Council Regulation 1347/2000 (the ‘Brussels II Regulation’) marked the beginning of the ‘Europeanization’ of family law. This article analyses the development of EU family law policy over the last decade, with particular focus on the common law perspective. It is argued that the Brussels II Regulation and the ensuing EU family law measures have had (and will have) a significant negative impact in English and Irish law, clashing with internal legal policy and sitting uneasily alongside existing legal structures.

European farm policy has undergone radical change in recent years, culminating in the Agenda 2000 reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy agreed in 1999 and then their Mid-Term Review in 2003. In particular, subsidy payments have been substantially ‘decoupled’ from production and switched decisively towards providing income support for farmers under a new ‘single farm payment’ scheme. These reforms have been predicated upon the need to win acceptance for Community farm subsidies in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. This article examines the new law of the Common Agricultural Policy against the background of the domestic support reduction commitments contained in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. It questions the extent to which the single farm payment scheme fulfils the requirements for ‘green box’ exemption from such commitments. Options for the re-negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture are discussed, including measures to improve the justiciability of its terms and to exclude discriminatory and trade-distorting domestic support. The article also considers the implications of the recent WTO Appellate Body Decisions in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton and European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar. It concludes that the Community will have difficulty gaining acceptance for its reforms among WTO Members. Whatever the legitimacy of its subsidy regime within the framework of the current Agreement on Agriculture, the emergence of a strong negotiating position among developing countries, posited on opposition to the volume of farm support maintained by the Community and United States, may present even greater obstacles to the conclusion of a new Agreement on Agriculture in the Doha Round.

The Award on Maritime Delimitation concerning the second stage of the Eritrea/Yemen case (hereinafter “Award” or “Second Award”) was delivered on 17 December 1999, pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement signed in October 1996 and following the Award on Territorial Sovereignty rendered on 9 October 1998 (hereinafter “First Award”). The two-stage settlement devised in Article 2 of the arbitral compromis bears a perceptive logic—territorial sovereignty issues precede maritime delimitation—the advantages of which makes it likely to be adopted in future similar dispute settlements. Importantly, in casu, the objective of re-establishing a peaceful relationship between the two peoples and contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in a sensitive region of the world seems to have been attained.1

After the Lisbon Treaty, the objectives of the European Union are more numerous and ambitious than ever. But what is their importance and function within the ‘thickening’ legal order of the EU? Combining insights from both the law of international organizations and comparative constitutional law, the article traces the diverging role of objectives for, on the one hand, a traditional international organization marked by the principle of ‘speciality’ and, on the other, a maturing legal order increasingly exhibiting ‘constitutional’ traits. It argues that in the case of the EU, objectives and competences have developed into two related but distinct norm categories. While objectives serve to bolster arguments to shape such powers, they no longer represent a rationale in their own right for founding competences. The EU no longer justifies its existence solely by striving for a particular set of goals. Rather, these norms represent an entrenched duty to pursue these objectives through the actors, structures and procedures available, regardless of the Union's ultimate form (finalité). Today, the EU stands for certain values and has been endowed with powers, the exercise of which is guided by promoting these various aspects of the ‘common good’.

While ‘global anti-money laundering (AML)’ regulations aim to detect and deter corrupt ‘politically exposed persons (PEPs)’, they have caused tremendous collateral damage to many innocent PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs. Due to the significant compliance costs of identifying and managing accounts of foreign PEPs coupled with an increased risk of serious fines against compliance failures, financial institutions have voluntarily terminated the accounts of foreign PEPs. Global AML regulations could avoid the collateral damage while maximising the deterrence of corruption if high degrees of coordination along two dimensions are satisfied, namely, transborder coordination and coordination between public enforcement entities and private actors. This study illustrates a cornerstone change made in 2012 to fulfil the first dimension and offers policy recommendations to build on this cornerstone by pursuing coordination along the second dimension.

This article examines the evolving way the ‘family’ and ‘family life’ have been understood in international and regional human rights instruments, and in the case law of the relevant institutions. It shows how the various structural components which are considered to constitute those concepts operate both between relevant adults and between adults and children. But it also shows that important normative elements, in particular, anti-discrimination norms, operate both to undermine the perception of some structures as constituting ‘family’, and to modify those structures themselves. This raises the question how far human rights norms should be seen as protecting family units in themselves or the individual members that constitute them.

