The British Government's nationalization of the shares of Northern Rock plc and Bradford & Bingley plc in 2008 raises important issues about the standard of protection owed to the banks' non-UK investors and the manner in which compensation should be calculated. The United Kingdom is party to numerous bilateral investment treaties as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, which adopt an international standard of protection for foreign investors and require the payment of ‘market value’ compensation for the property taken. As the analysis in this article shows, the compensation scheme established by the British Government appears to fall short of these obligations.

As scholars in the Global Administrative Law project have recognized, doctrines familiar from domestic administrative systems are beginning to appear, in nascent forms, in some areas of international law. This article makes a first attempt to examine the appearance of one such doctrine, the duty to give reasons for administrative decisions, in international case-law. The existence of and rationales for this duty have been contentious in many domestic jurisdictions. The article thus considers the extent to which these debates have been replicated amongst adjudicators at the international level. The focus is on cases in the areas of WTO law, investment law and human rights law. It is found that the case law is not yet extensive, and (perhaps as a result) that no coherent picture emerges. In contrast to domestic systems, the areas examined in international law demonstrate some agreement on the desirability of the duty. However, different international adjudicators have recognized different rationales for the duty, with only limited consensus even within each area of international law studied.

In recent years, the European Union (‘eu’) has taken a number of initiatives with a view to co-ordinating consular assistance in third countries. Not only have EU citizens an entitlement to consular assistance by any EU Member State in the absence of a representation of their own, but EU Member States themselves are encouraged to co-operate by means of the Lead State Concept and other forms of co-operation. While this may seem relatively unproblematic from the perspective of the EU, it is very difficult to reconcile with general international law. The various EU agreements in this area have no application to third States: some do not have legally binding form and even those that do only apply to the parties to the treaties, ie EU Member States. This article will present the situation, analyse its complexities and offer some reflections on the global application and desirability of the regime created by the EU.

No place is safe-no place is at peace. There is no place where a woman and her daughter can hide and be at peace. The war comes through the air, bombs drop in the night. Quiet people go out in the morning, and see air-fleets passing overhead-dripping death-dripping death!1

Taking a law-and-governance approach, this article addresses legal certainty in international human rights law as it applies to artificial intelligence (AI). After introducing key issues concerning legal certainty, a comparative analysis of AI law-and-governance initiatives at the international, regional and national levels is undertaken. The article argues that many initiatives contribute to increased legal certainty and can partially compensate for some of the shortcomings of the international human rights law framework, but that further clarification is badly needed. This is especially true for the responsibilities of private businesses which are developing AI and the corpus of human rights beyond privacy and data protection.

1. You have asked me for advice on the legality of military action against Iraq without a further resolution of the Security-Council, This is, of course, a matter we have discussed before. Since then I have had the benefit of discussions with the Foreign Secretary and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who have given me valuable background information on the negotiating history of resolution 1441. In addition, I have also had the opportunity to hear the views of the US Administration fromtheir perspective as co-sponsors of the resolution. This note considers the issues in detail in order that you are in a position to understand the legal reasoning. My conclusions are summarised at paragraphs 26 to 31 below.

The right to property was accorded the status of a human right as a result of its incorporation in international human rights instruments in the second part of the twentieth century. The right has acquired special importance as part of the freedom of the individual, his economic autonomy in modern democratic societies and generally as a significant element for the development of the individual's personality.1 Its recognition as a separate human right and its legal protection on an international level was the result of gradual efforts. It is still in the process of further legal elaboration, as regards both its scope and effect, by legal theory and jurisprudence.

On 6 November 2003 the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms,1 which involves multiple aspects of international law, most notably the issues of treaty interpretation, use of force, hierarchy of norms and the nature of international judicial competence. The case arose out of forcible action by US naval forces in the Persian Gulf against certain Iranian oil platforms.