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Is real self-deception really all that biased?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

James Friedrich
James Friedrich
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Willamette University, Salem, OR 97301 [email protected]
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Abstract

The mechanisms invoked to demonstrate how self-deception can occur without intention or awareness imply that self-deceptive beliefs are nevertheless the outcome of inappropriate and often egoistically driven processes. In contrast, models of pragmatic reasoning suggest that self-deception may well be the “reasonable” output of a more generalized, adaptive approach to hypothesis testing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 113 - 114
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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