The seat of arbitration is fundamental to defining the legal framework for international arbitral proceedings. Although parties are able to select the arbitral seat, arbitration clauses are frequently ‘pathological’, failing to designate the seat or failing to do so clearly. If the seat is not clearly identified by the parties’ agreement, the court may be called upon to decide which country is the seat (typically, in order to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain certain types of arbitration application). The simplest situations are ‘uni-directional’ cases in which, in procedural terms, the parties' agreement points expressly or impliedly towards a single location. More difficult are ‘pluri-directional’ cases in which the agreement refers to more than one possible location. While certain scenarios are relatively straightforward, what constitutes a choice by the parties is more complicated if the parties' agreement contains signposts pointing in different directions. In ‘uni-directional’ cases, the English courts have developed a series of interpretative guidelines which solve most of the problems posed by potentially ambiguous clauses. However, in ‘pluri-directional’ situations, the English case law is less convincing. In such cases, the courts have not approached the identification of the arbitral seat in a consistent way; they have not laid down a clear doctrinal framework; and they may be legitimately criticized for displaying a measure of ‘forum preference’.

After the debacle in Seattle in December 1999, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of WTO members took place successfully under tight security in the capital city, Doha, of the small Arabian state of Qatar in November 2001. The Doha conference did not adopt any new treaty or protocoll to add to the network of WTO agreements already in place. It did, however, approve a ‘broad and balance ’ work programme in the form of two declarations—a main declaration and one on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public health, plus a decision on implementation designed to alleviate the difficulties of developing countries in implementing the existing WTO agreements. In other words, the Doha conference agreed on the nature and scope of the next round of trade negttiations, named as the ‘Development Round’. Although some least-developed countries had argued that ‘no new round should be started until there has been full implementation of the agreements concluded in the last Round, and an evaluation of their effects done’, the Doha Conference decided to start a new round of trade negotiations. How development oriented is the agenda of the new round of trade negotiations? What is going to be negotiated during th e negotiations? Is it indeed going to be a ‘Development Round’ in more than name? The object of this article is to analyse the background to the Doha conference, to assess the nature of negotiations at the conference and to evaluate its outcome.

As the global financial crisis threatens to manifest in enhanced protectionism, the economic irrationality of dumping, countervailing, and global safeguard measures (so-called ‘trade remedies’) should be of increased concern to the Members of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). Long tolerated under the WTO agreements and perhaps a necessary evil to facilitate multilateral trade liberalization, elimination of trade remedies is far from the agenda of WTO negotiators. However, a small number of regional trade agreements offer a model for reducing the use of trade remedies among WTO Members in the longer term, consistent with WTO rules and broader public international law.

The Court of Justice has ruled in Owusu v Jackson that the Brussels Convention is applicable even where a case has objective connections to only one Contracting State and to a non-Contracting State. It has also held that where the court of a Contracting State to the Brussels Convention has jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's domicile pursuant to Article 2, it has no general discretion to stay its proceedings in favour of the court of a non-Contracting State on the basis that the latter is the natural forum for resolution of the dispute. However, the ruling leaves a number of important questions unresolved. This article considers the reasoning behind, and implications of the ruling, and the permissibility of staying proceedings in other situations falling within the scope of the Brussels regime post-Owusu.

It might be thought an unusual or peculiar feature of international relations that, on occasion, States engaged in an armed conflict decide to appeal to international law and institutions for the provision of immediate judicial remedies.2 Yet, within the short space of 14 months, the International Court of Justice has twice found itself on the receiving end of such requests: in the first of these cases, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) filed an application on 29 April 1999 against 10 Member States of NATO for using armed force against the FRY in March 1999. At the same time, the FRY made a request for provisional measures, in which it asked the Court to indicate that the States involved “cease immediately [their] acts of use of force” and “refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against the FRY.3 In June 1999 the Court dismissed this request.4

Ceuta, Melilla, Vélez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands are Spanish territories that lie along Morocco's northern coastline. Morocco has claimed the territories since its independence in 1956. The sovereignty of a further territory, the islet of Perejil, remains unresolved after a military confrontation between Morocco and Spain in 2002. The author examines the arguments in the ongoing sovereignty dispute. Morocco's claim to Ceuta and Melilla is found to be weak. However, its claim to the remaining territories may be supported by the analogous case of São João Baptista de Ajudá, an unpopulated Portuguese fortress territory in Dahomey (Benin) that was singled out for ‘statutory decolonization’ by the UN.

