A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.

Large scale DNA-mutation screening in patients with hereditary retinal diseases greatly enhances our knowledge about retinal function and diseases. Scientists, clinicians, patients, and families involved with retinal disorders may directly benefit from these developments. However, certain aspects of this expanding knowledge, such as the correlation between genotype and phenotype, may be much more complicated than we expect at present.

In addition to the scientific and medical issues surrounding the use of fetal tissue transplants, the ethical implications should be considered. Two major ethical issues are relevant. The first of these is whether this experimental procedure can be justified on the basis of potential benefit to the patient. The second is whether the use of tissue obtained from intentionally aborted fetuses can be justified in the context of historical and existing guidelines for the protection of human subjects. The separation of ethical decisions from medical practice and scientific research is necessary to prevent the exploitation of innocent human life.

Amit's efforts to provide stronger theoretical and empirical support for Hebb's cell-assembly concept is admirable, but we have serious reservations about the perspective presented in the target article. For Hebb, the cell assembly was a building block; by contrast, the framework proposed here eschews the need to fit the assembly into a broader picture of its function.

Complementation and correction of a genetic defect with CNS manifestations lags behind gene therapy for inherited disorders affecting other organ systems because of shortcomings in delivery vehicles and access to the CNS. The effects of improvements in viral and nonviral vectors, coupled with the development of delivery strategies designed to transfer genetic material thoughout the CNS are being investigated by a number of laboratories in efforts to overcome these problems.

Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.

Amit argues that the local neuronal spike rate that persists (reverberating) in the absence of the eliciting stimulus represents the code of the eliciting stimulus. Based on the general argument that the inferred functional meaning of reverberation depends in part on the type of representational assumptions, reverberations may only be important for the encoding of contextual information.

A photoaffinity analog of cGMP has been used to biochemically identify a new ligand-binding subunit of the retinal rod cGMP-activated ion channel, as well as amino acids in contact with cGMP in the original subunit. Covalent tethering of this probe to channels in excised menbrane patches has revealed a functional heteogeneity in the ligand-binding sites that may arise from the two biochemically identified subunits.

The neural transplantation research described by Sinden and colleagues provides part of the rationale for the clinical application of neural transplantation. The authors are asked to clarify their view of the role of the cholinergic system in cognition, to address extrahippocampal damage caused by transient forebrain ischemia, and to consider the effects of delayed neural degeneration in their structure-function analysis.

One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.

Hebbian mechanisms are justified according to their functional utility in an evolutionary sense. The selective advantage of correlating content-contingent stimuli reflects the putative common cause of temporally or spatially contiguous inputs. The selective consequences of such correlations are discussed by using examples from the evolution of signal form in sexual selection and model-mimic coevolution. We suggest that evolutionary justification might be considered in addition to neurophysiology plansibility when constructing representational models.

Rapidly advancing studies on rhodopsin have focused on new strategies for crystallization of this integral membrane protein for x-ray analysis and on alternative methods for structural determination from nuclear magnetic resonance data. Functional studies of the interactions between the apoprotein and its chromophore have clarified the role of the chromophore in deactivation of opsin and in photoactivation of the pigment.

Light activated rhodopsin functions by catalyzing the exchange of GTP for GDP on numerous copies of transducin. Peptide mapping has shown that at least six regions, three on rhodopsin and three on the transducin alpha subunit, are involved in the active interface between the two proteins. The most informative structural studies of rhodopsin should include focus on the transducin interaction.

It is well established that neural grafts can exert functional effects on the host animal by a multiplicity of different mechanisms – by diffuse release of trophic molecules, neurohormones, and deficient neurotransmitters, as well as by growth and reformation of neural circuits. Our challenge is to understand how these different mechanisms complement each other.

This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.

Hebbian cell-assembly theory and attractor networks are good starting points for modeling cortical processing. Detailed cell models can be useful in understanding the dynamics of attractor networks. Cell assemblies are likely to be distributed, with the cortical column as the local processing unit. Synaptic memory may be dominant in all but the first couple of seconds.

Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.

Strong arguments are presented by Hargrave suggesting that the crystallization of visual rhodopsin for high resolution analysis by X-ray crystallography or electron microscopy is feasible. However, the effort needed to achieve this goal will most likely exceed the resources of a single laboratory and a concerted approach to the research is necessary.

Cholinergic-rich grafts have been shown to be effective in restoring maze-learning deficits in rats with lesions of the forebrain cholinergic projection system. However, the relevance of those studies to developing novel therapies for Alzheimer's disease is questioned.

Every immediate memory is unique; it is therefore unlikely to consist of an attractor or even a combination of attractors. In the present state of knowledge about the chemistry of synaptic transmission, there is no reason to look beyond neurons that directly receive sensory afferents for the afterdischarges that correspond to active memories.