In a global economy, a country’s international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country’s exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in twenty OECD countries from 1974 to 2008.

Political parties face strategic decisions about whether to campaign on issue-based appeals, pertaining to debates over such issues as economic, immigration, and environmental policies, versus valence-based appeals, emphasizing leadership attributes, such as character (integrity, honesty, and so on), along with performance, that is, the ability to deliver positive outcomes. To better understand these choices, we analyze parties' national election campaign strategies across ten Western European democracies. We argue for, and empirically substantiate, an: our issues versus their valence effect, that is, that parties' self-presentations will be more issue-based than their presentations of opponents; an extremist party issue focus effect, that is, that parties with more extreme ideologies most strongly emphasize issues over valence in their self-presentations; and a prime ministerial valence focus effect, that is, that prime ministerial parties more strongly self-present on valence. These findings have implications for election outcomes and mass–elite linkages.

Autocracies are widely assumed to have a counterterrorism advantage because they can censor media and are insulated from public opinion, thereby depriving terrorists of both their audience and political leverage. However, institutionalized autocracies such as China draw legitimacy from public approval and feature partially free media environments, meaning that their information strategies must be much more sophisticated than simple censorship. To better understand the strategic considerations that govern decisions about transparency in this context, this article explores the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) treatment of domestic terrorist incidents in the official party mouthpiece – the People's Daily. Drawing on original, comprehensive datasets of all known Uyghur terrorist violence in China and the official coverage of that violence, the findings demonstrate that the CCP promptly acknowledges terrorist violence only when both domestic and international conditions are favorable. The authors attribute this pattern to the entrenched prioritization of short-term social stability over longer-term legitimacy.

Vastly increased transnational business activity in recent decades has been accompanied by controversy over how to cope with its social and environmental impacts. The most prominent policy response thus far consists of international guidelines. We investigate to what extent and why citizens in a high-income country are willing to restrain companies to improve environmental and social conditions in other countries. Exploiting a real-world referendum in Switzerland, we use choice and vignette experiments with a representative sample of voters (N = 3,010) to study public demand for such regulation. Our results show that citizens prefer strict and unilateral rules (with a substantial variation of preferences by general social and environmental concern) while correctly assessing their consequences. Moreover, exposure to international norms increases demand for regulation. These findings highlight that democratic accountability can be a mechanism that motivates states to contribute to collective goods even if not in their economic interest and that awareness of relevant international norms among citizens can enhance this mechanism.

As spending on welfare in the United States has increased over time, preferences for more spending have remained fairly stationary. Given that previous research shows that the public adjusts its welfare spending preference thermostatically in response to welfare spending, the over-time pattern of preferences implies that something must be producing an increase in public support, but what? We address this question, focusing on individuals' demographics and a set of aggregate economic variables, both macroeconomic and distributional. Results reveal that individual-level factors matter little to the temporal variation and aggregate economics matter a lot: there are pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical elements in spending preferences and a dampening effect of income inequality over time. The combination of these variables accounts for the underlying trend in welfare spending preferences in the US, and the method used to reveal these dynamics can be used to analyze preference evolution in other spending domains and countries.

In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those which are isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated.

In response to growing economic and political interdependence at the international level, contemporary theories of justice have debated whether the demands of distributive justice extend beyond the nation-state. This article addresses the reverse question: whether and how the demands of justice arise below the state, at the level of civil society associations. This question becomes pressing in light of the increasing fragmentation of national governance, and the resulting institutional interdependence between political institutions and private associations. The article argues that the extent to which these associations are directly bound by egalitarian principles depends on a complex set of factors, including their structure and size, their role in the social provision of important goods, and their institutional relation with political institutions.

This article explores the properties of paradoxical voting situations in legislatures as illustrated by the decision-making process attending passage of the 1951 Electoral Reform Act in Fourth Republic France. First, conditions for demonstrating existence of a voting paradox for the case are developed and applied to data describing the voting behaviour of individual deputies. There follows an exploration of how a voting cycle over reform alternatives was overcome, focusing on the ways institutional rules and procedures structured the behaviour of parties and individual members and on the strategic manœuvring of political leaders. We conclude by relating characteristics of the case to general propositions found in the theoretical literature on the paradox of voting.