This article provides an analysis of the normative framework for Spanish cannabis clubs by contextualizing it within the growing body of comparative constitutional law that recognizes legal obstructions to personal drug consumption as intrusions of the right to privacy. Article 3(2) of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 relieves State parties from the Article's obligation to criminalize drug possession and cultivation for ‘personal consumption’ when doing so would conflict with their constitution or basic concepts of their legal system. Spain relied on Article 3(2) in its decision not to criminalize conduct involving personal consumption. The Spanish judiciary has had to consider the legal implications of collective consumption and cultivation in the form of cannabis clubs. In addition to operating in a grey area of domestic law, Spain's cannabis clubs straddle the blurred boundary in international and European legal instruments between ‘personal consumption’ and ‘drug trafficking’. This article explores the theoretical and doctrinal implications of both Spanish law on cannabis clubs and comparative human rights law on drug use to outline the potential contours of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy pertaining to cannabis use in a social context.

This article explores the question whether the territorial application of a treaty extends to unlawfully annexed territory. In this context, it examines State succession and the territorial application of treaties under general international law, as well as the moving treaty-frontiers rule and the extraterritorial application of certain treaties, specifically with respect to annexed territory. The article concludes that, while in some cases there is scope to find that a treaty applies extraterritorially in annexed territory, notably as a result of its object and purpose or its provisions, there may also be room, subject to the provisions of the treaty, for a limited form of treaty succession in such territory. Limitations to the obligation of collective non-recognition offer theoretical and practical support for this position.

In his Fourth Report on the Identification of Customary International Law (2016), Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood confirmed that ‘[i]n certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the expression, or creation, of rules of customary international law’. That the practice of international organizations can be relevant when identifying customary international law is relatively uncontroversial. The issue that is more debated is the extent to which the practice of international organizations as such may contribute to the development of customary international law. Using examples from the European Union's treaty practice and from the Court of Justice of the European Union, this article argues that international organizations may contribute to such practice, not only by representing the collective will of States, but as autonomous actors in their own right.

The voluntary assignment of contractual (and non-contractual) obligations in conflict of laws is governed by article 14 of the Rome I Regulation. Under this, the validity of the assignment as between the assignor and assignee is governed by the law applicable to the contract between them (paragraph 1 of article 14). On the other hand, the assignability of the claim and the relationship between the debtor and the assignee are governed by the law applicable to the obligation assigned (paragraph 2 of article 14). Certain issues are, however, outside the scope of article 14 as it stands at present. These are the question of priorities between competing assignments (if the same obligation is assigned twice to different assignees) and the rights of third parties (mainly creditors of the assignor). This article examines the precise scope of the two existing paragraphs and considers the arguments that might be relevant in deciding what law should govern the issues at present not covered by either paragraph, a question that has become more pressing in view of the fact that negotiations will soon begin on a possible amendment of article 14 to deal with it.

This article seeks to make sense of two seemingly contradictory aspects of the General Assembly's practice: its history of recommending to States that they impose unilateral sanctions; and its series of resolutions denouncing unilateral coercive measures as illegal. It examines the seeming discrepancy between the customary international law position regarding unilateral sanctions, and the position asserted by the Assembly, and argues that on a nuanced reading of the Assembly's resolutions, these positions are not so divergent as is often supposed. The article concludes by examining the scope for the Assembly to make future sanctions recommendations, consistently with its prior condemnation of unilateral coercive measures.

Following a large-scale disaster, such as a major earthquake, tsunami or cyclone, tens of thousands of persons are often displaced, suffer from food shortages and in need of medical assistance. In situations in which the State affected by the disaster does not meet the needs of the affected persons itself, humanitarian assistance from outside the State might be required. This article considers the role of consent to external humanitarian assistance on the part of the affected State. As there is no single overarching treaty in the area of humanitarian assistance in situations of disaster, the article explores the role of consent in the various disaster-specific, subject-specific and region-specific treaties as well as in the soft law instruments in the area. Although the instruments take seemingly different approaches to the subject, a common standard is identified, namely that consent on the part of the affected State is required before external assistance can be provided but that consent cannot be arbitrarily withheld. The article then goes on to give content to the arbitrary withholding standard, breaking it down into its substantive and procedural elements. These include the meaning of the term ‘arbitrary’; the requirement to provide a reason for the withholding of consent; legitimate grounds for withholding consent; and the actor that assesses the justification. Regard is had for State practice in the context of disasters as well as other areas of the law in which similar tests are used.