Plastic pollution is a planetary crisis posing a significant threat to humans and the environment. The regulatory response to this crisis has so far been piecemeal and has not prevented the accumulation and ubiquity of plastic pollution. The growing concern over plastic pollution and the first regulatory measures directed against it soon resulted in court cases. By early 2023, cases concerning plastic pollution emerged in more than 30 countries around the world. From holding private polluters accountable to considering the constitutionality of restrictions on certain plastic products and to ordering regulatory bodies to adopt or implement such measures, courts are playing an increasingly important role in plastic pollution governance.

Cyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable ‘law of peace’, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.

On 29 August 2013, the UK government published a memorandum setting out its ‘position regarding the legality of military action in Syria following the chemical weapons attack in Eastern Damascus on 21 August 2013’. While other States had contemplated some form of military action, most notably the US, none had been as clear and candid as to the legal basis upon which this would be launched. It might seem in this respect perhaps a little surprising that the UK decided in its relatively brief opinion that ‘the legal basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention’. As this article will attempt to highlight, this basic justification is far from uncontroversial. This short article will seek to be clear as to what the UK's legal position exactly was, whether and how this position can be reconciled with the lex lata governing the use of force for humanitarian purposes and its immediate impact upon it, and finally offer some reflections upon the contribution the opinion and its central legal argument has made to future legal argumentation in this area.

The requirements that an insured disclose all facts material to a transaction as well as not misrepresent material facts in the formation of an insurance contract are universal requirements of insurance law.1 The nature and extent of these obligations varies from one jurisdiction to the next but the fundamental justification for the duty to provide accurate information rests upon the perceived asymmetry of information as between insurer and insured as to the risk to be transferred.2 Disclosure in the insurance context is distinct from the general approach in commercial contracts, and in others between persons dealing at arm's length. Historically, the requirement to affirmatively volunteer information in relation to insurance transactions reflects, first, the potentially mortal impact inadequate information poses to the insurance industry's vitality, and second, the practical reality that certain critical information may be peculiarly within the insured's knowledge and difficult to elicit. The departure from caveat emptor and the allocation of the risk and consequences of non-disclosure to the party best placed to provide information pertinent to the transaction is seen as necessary to minimise transaction costs in such dealings.3

This article revisits the core difficulties with the international delict known as a denial of justice and, drawing insights from philosophical writing on adjudication, offers novel solutions to three principal issues: (a) the scope of the acts and omissions that can form the predicate conduct for a denial of justice; (b) the proper threshold for liability in respect of those acts or omissions; (c) the relationship between denial of justice and other international norms impacting upon domestic adjudication. The article concludes with a restatement of the law of denial of justice.

A technological revolution is transforming society in a profound way. If harnessed and directed properly, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have the potential to improve all aspects of our social, economic and cultural life. ICTs can serve as an engine for development in the 21st century, and as an effective instrument to help us achieve all the goals of the Millennium Declaration’ (Kofi Annan )1

The subject of this article is the current state of administrative law in the context of the European integration. It will indicate the prospects for development of administrative law offered by the Convention on the Future of Europe, and its proposed European Constitution, as well as the enlargement of the EU which has taken place. The focus is on rules and general principles of European administrative law. They constitute the main sources of administrative law—written rules as well as unwritten judge-made law, and both the development of these sources and their mutual influence are subjects of the present article.

The European Union is soon to be composed of twenty-seven Member States. The first wave of enlargement is to take place in 2004 and may see the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states. A few years later, Bulgaria and Romania are also expected to join the EU. Although previous enlargements have taken place,2 the imminent accession of ten countries, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, is unprecedented not only in terms of scale, but also for its political symbolism: for these states, EU membership confirms the success of their democratic and economic transition efforts and represents their (re-)integration to the European family after decades of isolation under the Soviet domination.