Recent studies take increasingly refined views of how socioeconomic conditions influence political behaviour. We add to this literature by exploring how voters' prospective evaluations of long-term economic and social opportunities relate to electoral contestation versus the stabilization of the political-economic system underpinning the knowledge society. Using survey data from eight West European countries, we show that positive prospects are associated with higher support for mainstream parties (incumbents and opposition) and lower support for radical parties on all levels of material well-being. Our results support the idea that ‘aspirational voters’ with positive evaluations of opportunities (for themselves or their children) represent an important stabilizing force in advanced democratic capitalism. However, we also highlight the importance of radical party support among ‘apprehensive voters’, who are economically secure but perceive a lack of long-term opportunities. To assess the implications of these findings, we discuss the relative importance of these groups across different countries.

The June 2016 Brexit referendum sent international shock waves, possibly causing adjustments in public opinion not only in the UK, but also abroad. We suggest that these adjustments went beyond substantive attitudes on European integration and included procedural preferences towards direct democracy. Drawing on the insight that support for direct democracy can be instrumentally motivated, we argue that the outcome of the Brexit referendum led (politically informed) individuals to update their support for referendums based on their views towards European integration. Using panel data from Germany, we find that those in favour of European integration, especially those with high political involvement, turned more sceptical of the introduction of referendums in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Our study contributes to the understanding of preferences for direct democracy and documents a remarkable case of how – seemingly basic – procedural preferences can, in today's internationalized information environment, be shaped by high-profile events abroad.

In a recent article in this journal, John Bartle, has extended work on British voting behaviour by testing the ‘funnel of causation model’ associated with the work of Miller and Shanks. He reported that left–right positions were important determinants of voters' party choices at the 1992 general election, and that these could only partly be linked to social class. John Bartle, ‘Left–Right Position Matters, But Does Social Class? Causal Models of the 1992 British General Elction’, British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998), 501–29. The key works by Miller and Shanks, on which he draws, include Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

This article is an examination of the English judicial process as a subject of research. My perspective is that of a political scientist whose major field of interest has been American judicial politics. If my subject were the House of Commons or party politics in Britain, it would be appropriate to focus my examination upon an evaluation of the relevant political science literature. But political scientists thus far have virtually ignored the English courts as an object of study; the limited scholarship done on this set of institutions has been contributed chiefly by social scientists in other fields and by legal scholars. For this reason, my primary goal is not to assess the existing literature on the judicial process. Rather, I wish to communicate this literature to political scientists and to suggest directions that they might take in studying the judicial branch.

The 1972 Democratic National Convention operated under much-heralded reform rules requiring, in effect, ‘quotas’ of blacks, women and youth in state delegations. The goal of these reforms obviously relates to deep normative concerns – improving representation, ‘democratizing’ conventions, etc. Their success in realizing this goal is obviously an empirical question, and it is one which has attracted considerable academic attention. Among the myriad of commentators, Jeane Kirkpatrick boasts the richest data base and the most subtle theoretical model. Her conclusion is that the reforms were largely a failure, insofar as they did little to improve the representation of Democratic party opinion by Convention delegates. On that point the data speak for themselves. The question to be raised here is simply whether these data really speak to the full range of normative concerns that might motivate quota requirements. This comment will discuss two other goals that convention quotas might serve, quite apart from their impact on representation of opinion.

Martin Harrop makes a large number of disparate observations connected with some aspects of my paper. In the space available I can do no more than take up those which seem particularly significant or contentious. Four points struck me in this way.

