The obvious advantage of edited collections, such as this interesting book, is that they allow a range of authors with a huge cumulative breath of knowledge about a subject to cover virtually all aspects of it. This they certainly do in Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War, examining the way in which both NATO as a whole and its most important members reacted to and handled the Kosovo crisis of 2000.

Robert Pinkney, a respected British Africanist, takes on an ambitious task: examining the interaction of three Anglophone states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) with the international community since independence, but primarily since the end of the Cold War opened up new avenues for mutual influence.

The 1990s saw a resurgence in demand for economic sanctions. The United States imposed extraterritorial sanctions on Cuba through the Helms-Burton Law and on Iran and Libya through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Environmental and human rights activists also sought, albeit with limited success, to impose sanctions against the military regimes in Burma and Nigeria.

One of the big questions concerning economic sanctions is why they so often fail. A widely accepted answer to this question argues that economic sanctions increase the political solidarity within the target nation because the targeted public rallies behind its leader in the face of external pressure (Johann Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19 [1967]: 378–416). David M. Rowe calls this explanation into question and shows that the unity behind the white regime in Rhodesia was politically constructed by the government and not a spontaneous rally effect generated by nationalism or racial unity.

Much has been written over the years about the impact of increasing levels of capital mobility both on national governments and on the international economic system as a whole. Owners of capital can now “shop” among a variety of economies for the investment climate that suits their needs most—lower inflation, better interest rates, less restrictive labor policies, and so on. In this sense, the increase in capital mobility over the last few decades has meant that investors (particularly large investors) are no longer restricted to searching for investment opportunities in their domestic economy. Thus, domestic economic policy must increasingly accommodate the needs of the international marketplace.

J. Ann Tickner's Gendering World Politics revisits—in the best sense of the term—many of the same themes she explored in her pathbreaking 1992 book, Gender in International Relations. The current volume comes almost a decade after that first book appeared—a decade during which both the field of international relations and the subfield of feminist IR have seen dramatic change and, especially in the case of the latter, exponential growth. Gendering World Politics brings us up to date on the current state of debates within IR and provides a thoroughgoing and sophisticated introduction to what is now a very sizable feminist IR literature. Perhaps the most important contribution of this book, however, is that it allows Tickner to move forward an agenda she has been exploring for a number of years now, to encourage “conversations” between mainstream and feminist IR, and, in particular, to ask why authentic conversations, despite a decade of both turmoil and growth, have not been more forthcoming. As she writes in the Preface, “I have spent much of this time trying to understand why the intellectual gulf between different IR approaches is so wide and why conversations between proponents of these various approaches can be so difficult” (p. x).