On 29 November 1996 Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“the ICTY”) handed down its sentence in the case of Dražen Erdemović. This was a decision of historie significance for a variety of reasons, the most obvious being that it was the first sentence passed by an international war crimes tribunals, applying international law, since the International Military Tribunals which sat at Nuremberg and Tokyo between 1945 and 1948; it was also the first time a truly international tribunal bas concluded the trial of a minor war criminal, as opposed to a senior military commander or political leader. In addition, it was the first sentence handed down by the ICTY, which has been plagued sincc its first days of operation by problems in securing evidence and witnesses, not to mention the presence of the accused. Now the ICTY has shown, in the face of widespread criticism and accusations of impotence, that it can actually perform the task assigned to it. The doubt about such a judgment is that the Erdemović case is not perhaps the best basis on which to assess the ICTY's performance, so singular were the accused's conduct and, indeed, the circumstances in which he found himself before the Tribunal. Essentially, had it not been for the accused's voluntary surrender and his extensive co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor, and the co-operation of the judirial authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in transferring Erdemović to The Hague, the case would probably never have happened at all.

Images of widespread looting were the first to come from Baghdad following the entry of US forces into the Iraqi capital city in April 2003. In particular, it is hard to forget the powerful images of smashed display cases, empty vaults, and desperate staff in the Iraqi National Museum. Worse still, the National Library was burnt down. The looting of the Iraqi National Museum took place between 8 April, when the security situation prompted staff to leave the museum, and 12 April when some of them managed to return. Despite early pleadings with US forces to move a tank to guard the museum gates, US tanks did not arrive until 16 April.1 Cynics would say that the protection of the Oil Ministry appeared to take priority at the time.2 Early reports estimated that around 170,000 items went missing from the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad.3 This figure was completely exaggerated and the Bogdanos enquiry established that over 13,000 items had been stolen and about 3,000 recovered by September 2003.4 This article seeks to determine to what extent the US can be held legally responsible for the looting, and then to examine the international legal framework in place to facilitate the recovery and return of the items stolen from the Iraqi National Museum and other Iraqi cultural institutions

This article explores how a procedural approach in the case law of the ECtHR combines subsidiarity and progressive development of international obligations. Rather than constituting a simple retreat from substantive commitments, it renders the obligations of Conventions States more flexible and has the potential to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Court's rulings. This article first sets out various aspects of proceduralization in international human rights law. This is followed by a discussion of how procedural approaches are linked to subsidiarity. In the case law of the ECtHR, procedural approaches facilitate dynamic evolution, both in the practice of Convention States (analytic or bottom-up approach) or by the Court itself (constructive or top-down approach). This interaction of the procedural approach and arguments based on European Consensus allows the ECtHR and domestic institutions to fulfil their ‘shared responsibility’ for the effective protection of human rights in Europe.

The European Court of Human Rights has decided in the last three years five cases dealing with state or international immunities.1 Although the facts differed, the arguments of the applicants were much the same. They contended that allowing a foreign State or an international organisation to claim immunity in a civil action in proceedings in the defendant State violated the applicants' rights to access to a court for the determination of a civil right.2 The European Court accepted the claims in principle but concluded in each case that the limitation imposed on the right of access was for a legitimate reason (the protection of State or international immunities, a condition for effective co-operation between States or with international organisations) and was proportionate to this aim, because in each case, the grant of immunity was required by international law and that in each case there was the possibility of the applicant using another procedure to try to assert his rights, action in the courts of the foreign State or under the special staff regime of the international organisation.

Since many offensive and defensive wars or acts of terrorism, such as the atrocities of 11 September in the United States and the July 2005 bombings in London, are committed under the banner of Islam and the duty of jihad, it is important to shed some light upon the Islamic laws of war in general, and the controversial concept of jihad in particular. This article traces the origins of, and rationale for, the use of force within the Islamic tradition, and assesses the meaning and evolution of the contentious concept of jihad within its historical context. Following an analysis of the opposing doctrinal views on the potential implications of jihad, the study argues that the concept of jihad should not be interpreted literally, but be adjusted in accordance with new historical and international conditions, and conducted by peaceful means, rather than by the sword.

The core provisions of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations are deceptively simple: a contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties (Article 3(1)); to the extent that the parties have not made a choice, a contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 4(1)). However, within these provisions there are a number of problems. First, Article 3 provides that the parties’ choice may be either express or ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the terms ofthecontract or the circumstances of the case’. This gives rise to potentially difficult questions about what constitutes an express choice and uncertainty as to the dividing line between, on the one hand, cases where the parties have made a choice (albeit not an expressone) and, on the other, cases where the parties have not made a choice at all. Secondly, the general principle in Article 4 is supplemented bya presumption (in paragraph 2), 1 which may, incertain circumstances, be disregarded (under paragraph 5). The operation of the presumption is problematic and the relationship between Article 4(2) andArticle 4(5) controversial.

In May 2003 the United Nations General Assembly approved an agreement between the United Nations and the Cambodian government (UN Agreement) providing for United Nations assistance in the establishment and operation of ‘Extraordinary Chambers’ within the domestic court structure of Cambodia.1 The UN Agreement is the result of a lengthy process of negotiation between the United Nations and the Cambodian government, with the intervention of several interested states.2 The final agreement reflects a compromise between the need to address impunity and the need to preserve Cambodian sovereignty.

This article explores the issue of norm conflict in the context of specific multilateral agreements that are administered and enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), namely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Any discussion of norm conflict between treaty provisions must necessarily draw a critical distinction between an apparent conflict, on the one hand, and a real conflict, on the other hand. An apparent conflict is one where the content of two or more norms is at first glance contradictory, yet the conflict can be avoided, most often by interpretative means. A real conflict represents an irreconcilable divergence between norms which cannot be interpreted away and can only be solved by the application of a conflict rule. The notion of intra WTO conflict is largely unexplored and consequently under-theorized. It is explored here not as an abstract notion, but rather against the backdrop of the institutional and normative environment of the WTO. It is submitted that intra WTO norm conflict is hardly likely to arise as a legal issue under WTO law. This is because the normative and institutional environment of the WTO militates against treating overlapping WTO provisions as situations of real norm conflict. This environment allows for, and potentially mandates a judicial approach to intra WTO conflict that accords with the telos of the single undertaking nature of WTO rights and obligations. In the result, intra WTO conflict will possibly never be real; will often be deemed as merely apparent; and will sometimes be avoided.

On 1 March 2001 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of both Spouses (Brussels II) entered into force.1 In the United Kingdom at least this significant step went relatively unnoticed. Nevertheless, the Regulation marks a new departure for the European Community and is likely to be but the first in a series of instruments dealing with family law issues. This article will use an analysis of the evolution of the Brussels II initiative to explore how and why the European Community has been able to move into an area not innately associated with traditional European goals.2 It will then reflect on the wider impact of the Regulation and any future initiatives for private international law and family law in Europe.

International investment law can be criticized for its understanding of sovereignty. Informed by the works of Koskenniemi, this article reimagines ‘sovereignty’ based on a host State population exercising its right to economic self-determination. Recent transparency initiatives in international investment law support this conceptualization of sovereignty. Further, the stance taken aligns with the continuous evolution of the international investment law regime. The establishment of a different perspective on sovereignty in international investment law highlights the need for an alternative understanding of this term if international investment law is to achieve widespread approval.