Article 130 is closely linked to Article 129. It contains an exhaustivelist of offences bearing the most gravity, for which States undertake toprovide effective penal sanctions and to either prosecute or extradite,regardless of their nationality, alleged offenders who are suspected ofhaving committed one of these grave breaches against persons protected bythe Convention. Article 130 is common to the four Conventions. It isreproduced in identical terms in the First and Second Conventions butcontains two additional grave breaches in the Third Convention.

Article 102 belongs to the section on judicial proceedings in thechapter on penal and disciplinary sanctions. It lays down the rulethat a prisoner of war may be sentenced only by the same courtsaccording to the same procedure as in the case of members of theDetaining Power’s own forces, thus reflecting the ‘principle ofassimilation’. This principle, which employs the rules and standardsin force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power as the point ofreference for determining the treatment owed to prisoners of war,runs through the Convention as a whole and underpins severalprovisions of the present chapter. The principle seeks to ensurethat prisoners of war benefit at a minimum from the safeguardsafforded to members of the Detaining Power’s own forces.

The purpose of this provision is to ensure that financial constraints areno impediment to the sending and receiving of correspondence by prisoners ofwar, or to their receiving relief supplies and remittances of money. Thisarticle is therefore a further articulation, and practical facilitation, ofthe principles underpinning Articles 63, 71 and 72 of the Third Convention,allowing prisoners of war to maintain such forms of interaction with theoutside world.

Article 17 is the first of four articles dealing with point-of-captureissues (Articles 17–20). They are also relevant beyond the immediate timeand location of capture, including in some cases throughout captivity. Theseprovisions are applicable from the time a person falls into the power of theenemy until their final release and repatriation. The issues dealt with havehistorically proven difficult to monitor and enforce because they oftenarise soon after combat operations have concluded, sometimes while they arestill in progress, when emotions may still be running high and supervisionmay be limited.

Article 4 defines who is a ‘prisoner of war’ and identifies the personsentitled to the protection of the Third Convention. Article 4A lists thecategories of persons who, if they fall into the power of the enemy, areprisoners of war. It includes members of the armed forces, members of‘irregular’ armed forces that belong to a Party to the conflict, and persons whotake up arms spontaneously in response to an invading army (levée en masse). It also includes certain categories of civiliansauthorized to accompany the armed forces during conflict, such as supplycontractors, as well as members of the merchant marine and the crews of civilianaircraft. All such persons are protected by the Third Convention from the momentthey fall into the power of the enemy until their final release andrepatriation.

Article 92 is part of a series of articles (Articles 91–94) of theThird Convention that provide the contemporary legal frameworkregulating escapes and escape attempts. These provisions shouldtherefore be read together. In essence, provisions surroundingArticle 92 state that: successful escapes may not be punished(Article 91); connected offences committed with the sole intentionof facilitating escape and which do not entail any violence againstlife or limb occasion disciplinary punishment only (Article 93); andthe Power on which the escapee depends must be notified of anyrecapture, provided that notification of the escape has been made(Article 94). These provisions are complemented by other rules, suchas Article 42, which addresses the possibility of using weapons toprevent an escape.

Article 89 restricts disciplinary punishments applicable toprisoners of war to four types: fines, discontinuance of privileges,fatigue duties and confinement. It further prescribes that none ofthese punishments may be applied if it would be inhuman, brutal ordangerous to the health of the prisoner concerned. Despite theseessential safeguards, in armed conflicts since 1949 the ICRC hasencountered various forms of ill-treatment of prisoners of warundergoing disciplinary punishment.

The overall purpose of Article 65 is to ensure the transparency, validityand accessibility of prisoners’ accounts. To that end, prisoners or theirrepresentative must verify each credit or debit entered in the accounts bycountersigning or initialling them. Moreover, prisoners must have access tothe information shown in their accounts and may request copies of them.Representatives of the Protecting Power may also inspect the prisoners’accounts.

Article 121 requires the Detaining Power to open an official enquiryfollowing the death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused orsuspected to have been caused by a guard, another prisoner of war or anyother person, as well as any death of unknown cause. If the enquiryindicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power must takeall measures for their prosecution. The article thus seeks to protectprisoners from attacks by guards or other agents of the Detaining Power, aswell as by civilians or fellow prisoners of war, that result in their injuryor death. The fact that prisoners of war are in the hands of the personnelof an enemy power makes them more vulnerable to such attacks.