proprio, unilaterally.

The EC maritime transport policy was slow to develop. Although the EC Treaty requires the Member States to create a Common Transport Policy,1 the focus of the Treaty transport provisions2 is on inland modes of transport (road, rail and inland waterways).3 However, the EU Council is expressly given competence to decide what ‘appropriate provisions’ may be adopted for maritime and air transport.4

Maritime transport is by its very nature an international mode of transport regulated by a large number of international treaties and conventions, most of them negotiated and concluded within the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Members of the international community, including some EU Member States themselves, were initially reluctant to transfer their sovereignty in this field of transport to the Community. However, two main events gradually changed the attitude of the Member States to the Community's competence to regulate this mode of transport. First, the mid-1980s impetus to establish an internal market by 1992 placed all modes of transport at the centre of the project. It was not feasible to establish a geographical market, stretching from the Atlantic to the Eastern European countries and from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, where goods, people, services and capital would be able to circulate freely,5 and in a competitive manner, without the Community seriously addressing transport issues. Thus, unsurprisingly, a number of important legislative proposals affecting the provisions of maritime transport services were adopted and implemented during that period.6 The second significant factor in the development of a maritime transport policy was the number of serious marine accidents which took place in the Community's coastal waters during the last 20 years.7