In December 1995 Eritrean and Yemeni armed forces clashed in one of the islands situated off the coast of these two States in the Red Sea (Greater Hanish1). Behind the incident was a dispute concerning, inter alia, the territorial sovereignty over several uninhabited islands in the area, the definition of the maritime boundary between the two States and the use of the waters surrounding the islands by fishermen of both States.2 Undoubtedly, this dispute is deeply rooted in the history of the two States, and their peoples.

On 18 November 2012 the ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). ASEAN has existed since 1967 and as a result allows Southeast Asia to be identified as a ‘region’ comparable with other regions such as Africa, the Americas and Europe which have been seen as such in human rights terms for over 40 years. However, until recently Southeast Asia has not been involved in a process of regional human rights institutionalization which in other regions has been an important means of implementing international human rights treaty commitments adopted by their member-States in global forums. Furthermore, the ten States of ASEAN as a group are parties to relatively few of the principal international human rights standard-setting and monitoring regimes. Hence vesting ASEAN with a human rights mandate would seem to present an opportunity to enhance the range of human rights commitments to which ASEAN States are subject. However, after reviewing the ‘ASEAN human rights mechanism’ it is concluded that much recent ASEAN activity amounts either to political rhetoric or has potential to fragment the human rights norms recognized by those ASEAN States which are committed to international human rights treaties. For the ASEAN States which are relatively uncommitted to international human rights treaty regimes, participating in the ASEAN mechanism may reduce pressure to recognize international norms.

On 1 July 2011 the UK Bribery Act 2010 and accompanying guidance finally came into force, marking the end of years of controversy about how and when the United Kingdom would implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The United Kingdom's very delayed implementation of the Convention provoked an increasingly threatening response from the OECD Working Group on Bribery, and highlighted this body's lack of binding enforcement procedures. By contrast, the OECD's reliance on non-binding guidelines has proved successful in that the UK Guidance draws heavily upon the OECD's guidance on how corporations should prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.

In the light of the Supreme Court decision in OFT v Abbey National on unarranged overdraft fees in current account contracts, this article analyses the price term exemption at the heart of Directive 93/13 in its European context, and on a comparative basis. It argues for an interpretation in line with the ‘market for lemons’ rationale, which best fits the regulatory outline of Directive 93/13, and the European Court of Justice's case law. Under this approach, only those contract terms that are subject to the correcting forces of markets and competition are part of the ‘main subject matter of the contract’ and should be exempt from assessment of fairness under Directive 93/13.

In recent times the European Court of Human Rights has been very active in developing a number of duties of investigation, under various substantive Articles of the Convention,1 which member States are obliged to comply with. Therefore, this paper seeks to analyse the nature and scope of these important duties, together with the interrelationships between them.2

The atrocious abuses committed under South America's dictators resulted in a wave of amnesties. Following transitions to democracy, challenges from victims and civil society unpicked several of these amnesties, leading to hundreds of perpetrators facing prosecution. These developments prompted far-reaching claims in academic literature and policy reports regarding the significance of the erosion of South America's amnesties for shaping international legal norms and policy preferences on amnesties within the region and beyond. This article draws on a comparative analysis of case law from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and national courts as well as legislative changes to argue that there is a regional trend to move away from broad, unconditional amnesties enacted during or after dictatorial rule. However, it notes that this is not universal across the region, nor does it represent a rejection of all forms of amnesty. The article then tests the claims being made in the literature regarding the significance of the regional trend on the legality, durability and desirability of amnesties. It finds that there is little evidence to support claims that the regional developments are indicative of a broader normative shift. It concludes by identifying the risks posed by regional overreach.