Policy-making in the European Community in the area of education for migrants is driven by two conflicting pressures. On one side, the principle of effectiveness requires that the rights of free movement within the Community be supported by the best possible education for the children of migrants. However, on the other side is the importance of primary education to the member States as a political and cultural matter. This pressure is reinforced by the principle of subsidiarity. Member States have been relatively willing to support co-operative action by the Community in the area of higher education, such as in the ERASMUS exchange programmes. However, member States have been active in protecting their jurisdiction over education policy, particularly at the primary and secondary levels. As result, Community laws protecting the education rights of migrants have been most effective where two factors are present: first, that the rules are closely attached to the rights of free movement within the single market; and second, that the rules interfere as little as possible with substantive education policy. The first factor constitutes a significant weakness in Community education rights because it has created a distinction between Community migrants and those from third countries. The second factor has meant that the only Community policy on the education of migrants which could be described as an education right is the guarantee of equality of access to education within a member State.

This article analyses the source, nature, and use of unilateral, non-statutory executive powers, frequently employed as a governance tool but rarely studied in a comparative context. Exercised in the absence of direct statutory authorization, such powers are often invoked by executives in emergency and foreign affairs contexts, but are equally central to domestic policy-making. Unilateral executive power challenges two central democratic values that support the separation of powers ideal: representation and deliberation. Different structural treatments of these powers are considered through a comparison of three constitutional regimes, those of the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. Despite material structural differences between these systems, the emerging patterns are similar enough to support the argument that direct law-making by the executive is an unavoidable element of the political sphere. Developing a template for comparison analysis, this article shows that a pattern of functional convergence has emerged, unsupported by overt transplantation or borrowing between these systems. The results set a possible challenge to the growing recognition of global world constitutionalism, at least in structural-institutional contexts.

Punitive measures taken against vessels listed on RFMO IUU vessel lists often have very direct effects on the individuals associated with those vessels, such as the owner or operator. With developments such as cross-listing mechanisms and cross-references in international agreements, the number of actors that are encouraged or obliged to take measures against listed vessels now extends to a much wider group, well beyond just the Members of the listing RFMO. The impacts of these punitive measures on such individuals are accordingly very significant. Despite this, however, these listing procedures contain relatively limited due process features. This article considers whether this could contribute to diminishing the perceived legitimacy of IUU listings and generate a risk of reluctance by some actors within the international community to impose punitive measures on listed vessels.

Movement towards enhanced due process in decision-making processes appears to be emerging within many international organizations in recognition of the fact that increasingly, individuals are directly affected by decisions of international organizations. Examining such developments in other fora, this article considers possible adjustments to listing procedures, which might assist in safeguarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of IUU vessel lists. IUU lists play a significant role in international efforts to combat IUU fishing, and upholding their effectiveness is accordingly of critical importance.

The jurisdictional reach of causes of action brought under the Alien Tort Statute 17891 (ATS) was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum.2 The claimants in this decision sought to bring an action before a US District Court asserting universal civil jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign corporations performed against non-US nationals in the territory of a foreign State. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the particular claim on the basis of a domestic canon of statutory interpretation (the presumption against extraterritoriality), the narrowness of its reasoning left open the possibility for actions to continue being brought under the ATS which assert universal civil jurisdiction over the harm caused by individuals rather than corporations. Moreover, this position was specifically endorsed by a four-member minority of the Supreme Court in the Concurring Opinion of Justice Breyer. This paper argues that the reasoning of Justice Breyer is unconvincing and goes on to suggest that assertions of civil jurisdiction made under the universal principle are unlawful in international law as they fail to find a legal basis in either customary or conventional international law.

With the constant flow of data across jurisdictions, issues regarding conflicting laws and the protection of rights arise. This article considers the EU–US data transfer relationship in the aftermath of the decision in Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated an EU–US data transfer agreement for the second time in just five years. This judgment continues the line of cases emphasising the high value the Court places on securing EU personal data in accordance with EU data protection standards and fundamental rights. This article assesses the implications of the ruling for the vulnerable EU–US data transfer relationship.