The European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC requires all European Economic Area (EEA) jurisdictions to provide an equivalent regime protecting the privacy and other fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to personal data processing, whilst also shielding media expression from the default substantive requirements as necessary to ensure a balance between fundamental rights. Through a comprehensive coding of the derogations set out in each jurisdiction's data protection laws, this article provides the first systematic analysis of whether this has in fact been achieved. It is demonstrated that there is a total lack of even minimal harmonization in this area, with many laws providing for patently unbalanced results especially as regards the publication of sensitive information, which includes criminal convictions and political opinion, and the collection of information without notice direct from the data subject. This reality radically undermines European data protection's twin purposes of ensuring the free flow of personal data and protecting fundamental rights, an outcome which remains largely unaddressed by the proposed new Data Protection Regulation. Practical suggestions are put forward to ameliorate these troubling inconsistencies within the current process of reform.

Judicial notice has become a widely used tool in the practice of international criminal tribunals but its use has always been constrained by the fair trial rights of the accused. This article considers the possible impact on those rights of the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Appeals Chamber to take judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda as a notorious fact against the backdrop of the legal requirements for judicial notice as a fact of common knowledge and as an adjudicated fact. The question whether it would have been more appropriate to notice the Rwandan genocide as an adjudicated fact is addressed in the context of the implications for other instances of genocide, for example Srebrenica.

On 29 August 2013, the UK government published a memorandum setting out its ‘position regarding the legality of military action in Syria following the chemical weapons attack in Eastern Damascus on 21 August 2013’. While other States had contemplated some form of military action, most notably the US, none had been as clear and candid as to the legal basis upon which this would be launched. It might seem in this respect perhaps a little surprising that the UK decided in its relatively brief opinion that ‘the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention’. As this article will attempt to highlight, this basic justification is far from uncontroversial. This short article will seek to be clear as to what the UK's legal position exactly was, whether and how this position can be reconciled with the lex lata governing the use of force for humanitarian purposes and its immediate impact upon it, and finally offer some reflections upon the contribution the opinion and its central legal argument has made to future legal argumentation in this area.

Complex multi-actors and multi-level governance structures have emerged in areas that were traditionally exclusively the preserve of the State and treaty-making. The adoption of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) affirmed a corporate responsibility to respect human rights to be implemented through human rights due diligence (HRDD), ie via management processes. The open-ended character of the UNGP generated the emergence of other soft instruments offering guidance to corporations in structuring HRDD. This contribution conceptualises the UNGP from the perspective of regulation as a principles-based exercise in polycentric governance reliant on regulatory intermediaries for interpretation. It then assesses the role of various sui generis normative instruments in providing interpretation to the UNGP and, how the presence of an additional layer of interpretative material contributes to the institutionalisation of responsible corporate conduct. The analysis of instruments drafted by international, non-governmental and business organisations reveals both a decentralising tension between different intermediaries due to disagreements and divergence concerning the precise extent of corporate human rights responsibilities, as well as attempts to centralise the interpretation of the UNGP. The article concludes by recommending some caution towards the employment of polycentric governance regimes and their lack of centralised interpretive authority in this domain of international law and suggests possible ways to formally establish centralised interpretation.

The law of armed conflict requires ‘distinction’ between civilians and combatants and provides that only the latter may be targeted. However, for proper implementation, distinction requires advanced observation and recognition abilities as well as the capacity to exercise judgement based on situational awareness. While the observation and recognition abilities of machines may now surpass those of humans, the capacity of machines to exercise judgement remains significantly more limited than our own. Consequently, this article contends that the deployment of ‘autonomous weapons’ based on current levels of technological sophistication would be incompatible with distinction and that, as such, their use in conflict would be unlawful.

This contribution examines access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the first decade of its operation. Compared with other regional human rights Courts over the corresponding period, the African Court has decided more contentious cases. Direct access accounts for this difference. Acceptance by States of optional direct access is a necessary but insufficient condition for actual access. The reasons for the Commission's reluctance to refer cases, which hampered indirect access to the Court, are investigated. Although the Court's advisory jurisdiction has found limited application, it has welcomed amici curiae and showed some acceptance of the role of original complainants before the Court.

On 23 September 2011, Mahmoud Abbas, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and President of the State of Palestine, applied for full membership of the United Nations (UN) on behalf of the State of Palestine. In his letter of application (addressed to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon), Mr Abbas made reference to section F of the Plan of Partition in UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 (where sympathetic consideration of the application for membership of the UN of both the Arab and Jewish States was urged) as well as the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988 and the acknowledgement by the General Assembly (GA) of this Declaration in Resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988.1

This article offers a systematic analysis of the plenary Chamber of the French Cour de Cassation's final decision in the Baby Loup case which held that a private nursery had acted lawfully when requiring an employee to remove her jilbab at work, in accordance with the religious neutrality requirements of the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECHR and French domestic legal requirements. First, it is argued that laïcité—rightly held to be irrelevant—still unduly taints the reasoning. As a result, proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions are not properly applied. Secondly, the decision is compared and contrasted with recent ECtHR cases, notably Eweida and Others v UK. It is argued that a Baby Loup-type restriction does not meet ECHR standards. Additionally the margin of appreciation, used by the ECtHR to save the French ban on the full-covering of the face in the SAS case, should not, as will be demonstrated, come into play in a Baby Loup context.

The government's decision, announced on 22 October 1993, to ratify the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as soon as amendments to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 could be made led to a race to pass the bill through all its stages in both Houses before 4 December 1995.1 This was the date of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent held in Geneva and it was argued in the House of Lords that the British Red Cross should be able to attend the conference and to say that the necessary domestic legislation had been passed to enable ratification to take place. The bill had started its life in the House of Lords and had received its second reading only on 25 May 1995. It was, in fact, given the royal assent on 19 July 1995.

After nearly 10 years of proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court, on 16 March 2001, rendered the decision concerning maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain. One may identify two interesting features in this judgment. First, the ICJ, in the Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), peacefully resolved a difficult dispute regarding territorial sovereignty as well as maritime delimitation.1 In this connection, a question which arises is the interrelation between territorial disputes and maritime delimitation.2 As will be seen later, the status of low-tide elevations, in particular, generated a serious disputes between the Parties. Secondly, the equidistance method was, for the first time in the case law of the ICJ, explicitly applied to a delimitation between States with adjacent coasts under customary law. Considering that the Court has been reluctant to apply the equidistance method to delimitations in situations of adjacency, this may be said to be a new development.