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What unifies experiences generated by different parts of my brain?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Eric Schwitzgebel
Eric Schwitzgebel
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521-0201 [email protected]
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Abstract

Neither of the explanations O'Brien & Opie offer to account for “subject unity” succeeds. Subject unity cannot arise from constructed personal narratives, because such narratives presuppose a prior unity of experience. Subject unity also cannot arise from projection of experiences to the same position in space, as reflection on pregnant women and the spatially deluded reveals.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , February 1999 , pp. 167 - 168
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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