In the last chapter of the book, I examine the theoretical perspectives that question the narrative created by comparative modern law. Comparative law’s thought structures dominate an important part of the modern legal and political imagination. Nevertheless, these structures do not absolutely govern the way in which moderns give meaning to their experience. In its margins, there are theoretical perspectives that question them and try to articulate alternative normative horizons. Three of these perspectives are the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), the postcolonial studies of law, and critical comparative law. Each of these intellectual movements pursues distinct, precise objectives, such as the questioning of the imperial dimensions of international law, the critique of neocolonial legal relationships, or the questioning of the traditional methods and objectives of comparative law. Nevertheless, these movements share some elements that constitute this chapter's object of analysis. The aim of the chapter is thus not examining all dimensions, arguments, and authors that form each of these perspectives. What the chapter seeks is to describe and analyze how the three interact with the structures of thought of comparative law that form the basis of modern law. These intellectual movements describe these structures of thought as dominant, evaluate them negatively, and intend to replace them.

The Third Convention allows prisoners of war to maintain various forms ofcontact with the outside world. These include the sending and receiving ofletters and cards (including capture cards), relief shipments and legaldocuments.

Article 86 forms part of the general provisions of the chapter onpenal and disciplinary sanctions. The article lays down a rulecommonly known as the prohibition against double jeopardy or, inLatin terms, non or ne bis in idem (‘not twice for the same’).This rule acts as a procedural bar against prisoners of war beingsuccessively prosecuted or punished in respect of the same act orcharge. Article 86 thereby seeks to prevent abusive punishments andto avoid prisoners of war having to live in fear of furtherprosecution in respect of an act for which they have already beenfinally convicted or acquitted. A parallel provision is to be foundin Article 117(2) of the Fourth Convention, and the prohibition isalso reflected, albeit in different terms, in Article 75(4)(h) ofAdditional Protocol I.

Among the many important advances in international humanitarian law brought bythe adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 3 stands out in particular.With its inclusion, States agreed for the first time on regulating, in aninternational treaty framework, what they described as ‘armed conflict not of aninternational character’. Common Article 3 represented one of the firstprovisions of international law that dealt with what was at the time consideredby States as being exclusively their domestic affair. The provision is common tothe four Geneva Conventions.

Article 119 supplements Article 118 by setting out the procedure for therelease and repatriation of prisoners of war after the cessation of activehostilities. These two articles deal with different situations from thoseaddressed in Articles 109–117, which contain rules on the directrepatriation or accommodation in neutral countries of prisoners of warduring hostilities.

Whereas Article 100 lays down the rules on pronouncing the deathpenalty, Article 101 regulates its execution.

Article 111 should be read in conjunction with Articles 109 and 110. Thelatter two articles specify certain categories of persons who are eligibleeither for direct repatriation or for accommodation or internment in neutralcountries during hostilities. They primarily cover wounded and sickprisoners of war, providing for the repatriation or accommodation in neutralcountries only of those ‘able-bodied’ prisoners of war who have been incaptivity for a long time. Article 111 supplements the obligations inArticles 109 and 110 by requiring belligerents also to endeavour to concludeagreements with a neutral Power to intern all other ‘able-bodied’ prisonersof war in that country.

Article 59, which duplicates part of Article 18(4), recognizes theprinciple that money found on prisoners of war at the time of their captureis their private property. While such money may be taken from them inaccordance with the first sentence of Article 18(4), it must be credited totheir accounts as provided for in Article 64.