This article analyses the contribution made to the effective implementation of international environmental law in the EU by the ECJ invoking direct application and effect of international treaties. It considers the requirements of these doctrines in international law, distinguishing them from related doctrines in EU law. It reviews jurisprudence and literature and evaluates future potential. Implications for direct application and effect from the EU doctrine of primacy and for the principle of effective judicial protection are examined, and alternatives to full transposition, implementation and enforcement explored, including non-compliance procedures.

Over the course of the last hundred and fifty years or so the general trend in the laws of Western European countries has been, first, to make provision for judicial divorce and, second, to make it easier for parties to a marriage which has broken down to obtain such a divorce. This coupled with increased mobility has added to the significance of the law relating to the recognition of foreign divorces. The law's essential task is to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, being too restrictive, thereby creating “limping” marriages (i.e., marriages which are valid in one or more countries, but not others) and, on the other, being too generous, thereby sanctioning “quickie” divorces or divorces of convenience.1

In the three years since last surveyed in the Quarterly,1 EU environmental law has continued to justify its reputation as one of the most fast-moving fields of EU law, with a large number of highly significant legislative and jurisprudential developments. This review selects some of the most important areas of development in the field in recent years: in particular, the EU's new environmental action programme for 2013–20, EU climate and energy law, environmental governance and enforcement, and integration of environmental concerns into other EU policy areas.

English private international law generally gives a potential role, where appropriate, to foreign law, by allowing for the application of choice of law rules to determine its relevance. Yet in the context of anti-suit injunctions granted otherwise than in aid of a contractual right not to be sued, choice of law is conspicuously absent. In those cases, courts simply apply the lex fori without paying any regard to foreign law, although the notion of comity is taken into account in the final decision on whether to grant anti-suit relief. Clearer identification of the grounds for granting such relief should limit application of the lex fori to instances where the anti-suit injunction serves as a form of ancillary relief to protect the judicial processes of the forum, and in which comity plays no role. In all other cases, which ultimately concern private justice between the parties, comity is best understood as an expression of justice in cases involving foreign elements, and better reflected through choice of law rules, which might lead to the application of foreign law. This approach is preferable to invoking comity as a consideration relating to the manner in which the court regulates the grant of anti-suit relief, because courts tend to bestow rights, which parties may not otherwise have, under the cloak of comity. Understanding comity as the catalyst for taking account of foreign law assuages concerns about interfering with foreign courts, acts as a deterrent to remedy shopping, and provides greater certainty as regards the vindication of rights. The case for widening the application of choice of law in this context does not depend on Rome II, but if the principle is accepted, courts must follow the process which it specifies.