In the past, the literature of community power studies has been bedevilled by two interrelated divisions amongst those who have conducted these studies. On the one hand, there has been a complex and bitter dispute about techniques, and on the other there has been a battle between the Sociologists who espoused a stratification theory and saw in all community structures a recurrent pattern of elites, and the Political Scientists who, with almost equal persistence, have found pluralistic structures. In this paper we wish if possible to break with this increasingly barren discussion and to use the study of the town of Ashford in Kent, with which we have been engaged in recent years, in order to illustrate what we hope to be a rather more fruitful approach to the analysis of community power structure. Our contention is that in this field of political science, which has claimed to be extremely scientific in its approach, there has been no real attempt to apply a thorough-going scientific methodology, and, as a result, the discussion has become bogged-down in a dispute about methods, in which the protagonists have become so embroiled that they have lost sight of the basic problem. Important as has been this debate about methods, it has taken attention away from the need to develop a theoretical framework for the study of community power which will enable us to transcend a level of the discussion which has largely been conducted by two ideologically opposed schools of thought, each determined to prove the other wrong.

A concern with the relationships between different levels of centralization and the management of change is long-standing in many of the social sciences. The French educational system has always stood in the minds of many as a monument to over-centralization and red tape. In her recent magisterial study, The Social Origins of Educational Systems, Archer has examined the consequences for educational change of different levels of centralization in the educational system in a variety of national settings. In her book she argues with great care and a wealth of historical example that it is possible to establish certain broad generalizations which describe the manner in which educational change is produced, and that sharp distinctions in this regard must be made between the centralized systems and the more decentralized systems. Her study covers the period up to 1974. Since then there have been very important changes in the French educational system. These changes and the political conflict which surrounded them, particularly between 1974 and 1978, are of considerable interest in their own right, to students of both comparative public policy and French politics. The principal purpose of this discussion, however, is to examine Archer's propositions about the modes of change typical of centralized systems in the light of the reforms introduced in these years. My concern is therefore with the administrative and political consequences of centralization and this inquiry leads in turn to some discussion of the role of pressure groups in the Fifth French Republic.

This paper examines the relationship between the coming of the railroads, the expansion of primary education, and the introduction of national school curricula. Using fine-grained data on local education outcomes in Sweden in the nineteenth century, the paper tests the idea that the development of the railroad network enabled national school inspectors to monitor remote schools more effectively. In localities to which school inspectors could travel by rail, a larger share of children attended permanent public schools and took classes in nation-building subjects such as geography and history. By contrast, the parochial interests of local and religious authorities continued to dominate in remote areas school inspectors could not reach by train. The paper argues for a causal interpretation of these findings, which are robust for the share of children in permanent schools and suggestive for the content of the curriculum. The paper therefore concludes that the railroad, the defining innovation of the First Industrial Revolution, mattered directly for the state's ability to implement public policies.

The crisis facing the World Trade Organization illustrates the trade-off between legalization and compliance in international legal systems. Dispute bodies can sometimes “overreach” in their rulings, leading to resistance from member states. This article looks at one form of legal overreach: the extension of legal precedent. We argue that extending previous decisions can reduce the flexibility that states include deliberately in their agreements. We utilize original data on individual applications of precedent in the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body decisions from 1995 to 2015 and on policy responses to those decisions. We find strong evidence that extending precedent reduces on-time compliance. It also leads to longer delays before members comply. The results speak to the life cycles of international organizations, as well as questions of design and cooperation.

It is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism.

Members of the House of Representatives often forsake re-election to run for the Senate. Do they realize what they might be giving up? In the 1978 elections only 5 per cent of House incumbents who sought another term were denied it, compared with 40 per cent of the Senators seeking to continue in office. While several students of House elections have referred to the few members in serious electoral trouble (and even fewer who actually lose) as ‘vanishing marginals’, the safe incumbent Senator, particularly a liberal Democrat, is an endangered species. In the 1976 and 1978 elections, ten moderate-toliberal Democratic Senators were defeated, five in each election. Over a dozen more faced the electorate in 1980, facing the threat that the liberal majority within the Senate Democratic party would be erased – or at least eroded. While 93·7 per cent of House incumbents seeking re-election won in 1978 (a figure which has changed little since 1968), the Senate figure of 60 per cent is the smallest percentage since the Democratic landslide of 1958. In an era when House seats have become relatively safe by almost any standard, incumbent Senators appear increasingly more vulnerable.