Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Dialectic and virtue in Plato's Protagoras
- 2 Ethics and argument in Plato's Socrates
- 3 The speech of Agathon in Plato's Symposium
- 4 Is dialectic as dialectic does? The virtue of philosophical conversation
- 5 What use is Aristotle's doctrine of the mean?
- 6 Aristotle's ethics as political science
- 7 Epieikeia: the competence of the perfectly just person in Aristotle
- 8 Aristotle on the benefits of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 9.8)
- 9 Epicurean ‘passions’ and the good life
- 10 Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus' philosophy
- 11 ‘Who do we think we are?’
- General bibliography
- List of publications by Dorothea Frede
- Index locorum
- Index nominum et rerum
7 - Epieikeia: the competence of the perfectly just person in Aristotle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Dialectic and virtue in Plato's Protagoras
- 2 Ethics and argument in Plato's Socrates
- 3 The speech of Agathon in Plato's Symposium
- 4 Is dialectic as dialectic does? The virtue of philosophical conversation
- 5 What use is Aristotle's doctrine of the mean?
- 6 Aristotle's ethics as political science
- 7 Epieikeia: the competence of the perfectly just person in Aristotle
- 8 Aristotle on the benefits of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 9.8)
- 9 Epicurean ‘passions’ and the good life
- 10 Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus' philosophy
- 11 ‘Who do we think we are?’
- General bibliography
- List of publications by Dorothea Frede
- Index locorum
- Index nominum et rerum
Summary
For many readers of the Nicomachean Ethics it is surprising how highly Aristotle values a capability which he calls epieikeia or to epieikes, an expression usually rendered by ‘equity’. In the short chapter EN 5.10, he characterizes it as a perfect moral competence which overrides even justice. At first glance, one might suppose that Aristotle does nothing more in this passage than report several traditional commonplaces (endoxa). But on a close reading, there can be no doubt that his account is strongly affirmative. The reason he gives us for this affirmation is that while to epieikes is itself a form of justice, at the same time it goes beyond justice, since it enables the person who possesses it to improve written law when it is in need of correction or when written law is incomplete. Thus to epieikes, he says, can even be used as an equivalent of ‘good’ (anti tou agathou), for what is more equitable (epieikesteron) is always the better. What is called equitable, Aristotle continues, is a form of justice, but it is even superior to justice (1137b1–2 and 8–11). According to Aristotle, the riddle of how equity can simultaneously transgress justice and be a form of justice finds a simple solution: to epieikes is the second part of justice which supplements the first part, or the law. Both are species of a unique genus justice, but to epieikes is the better one of them (1137b11–13).
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- Information
- The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics , pp. 142 - 166Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
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