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What neuron doctrines might never explain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Keith Gunderson
Keith Gunderson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 [email protected]
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Abstract

My focus is on the inability of neuron doctrines to provide an explanatory context for aspects of consciousness that give rise to the mind–body and other minds problem(s). Neuroscience and related psychological sciences may be viewed as richly contributing to our taxonomic understanding of the mind and conditions underlying consciousness, without illuminating mind–body and other minds perplexities.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 837 - 838
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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