The synthetic position adopted by Müller is weakened by a large number of overinterpretations and misrepresentations, together with a caricatured view of innateness and modularity.

Geary proposes a sociobiological hypothesis of how (and why) sex differences in math and spatial skills might have jointly arisen. His distinction between primary and secondary math skills is noteworthy, and in some ways analogous to the closed versus open systems postulated to exist for language. In this commentary issues concerning how genes might affect complex cognitive skills, the interpretation of heritability estimates, and prior research abilites are discussed.

Thach's target article presents a remarkable overview and integration of animal and human studies on the functions of the cerebellum and makes clear theoretical predictions for both the normal operation of the cerebellum and for the effects of cerebellar lesions in the mature human. Commentary is provided on three areas, namely, spatial navigation, implicit learning, and cerebellar agenesis to elicit further development of the themes already present in Thach's paper, [THACH]

Adaptations occurring in the central nervous system (CNS) in the presence of pathology are not uniformly “good” for the organism when viewed in a functional context. A functional reordering of CNS priorities can be produced by allowing restructuring of the external context or through modification of neuromuscular physiology or anatomy designed to reduce the inherent restriction of functional movement in upper motor neuron syndrome. In fact, volitional control can often be “unmasked” through such interventions. Therapeutic interventions should not be directed toward “normalization” of motor patterns but should permit a functional reordering of CNS priorities that would otherwise not be possible.

Müller provides a valuable synthesis of neurobiological evidence on the epigenetic development of neural structures involved in language acquisition. The pluripotentiality of developing neural tissue crucially constrains linguistic/cognitive theorizing about supposedly innate neural mechanisms and contributes significantly to our understanding of experience–dependent processes involved in language acquisition. Without this understanding, any proposed explanation of language acquisition is suspect.

The views of Houk et al., Smith, and Thach on the role of cerebellum in movement control differ substantially, but all three are flawed by the false reasoning that because information passes from the cerebellum to movements the cerebellum must be a movement controller, or a part of one. The divergent and less than compelling ideas expressed by these leading cerebellar theorists epitomize the fruitlessness of this paradigm, and signal the need for a change. [HOUK et al.; SMITH; THACH]

Although Geary's partitioning of mathematical abilities into those that are biologically primary and secondary is an advance over most sociobiological theories of cognitive sex differences, it remains untestable and ignores the spatial nature of women's traditional work. An alternative model based on underlying cognitive processes offers other advantages.

It is difficult to chart “normal movements” in atypical populations, such as those with Parkinson's disease, because there is great variability in the pattern of motor changes, both within and between patients. However, the potential clinical implications of Latash & Anson's theme are positive and powerful.

Müller's goal of bringing neuroscience to bear on controversies in linguistics is laudable. However, some of his specific proposals about innateness and autonomy are misguided. Recent studies on the neurobiology of regular and irregular inflectional morphology indicate that these two linguistic processes are subserved by anatomically and physiologically distinct neural subsystems, whose functional organization is likely to be under direct genetic control rather than assembled by strictly epigenetic factors.

Movement patterns in impaired gait are not selected by a smart central nervous system (CNS), but arise by virtue of mutual constraints of task, limitations in personal dynamics available for the task, and optimality criteria. An oscillatory model of gait cycle is presented that exemplifies this control and coordination scheme. Preferred gait patterns may be based on physical principles rather than CNS “coordinative rules.”

Geary's anthropological assumptions are questioned as he uses literature influenced by sociobiology to back the claim that Female humans do not engage in environmental orientation. Yet, female gatherers or migrators do need and use spatial skills. Geary's exploration of gender differences in math skills is speculation that hasharmful, ungrounded, and misleading educational implications and applications, particularly in light of research on the status of gender equity in education.

The behavior of the climbing fiber system in the cerebellum is viewed in terms of resonances and rhythms. Building upon the anatomical modules in the target article by Simpson et al., the rhythmic behavior of the system is analyzed using a discrete approach. Rhythmic behavior requires oscillations of the olivary cells, but does not necessitate synchrony of complex spike activity. [HOUK et al.; SIMPSON et al.]

To the extent that Geary's theory concerning biologically primary and secondary behaviors depends on factor analytic methods and findings, it is woefully weak. Factors have been mistakenly called primary mental abilities, but the adjective “primary” represents reification of a mathematical dimension defined by correlations. Fleshing out a factor beyond its mathematical properties requires much additional quantitative experimental and correlational research that goes far beyond mere factoring.

Segregated neural circuits that effect particular domain-specific behaviors can be differentiated from neuroanatomical structures implicated in many different aspects of behavior. The basal ganglionic components of circuits regulating nonlinguistic motor behavior, speech, and syntax all function in a similar manner. Hence, it is unlikely that special properties and evolutionary mechanisms are associated with the neural bases of human language.

This commentary concerns the cerebellar contribution to cognition. It addresses the relevant historical background, elaborates upon the associative and paralimbic incorporation into both feedforward and feedback limbs of the cerebrocerebellar system, and relates this to the newly described cerebellar cognitive-affective syndrome. It then addresses the degree to which available anatomic data support current theories regarding nonmotor learning in the cerebellum, [HOUK et al.; THACH]

To understand the basic priorities of the central nervous system in human motor control, neurophysiological parameters are important. Certain H-reflex methods related to anticipatory postural control are particularly useful and may have therapeutic implications.

Geary's emphasis on hunting ignores the possible importance of other human activities, such as scavenging and gathering, in the evolution of spatial abilities. In addition, there is little evidence that links spatial abilities and math skills. Furthermore, such links have little practical importance given the small size of most differences and girls' superior performance in mathematics classrooms.

Because Müiller fails to distinguish between two senses of the term “autonomy,” there is a danger that his results will be misinterpreted by both linguists and neuroscientists. Although he may very well have been successful in refuting one sense of autonomy, he may actually have helped to provide an explanation for the correctness of autonomy in its other sense.

Priorities for movement reflect constraints deriving from the motor system, task goals, and physical environment. Atypical and typical populations alike set and reset priorities in response to constraints, and they do so at many processing loci and time scales. Efforts to understand what is atypical about a population should focus first on the constraints it encounters.

The target article by Thach outlines the Brindley-Marr-Albus-Gilbert (BMAG) learning theory and extends its validity to cognitive processes. We provide here an alternative explanation for the positron emission tomography (PET) data cited by Thach in support of the BMAG model. We also comment on the anatomical and physiological basis of the BMAG model and Houk's adjustable pattern generator (APG), both models being based on similar assumptions, [HOUK et al.; THACH]