1. You have asked me for advice on the legality of military action against Iraq without a further resolution of the Security-Council, This is, of course, a matter we have discussed before. Since then I have had the benefit of discussions with the Foreign Secretary and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who have given me valuable background information on the negotiating history of resolution 1441. In addition, I have also had the opportunity to hear the views of the US Administration fromtheir perspective as co-sponsors of the resolution. This note considers the issues in detail in order that you are in a position to understand the legal reasoning. My conclusions are summarised at paragraphs 26 to 31 below.

A ‘safe zone’ refers to an area established in armed conflict for the purposes of protecting civilians. This article provides the first legal analysis of whether safe zones can be invoked as a ground for refusing asylum. It examines the concept of the Internal Protection Alternative (IPA) which posits that an individual is not a refugee if there is a safe place within his/her country where he/she can relocate. It clarifies the applicable criteria in the IPA inquiry and uses three case studies to illustrate that safe zones can only qualify as lawful IPAs in exceptional circumstances.

This article argues that a new understanding of the indivisibility of human rights has emerged through the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has blurred the distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other. After showing how this distinction has been blurred in the Convention, the article critically analyses the impact this has had on the concept of indivisibility, as well as its consequences for international human rights law more generally. It shows that there is now a shift away from a preoccupation with different categories of rights and towards concern for the real and actual enjoyment of human rights.

Comparing the EU law principle of loyalty with international law good faith and the duty of federal good faith in German constitutional law (Bundestreue), this article contributes to the discussion on the nature of the EU legal order and its relationship to international law more generally by finding that EU loyalty is in essence a specific incarnation of the international law principle that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith. At the same time, it challenges the assumption that international law good faith differs fundamentally from federal good faith. To this end, the article points at historical links between both, and posits that good faith is in essence a principle of constructive interpretation, the strictures of which increase with the level of integration of the legal order in which it is applied.

This article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed conflict.

The decision of the International Court of Justice of 13 December 1999 in the dispute between Botswana and Namibia concerning the island known to the former as Sedudu and the latter as Kasikili is the latest in a line of cases dealing with the identification of colonial boundaries,1 including the two Eritrea/Yemen arbitration awards, the second of which (on Maritime Delimitation) was delivered four days after the Kasikili/Sedudu Island judgment itself.2 While not as wide-ranging in either the geographical or legal senses as some of the preceding decisions on territorial issues, the decision of the Court in this case nevertheless raises some interesting and important questions.

This article examines whether general international law supports the claim that direct military assistance by one State to another State upon the latter's request is prohibited where the inviting State is implicated in (gross) violations of international humanitarian and/or human rights law. It approaches the question from the perspective of State responsibility, analysing the threshold requirements of Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility (ASR),1 which represents the customary international law standard for responsibility for aiding or assisting wrongful conduct by another State. In so doing, the article illuminates how factual uncertainties complicate the triggering of the responsibility of the intervening (assisting) State for any violations of international humanitarian and/or human rights law by the territorial (recipient) State. Thereafter, the article questions whether, in the event that the responsibility of the intervening State is triggered, it would in consequence have to withdraw its troops and/or military air power from the territorial State.

In the Commission's White Paper on European Governance1 and the subsequent Laeken2 Declaration, the participation of civil society in the Community method of decision-making was viewed as the primary way of engaging directly with EU citizens. The White Paper accepts that participatory democracy is created from the bottom up by ‘groups of people dedicated to the disinterested search for the public interest in society’.3 This statement recognises that participation goes beyond the pre-legislative lobbying process. It suggests that the representation and protection of citizens' interests requires ex post judicial protection in circumstances where the legislative measure breaches fundamental rights or if its application infringes principles of procedural propriety. The only vehicle for such judicial protection at the Community level is paragraph 4 of Article 230 EC, which already provides recourse to individuals who are ‘directly and individually concerned’ by an act of the institutions. Direct actions under Article 230 EC are preferable to the indirect protection available in national courts when a preliminary reference can be made under Article 234 EC. This is because national courts cannot declare a Community measure as being invalid or provide a remedy against the Commission. Despite these deficiencies with domestic enforcement actions, the Court's judgments have been consistently of the view that the granting of locus standi under Article 230 EC should be narrowly construed and most significantly does not extend to judicial review actions by representative groups. This is in stark contrast to the practice within the domestic courts of Member States where proxy actions have, in recent years, been encouraged.