Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction : An Approach to a Branch of Logic
- Theorizing about reasoning and argument
- Fallacies and asymmetries
- Critiques
- 10 Siegel on Critical Thinking : Reasoning versus Rationality versus Criticism (1989)
- 11 Induction and Intuition in the Normative Study of Reasoning : Cohen on Inductive Reasoning in Philosophy (1991)
- 12 Logic, Politics, and Gramsci
- 13 The Dialectical Approach to Interpretation and Evaluation : From Axiom to Dialogue (Barth) and from Structure to Dialogue (Freeman) (1995)
- 14 The Port-Royal Logic's Theory of Argument
- 15 A Critique of the Dialectical Approach, Part Ⅱ : The Amsterdam School and Walton on Complex Dialogues (1999)
- 16 Valid Ad Hominem Arguments in Philosophy
- 17 Dialectics, Evaluation, and Argument : Goldman and Johnson on the Concept of Argument (2003)
- Historical analyses
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
16 - Valid Ad Hominem Arguments in Philosophy
Johnstone's Metaphilosophical Informal Logic (2001)
from Critiques
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction : An Approach to a Branch of Logic
- Theorizing about reasoning and argument
- Fallacies and asymmetries
- Critiques
- 10 Siegel on Critical Thinking : Reasoning versus Rationality versus Criticism (1989)
- 11 Induction and Intuition in the Normative Study of Reasoning : Cohen on Inductive Reasoning in Philosophy (1991)
- 12 Logic, Politics, and Gramsci
- 13 The Dialectical Approach to Interpretation and Evaluation : From Axiom to Dialogue (Barth) and from Structure to Dialogue (Freeman) (1995)
- 14 The Port-Royal Logic's Theory of Argument
- 15 A Critique of the Dialectical Approach, Part Ⅱ : The Amsterdam School and Walton on Complex Dialogues (1999)
- 16 Valid Ad Hominem Arguments in Philosophy
- 17 Dialectics, Evaluation, and Argument : Goldman and Johnson on the Concept of Argument (2003)
- Historical analyses
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is a critical examination of the thesis that valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. This thesis was advanced by Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and constitutes a highly original contribution, a brilliant idea, and a constant theme of his half a century of philosophical effort. In general, his work was a pioneering effort in the informal logic of philosophical argument and included other related themes, such as metaphilosophy and the role of rhetoric and of formal logic in philosophy. In focusing on this thesis, I do so because it is probably his key contribution and is emblematic of both the rest of his work and of the informal logic of philosophy. I shall first discuss several clarifications, then a concrete illustration, then some supporting arguments, and finally several objections.
Clarifications
The thesis can be expressed in several ways: that “all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem” (PA81); that in philosophy only ad hominem arguments are valid (PA3; VR56); that the validity of philosophical arguments lies in the property of being ad hominem (PA57–92); that ad hominem argument “is the only valid argument in philosophy” (VR134); and that in order to be valid philosophical arguments must be ad hominem.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Arguments about ArgumentsSystematic, Critical, and Historical Essays In Logical Theory, pp. 277 - 291Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005